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Preface
This dissertation is organized in the following way: In the general introduction
some current ideas and issues concerning the investigation of executive
functions and inhibition will be presented.  This is not done to give a full
overview over these issues, which is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but
as an attempt to put the studies of this dissertation into a framework of current
research.  In the general methods section, methods that are equal for some of
the studies will be presented to avoid redundancies later in the text.  After that,
the dissertation is organized along three studies and an explorative analysis.
For each study a separate introduction will be provided, dealing with the
theoretical issues specifically concerning the question of the study, and the
results for each study will also be discussed separately.  In the general
discussion a summary of results will be provided.  Only issues emerging from a
comparison across studies will be discussed there.  Furthermore, some
methodological limitations of the studies and implications for future research will
be discussed there.
At the time this dissertation was submitted, part of the dissertation was
already published (Study 3, British Journal of Psychology, 1999, 90, 509-518),
and other parts (study 1 and study 2) submitted to scientific journals.
IV
Contents
1. General introduction............................................................................1
1.1 Executive functions...........................................................................1
1.2 Executive functions and the frontal lobes..............................................3
1.3 Inhibition as an executive function........................................................5
1.4 The concept of inhibition...................................................................7
1.5 Inhibition of ongoing responses..........................................................13
1.6 Aftereffects of inhibition...................................................................15
1.7 General aims of this dissertation.........................................................16
2. General methods................................................................................18
2.1 The anatomo-clinical correlation method............................................18
2.2 Selection of patients according to lesion criteria (study 1 and 2)............19
2.3 General procedure..........................................................................24
2.4 Background neuropsychological assessment.....................................25
2.5 Response inhibition: the stop signal task............................................28
2.6 Some general remarks about statistical analysis................................37
3. Study 1: Inhibition of ongoing responses following frontal, nonfrontal
and basal ganglia lesions......................................................................40
3.1 Summary........................................................................................40
3.2 Introduction.....................................................................................40
3.3 Methods........................................................................................48
3.4 Results........................................................................................51
3.5 Discussion......................................................................................56
4. Study 2: Inhibition of ongoing responses in patients with traumatic
brain injury..........................................................................................64
4.1 Summary........................................................................................64
4.2 Introduction.....................................................................................64
4.3 Methods........................................................................................67
4.4 Results........................................................................................69
V4.5 Discussion......................................................................................71
5. Study 3: Inhibitory aftereffects in the stop-signal paradigm..................76
5.1 Summary........................................................................................76
5.2 Introduction.....................................................................................76
5.3 Methods........................................................................................78
5.4 Results........................................................................................80
5.5 Discussion......................................................................................83
6. An explorative analysis of inhibitory aftereffects in brain-damaged
patients................................................................................................87
6.1 Summary........................................................................................87
6.2 Introduction.....................................................................................87
6.3 Method........................................................................................88
6.4 Results........................................................................................89
6.5 Discussion......................................................................................94
7. General Discussion..........................................................................100
7.1 Summary of results.......................................................................100
7.2 Neuroanatomy of response inhibition................................................101
7.3 Inhibitory aftereffects.....................................................................107
7.4 Limitations and methodological problems.........................................109
7.5 Perspectives.................................................................................115
7.6 Conclusion....................................................................................119
8. Summaries........................................................................................120
8.1 English summary..........................................................................120
8.2 Deutsche Zusammenfassung...........................................................123
9. References........................................................................................125
10. Appendix........................................................................................147
11. General introduction
1.1 Executive functions
A number of important features of the human mind are summarized under the
terms “executive control” or “executive functions”.  These aspects can be
regarded as top down effects in contrast to bottom up effects, that only
represent stimulus driven processes.  Executive functions include the ability to
initiate, control or discontinue action, to use information flexibly, to make
reasonable inferences, to think abstractly, to respond to novel information and
situations, to sequence information and to direct behavior in a goal-directed
manner (e.g. Baddeley, 1996; Lezak, 1982; Logan, 1985a; Stuss & Benson,
1984).  Welsh and Pennington (1988, pp. 201-202) define executive functions
the following way:
“[Executive functions are] ... the ability to maintain an appropriate
problem-solving set for attainment of a future goals.  This set can
involve one or more of the following: (a) an intention to inhibit a
response or to defer it to a later more appropriate time, (b) a strategic
plan of action sequences, and (c) a mental representation of the task,
including the relevant stimulus information encoded into memory and
the desired future goal-state.”
The term executive function covers many abilities and, as such, is a concept for
which providing a precise theoretical or operational definition is difficult.  It is
interesting that in order to define executive functions, authors usually refer to
supposed abilities being executive functions or describe situations in which
executive functions are likely to be needed (see Table 1.1).  That those
characterizations are necessary reveals a key aspect about executive functions.
As Burgess (1997, p.84) puts it: “Neuropsychologists would hardly feel it
necessary to define the circumstances under which speech production
processes are likely to be needed.”  The provisional and underspecified
definition of executive function in both, neuropsychology and cognitive
psychology, is due to several reasons.
2Table 1.1. Examples of taxonomies of executive functions
Author(s), Year Proposed executive functions
Baddeley, 1996 Fractionation of the central executive into four parts
1. Capacity to timeshare
2. Capacity to switch retrieval plans
3. Capacity to attend selectively
4. Capacity for temporary activation of long-term memory
Lezak, 1982 Four categories of executive capacities
1. Goal formulation
2. Planning
3. Carrying out goal-directed plans
4. Effective performance
Logan, 1985a Executive functions
1. Choice  among different strategies
2. Construction or instantiation of a chosen strategy
3. Execution and maintenance of a strategy to perform the task
4. Inhibition or disablement of a strategy in response to changes
in goals or changes in the task environment
Rabbitt, 1997 Distinctions between „executive“ (EF) and „non-executive“
functions (NEF):
1. EF are necessary to deal with novel tasks
2. EF are necessary to manage the „internal information
environment“ of long term memory
3. EF are necessary to initiate new and interrupt ongoing
sequences of behavior
4. EF are necessary to prevent responses that are inappropriate
in context
5. EF are responsible for the strategic allocation of attention and
synchronization of responses
6. EF are necessary to monitor performance in order to detect
and correct errors
7. EF enable attention to be sustained continuously over long
periods
Stuss & Benson, Six specific prefrontal functions
1984 1. Separation of action from knowledge
2. Ability to handle sequential behavior
3. Ability to establish or change a set
4. Ability to resist interference
5. Ability to monitor personal behavior
6. Attitudes of concern and awareness
Stuss, Shallice,
Alexander &
Picton, 1995
Five independent supervisory processes in attention
1. Energizing schemata
2. Inhibiting schemata
3. Adjusting contention scheduling
4. Monitoring the level of activity in schemata
5. Control of “if-then” logical processes
3In comparison to other cognitive functions, executive functions are much less
well understood (e.g. Burgess, 1997).  Furthermore, the term executive
functions is often associated with a homunculus (Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996,
for homunculus conceptions see “supervisory attentional system”, SAS, Norman
& Shallice, 1986; Shallice, 1988; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; or “central
executive”, Baddeley, 1986).  In addition, there is no clear empirical distinction
between executive and non-executive function, those can rather be regarded as
a continuum than as separate entities (Rabbitt, 1997).
This state of affairs is reflected in the heterogeneous picture how researchers
approach the issue of executive functions. Some study specific functions (e.g.
control of motor responses), other base their research on a test-oriented
approach (e.g. the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test) and still other address more
abstract concepts like self-awareness (see Stuss, 1991).  Currently, because
the term executive function has no operational definition and entails varying lists
of functions, researchers have begun, rather than studying “executive
functions”, to give detailed analysis of certain types of functions, for example
confabulation, concept formation and response inhibition.  This will also be the
approach in this dissertation.  The function that will be studied in the present
work is the inhibition of ongoing responses.
1.2 Executive functions and the frontal lobes
The terms “executive functions” and “frontal functions” are often used
interchangeably.  However, the term “frontal functions” refers to a structural
entity, the anterior one-third of the brain, but does not emphasize that the brain
is a integrated functioning unit.  The term “frontal system” reflects a more
interactive approach, but again emphasizes the anatomical base (Rabbitt,
1997).  Therefore the term “executive functions” is preferred.  This term makes
the attribution to the frontal lobes, exclusively or primarily, not necessary, it is
more directly related to the psychological concept, regardless of the underlying
neuroanatomy.
It is not surprising that executive functions have been associated with the
frontal lobes.  Patients with frontal lesions show in comparison to patients with
4nonfrontal lesions a rigid behavior in sorting and categorizing tasks (Delis, et al.,
1992; Milner, 1964; Nelson, 1976), are easily distracted (Knight et al., 1981;
Wilkins et al., 1987) and deficits in planning and problem solving (Karnath,
Wallesch & Zimmermann, 1991; Milner, 1965; Shallice & Burgess, 1991; Vilkki
& Holst, 1991).  The reason for attributing abilities like planning, decision
making, goal-directed selection and monitoring of ongoing behavior to the
frontal lobes is thus obvious: focal lesions to this cortical region often result in
striking impairment of these functions (e.g. Fuster, 1989, Stuss & Benson,
1986).
It is however not always that easy to establish a relationship between
executive functions and specific neuroanatomical regions or neurophysiological
systems.  Not everyone accepts that the major (or only) function of the frontal
lobes are executive control processes (e.g. Reitan & Wolfson, 1994).  There are
frequent findings of frontal patients who perform perfectly well on such tests
(e.g. Shallice & Burgess, 1991) and patients with non-frontal lesions who
perform poorly on the supposedly frontal-specific tests (e.g. Anderson et al.
1991; Grafman et al., 1990).  However, deficits in executive function are much
more common after anterior damage.  An additional problem is, that in some so-
called “executive tests” there is a lack of evidence that poor performance is
always due only to executive deficits.  There are a number of potential reasons
for performing poorly on such tasks, given the complexity for example of the
Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Anderson et al., 1991; Milner, 1964).
It is important to note that the prefrontal cortex has extensive reciprocal
connections to many areas of the brain, including the basal ganglia, the limbic
system, the thalamus and the posterior cortex.  It seems plausible that
executive functions, including inhibition, are sustained by a cortical and
subcortical neural network, and not by a localized region such as the frontal
lobes (Jahanshahi & Frith, 1998; Vilkki et al., 1996).  Thus, only some disorders,
which cause so-called „frontal deficits“ involve neuropathology within the
prefrontal cortex, others involve brain systems outside the prefrontal cortex, but
systems that are closely interconnected to it.  Weinberger (1992, cited in
Pennington & Ozonoff, 1996) distinguishes these two kinds of disorders as
5„intrinsic“ and „extrinsic“ frontal disorders.  According to this view the correlation
of a deficit exists not only with a damaged region, but with the whole circuit
made dysfunctional by a focal lesion.
The issue of response inhibition and its deficit should therefore be studied
outside the limits of its relation with frontal lobes.  It is the aim of this
dissertation, not to view the frontal lobes as an isolated structure, but to take
into account the interconnections to other parts of the brain.  This is done in
study 1, where not only patients with frontal lobes lesions, but also patients with
basal ganglia lesions will be investigated (for a review of fronto-striatal circuits
see Alexander, 1986).
1.3 Inhibition as an executive function
Many authors assume that a fractionation of executive processes or functions is
possible (e.g. Shallice & Burgess, 1991), see Table 1.1 for some of the
proposed distinct functions.  Inhibition is one of the most frequently mentioned
executive functions.  Inhibition is important when a task is finished, when a goal
is no longer relevant, when an error needs to be corrected, and when
appropriate stimuli have to be selected and inappropriate rejected (Logan,
1985a).
However, recently the concept of inhibition as a distinct executive function
has been challenged.  Instead, it has been proposed that several quite different
executive functions could more adequately be described within a single working
memory framework (e.g. Kimberg et al., 1997) or as a product of controlled
resources (Engle et al., 1995).  Engle et al. (1995) postulate that group
differences in inhibition may result from differences in controlled attentional
resources, not from inefficient inhibitory mechanisms.
This proposal stems primarily (but not only) from computer simulation
studies.  For example Cohen and Servan-Schreiber (1992) and Kimberg and
Farah (1993), who used similar architectures, modeled performance across
several executive function tasks.  Executive function tasks with very different
surface characteristics could be modeled with a common architecture and
disrupted by the same “lesion” to this architecture.  Descriptively, one can say
6that these “lesions” weakened the working memory representations of the
current task context (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber, 1992) or the connection
strengths among working memory elements (Kimberg & Farah, 1993), thereby
allowing other prepotent but inaccurate response tendencies to prevail.  As a
result, there was increased perseverative responding across the modeled tasks.
However, not all neural network models run without inhibition: for example
Houghton and Tipper (1994) have put forward a neural network model where
corresponding to each representation there is both an excitatory and an
inhibitory node, and when there in competition, the inhibitory nodes of the
rejected candidates are activated.
Does this mean that inhibition does not really exist or is a superfluous
construct?  It appears that the apparent confusion stems from the fact, that the
same terms are used at more than one level of description (Rabbitt, 1997) and
that processes are not distinguished from behavior (Burgess, 1997).  It is
tempting to assume that terms like “planning”, “inhibition” and “concept shifting”
are not merely descriptions of different task demands, whose effects can be
qualified in terms of indices that are measured in laboratory experiments, but
are also labels marking qualitative distinctions between the functional processes
by which these demands are met.  Thus, performance indices empirically
measured in laboratory tasks are often treated as being directly equivalent to
the hypothetical system performance characteristics.  As a results, hypothetical
components such as “inhibition”, “preparation” and “planning” may have very
poor construct validity, because although these demands appear logically
different, they can be met by identical system architectures (Rabbitt, 1997).
These terms describe what people do, but they do not enable us to define the
process responsible for this behavior.  Thus, a distinction between the logical
status of “task performance indices” that are obtained from diagnostic tests or
laboratory experiments and the “system performance characteristics” has to be
made (Rabbit, 1997).
It also has to be noted that neither task performance characteristics nor
models of cognitive functions can be equalized with the functional
neurophysiology and neuroanatomy of the central nervous system.  Those are
7further different levels of description.  Computational models are neither neural
models nor models of neural organization (Kimberg & Farah, 1993). If several
quite dissimilar deficits can be modeled in the same model, this does not mean,
that the same neuronal structures take part in all those modeled functions, it
simply means, that the way the brain handles different functions is similar (or
might be able to do it, it is not proved that the brain does handle information the
way network models in simulations do).  Thus, models like those of Cohen and
Servan-Schreiber (1992) and Kimberg and Farah (1993) make it probable that
there are distinct areas in the brain (in this case the frontal cortex), which share
the same performance characteristics, but differ in the types of elements
represented.  Different frontal areas may perform the same operation on
different inputs.  Damage to one would not be expected to impair any particular
set of tasks not sharing the same representation.  Thus, a large cortical area
could operate according to common information processing mechanisms, but
there are distinct and dissociable modules according to the content of the
information represented (Kimberg & Farah, 1993, Rabbitt, 1997).
In sum, a distinction between a) the logical status of task performance
indices, b) the system performance characteristics (functional models of
cognitive processes), c) the functional neuroanatomy, and d) the
neurophysiology of the central nervous system has to be made (Rabbitt, 1997).
The studies in this dissertation will concern the observable phenomenon of
response inhibition, as a task performance index – it is not the issue here, to
decide whether deficits in response inhibition could be explained in
computational modeling by a weakening of structures in working memory
without referring to it as “inhibition”.  There is no doubt that inhibition on the
behavioral or cognitive level is an important observable phenomenon,
regardless of the underlying system performance characteristics.
1.4 The concept of inhibition
Clark (1996) defines the term inhibition as
“...any mechanism that reduces or dampens neuronal, mental or
behavioral activity.“
8He adds:
„The danger of defining the concept so loosely may make the
concept meaningless.  Despite the wide range of phenomena
incorporated under the general rubric of inhibition, however, the
defining element in any suppression mechanism remains a
diminuation of ‘activity’ relative to that which would occur without
suppression, and this core element transcends conceptual levels
form the molecular to the molar“ (p. 128).
Definition is as great a problem for the inhibition construct as for executive
functions.  Rabbitt (1997) remarks that the usage of the term “inhibition” as a
component of executive behavior has tended to be somewhat promiscuous in
the choice of definition of its etiology, i.e. as an observable property of single
neurons, as a theoretical construct in connectionist simulations, as a property of
particular information-processing modules or as a task performance index.
Examples of current conceptualizations of inhibitory mechanisms and
phenomena can be seen in Table 1.2
The conceptualization of Clark might be “unifying” and states an important
commonality of different forms of inhibition, however, does give little help in
distinguishing inhibitory mechanisms or phenomena.  Noteworthy is, however,
Clark’s acknowledgement, that there are different levels at which inhibitory
mechanisms can be observed.
In cognitive psychology there are currently several distinct paradigms
available for the investigation of inhibitory phenomena.  Several theorists have
proposed that inhibition may best be conceptualized as a general process
operating in different domains and affecting many aspects of behavior (e.g.
Clark, 1996; Dempster, 1992).  Other authors propose separate processes that
have different operating characteristics and that apply to different circumstances
(e.g. Arbuthnott, 1995).
Arbuthnott (1995) distinguishes three kinds of relationships the targets of
inhibition (e.g. information or response that is inhibited) can have to the selected
targets (e.g. information or response that is activated) in several paradigms
used for the investigation of inhibitory mechanisms.
9Table 1.2 Examples of conceptions and typologies of inhibition
Author(s) Year Concept
Arbuthnott, 1995 Targets of inhibition in tasks can be associative neighbors (e.g.
ambiguous words), competitors in the task context (e.g. negative
priming, directed forgetting), produced units themselves (e.g.
negative error priming, stop signal task).
Two different inhibitory mechanisms are proposed: inhibition of
either associates of an activated unit (lateral inhibition, e.g.
suppression of irrelevant meanings of ambiguous words, some
negative priming effects) or the activated unit itself (self-
inhibition, e.g. stop signal task, some negative priming effects).
The influence of intention is either indirect (negative priming) or
direct (directed forgetting, stop signal task).
Clark, 1996 “unified framework for possible roles of inhibitory mechanisms”
The central construct of inhibition mediates effects of causal
factors that have an influence on behavior outcomes.  Causal
factors are for example hypoxia, aging, drugs, socialization,
genetics.  Effects of those factors are mediated by the central
construct of inhibition.  Effects are can be seen in areas where
there is evidence of the contribution of inhibitory mechanisms,
these range form elementary biological processes (e.g. measures
of brain function) to basic psychological processes (e.g. perception
and attention) to complex psychological domains (e.g. emotion).
Harnishfeger, 1995A framework for the definition of cognitive inhibition
1. Cognitive inhibition has to be distinguished from behavioral
inhibition (e.g. stop signal task).
2. Cognitive inhibition involves the control of cognitive processes,
and can be intentional and conscious (e.g. directed forgetting,
thought suppression paradigms) or unintentional and unavailable
for conscious introspection (e.g. negative priming, stroop).
3. Cognitive inhibition has to be distinguished from interference.
Inhibition refers to an active suppression process, interference
involves a competition between multiple stimuli, processes or
responses and does not necessarily involve active suppression
(e.g. interference vs. negative priming condition in the stroop task).
Logan, 1994 Reactive inhibition: Executing a process has a side effect or
leaves a residual effect that subsequent processes must
overcome. The inhibitory effect on concurrent and subsequent
processes is usually not intended (e.g. inhibition of return, negative
priming).
Active inhibition: inhibition as an deliberate, conscious action
(e.g. stop signal inhibition).
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First, the targets of inhibition can be associative neighbors, second, they can be
competitors in the task context but instructionally excluded and third, they can
be the produced units themselves.  As underlying mechanisms for different
inhibitory phenomena she proposes two distinct processes, lateral and self-
inhibition.  Lateral inhibition operates via preexisting inhibitory connections
between nodes sharing an associative network and is probably the mechanism
responsible in cases when the targets of inhibition are associative neighbors.
Self-inhibition refers to the inhibition of a node immediately following its
activation, and is the primary candidate mechanism, when the target of
inhibition is the just produced unit (e.g. inhibition of just produced motor or
speech behavior).  In case the targets of suppression are competitors in the
task context, but associatively unrelated distractors, Arbuthnott (1995) also
assumes self-inhibition to be the underlying mechanism. In this case distractor
representations are assumed to receive additional stimulation to the off-unit
from a higher level match-detector process (as a results of the detection of a
mismatch between distractor and the task defined target representation, e.g.
negative priming with unrelated distractors).  Arbuthnott (1995) furthermore
points to the influence of intention on observable inhibitory phenomena.  She
notes that in most paradigms there is some connection between specific goals
and the inhibitory effects.  This influence can be either indirect (e.g. negative
priming tasks) or direct (e.g. directed forgetting, stop signal task).  This explicitly
points to the executive component in those phenomena.  She also discusses
the possibility that intentional inhibition (stop signal task, directed forgetting)
relies on a distinct intentional inhibitory mechanism, but she concludes that
those could be modeled with a self-inhibition mechanism.  In sum, Arbuthnott
(1995) derives her distinction between lateral and self-inhibition from
connectionist modeling and attempts to relate tasks which measure observable
phenomena of inhibition to those two forms of inhibition.  This attempt is quite
appealing, however, it is unfortunate, that Arbuthnott (1995) does not provide
any simulations of the tasks she proposes to be related to self-inhibition and
lateral inhibition.  As already mentioned in the previous section, it also possible
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to model those phenomena in different ways (Cohen & Servan-Schreiber,1992;
Kimberg & Farah, 1993).
Harnishfeger (1995) and Logan (1994) are only concerned with distinctions of
observable inhibitory phenomena in different tasks, without direct reference to
the system performance characteristics that might apply to them.  There is a lot
of evidence, that it is useful to distinguish different inhibitory phenomena
according to task characteristics.  Observed inhibitory phenomena dissociate in
the developmental timecourse (Harnishfeger, 1995; May et al., 1995) and
different regions of the brain seem to be involved in different task demands of
inhibition (Connelly & Hasher, 1993; Stuss et al., 1999).  Evidence for a
dissociation of inhibitory phenomena comes for example from studies with
brain-damaged patients.  Stuss et al. (1999) investigated patients with focal
lesions at different areas of the brain in an location-based (“select-what,
respond-where”) priming task.  They found that three measures of selective
attention (interference, negative priming, inhibition of return) were mediated by
different brain regions.
Harnishfeger (1995) attempts to define cognitive inhibition, in doing so she
suggests some broad lines of demarcation.  First, she distinguishes cognitive
inhibition from behavioral inhibition.  Behavioral inhibition involves the control of
overt behavior, such as resisting temptation, delay of gratification and motor
inhibition.  Cognitive inhibition involves the control of cognitive contents or
processes.  She also states, that although it is useful to distinguish between
cognitive and behavioral inhibition, those two constructs are clearly related, e.g.
cognitive inhibition can serve to facilitate behavioral inhibition (e.g. delay of
gratification).  This distinction of behavioral and cognitive inhibition is appealing,
however, in most tasks she mentions as a measure of cognitive inhibition (e.g.
negative priming), inhibition is measured by the difference of reaction times -
this distinction has therefore to be treated with some caution.  A second
distinction Harnishfeger (1995) makes is between automatic and intentional
cognitive inhibition.   Automatic cognitive inhibition is important in attentional
processing to gate which information will enter consciousness.  Intentional
cognitive inhibition is a process deliberately invoked to deal with irrelevant
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stimuli, from either internal or external sources.  Third, Harnishfeger (1995)
distinguishes between interference and cognitive inhibition.  Those two terms
have often been used interchangeably in the literature, however, the constructs
are not the same.  Inhibition refers to an active suppression process, such as
the removal of task-irrelevant information form working memory, interference
refers to susceptibility to performance decrements under conditions of multiple
distracting stimuli.  Interference does not necessarily involve the active
suppression of cognitive processes or contents.  This is an important distinction,
nevertheless inhibition and interference bear a certain relationship to each
other, the exact nature is however still unknown (May et al., 1995).
Logan (1994) distinguishes between active and reactive inhibition.  The idea
behind reactive inhibition is that executing a process has a side effect that
concurrent processes must overcome or leaves a residual effect that
subsequent processes must overcome.  The process that produces the
inhibition may be engaged deliberately, but its inhibitory effect on concurrent
and subsequent processes is usually not intended.  Active inhibition requires a
deliberate action.
The different conceptions can be related to each other, but it also becomes
apparent that the authors have a different view on inhibitory phenomena.  This
is for example reflected in the way the role of intention is perceived.  Whereas
for example negative priming is viewed in the conceptions of Logan (1994) and
Harnishfeger (1995) as unintended, Arbuthnott (1995) explicitly point to a role of
intention, albeit indirect.
The conceptualizations given here to distinguish inhibitory phenomena are
still very rough taxonomies, and should not imply that all the different inhibitory
effects listed under one category are to be treated as equal.  However, a rough
taxonomy of inhibitory phenomena suffices for the present dissertation.
Especially Logan’s (1994) conception seems to be useful in this context.  This
dissertation is concerned with the inhibition of ongoing responses, which is
conceptualized a deliberate top-down process, i.e. active inhibition.  However,
this dissertation is also concerned with reactive inhibition.  In study 3 inhibitory
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aftereffects of the inhibition of ongoing responses will be investigated, which
can be conceptualized as reactive, i.e. not intended side effects.
1.5 Inhibition of ongoing responses
Complete suppression of an action is one of the most extreme forms of control,
it is however required in many real life situations, where unanticipated changes
in goals or in the environment suddenly make ongoing actions inappropriate.  It
is thus a general requirement in all kinds of cognitive control and a clear case of
executive intervention (Logan, 1994).  Imagine standing with your car in front of
traffic lights.  The light turns green and you start pressing the gas pedal.
Suddenly an ambulance crosses the junction.  You have to stop pressing the
gas pedal immediately.  Of course, in everyday actions complete inhibition of
ongoing actions is only the first step towards more adaptive behavior.  In the
driving example, the next thing would be to change to pressing the break.
In laboratory settings, inhibition of reactions can be investigated through a
comparison between conditions with and without response execution.
Paradigms which are used for this aim are the stop signal task (e.g. Lappin &
Eriksen, 1966; Logan, 1994; Logan & Cowan, 1984) and the go nogo task (e. g.
Drewe, 1975a, b; Falkenstein et al., 1999; Konishi et al., 1998).  In the go nogo
task participants usually have to respond to one type of stimuli and to withhold
the response to another.  For example, the instruction can be to respond to a
green symbol, but to withhold the response to a red one.  In the stop signal
paradigm the participant performs a reaction time (RT) task (usually to visual
stimuli).  This is occasionally interrupted by a stop signal (usually a tone) with a
variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) relative to the response signal
(Logan, 1994).  The instruction is to respond as fast as possible on all trials, but
to try to stop the response if the stop signal occurs.  The stop signal paradigm is
regarded as an elaboration of the go nogo task, with an delay or SOA of zero in
the go nogo task (Band & Boxtel, 1999).
Nevertheless, in spite of some close resemblance of these tasks, there are
important differences between the stop signal task and the go nogo task.  In the
stop signal task, the information to inhibit the response is delivered by a second
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stimulus after the usual primary task stimulus has appeared.  In the go nogo
task, there is no second stimulus necessary, the information, whether a
response should be withheld or not is usually directly conveyed with the primary
task stimulus.  This is reflected in an important difference in the timing of the
inhibitory process in the two tasks.  In the go nogo task, it is a prepotent
response which has to be inhibited, in the stop signal task, it is an ongoing
response.  Although ongoing responses are the continuation of prepotent
responses and at early delays in the stop signal task responses might still be
prepotent, the point is that in the stop signal task inhibition is usually required at
a later stage of response execution.  Since the stop signal task will be used in
this dissertation we will refer to the construct under investigation as “inhibition of
ongoing responses” rather than solely “response inhibition”.
Inhibition of a motor response is not directly observable, at least when people
are successful in inhibiting.  The advantage of the stop signal task is, that the
time it takes to stop a reaction, i.e. the stop signal reaction times (SSRT), can
be calculated.  This is done by the horse race model, which basically asserts
that the response production and the inhibitory process compete for the first
finishing time (Logan & Cowan, 1984, the model will be presented in detail in
the methods section).
Allocating inhibition of ongoing responses in the above presented concepts of
inhibition, it has to be said that Arbuthnott (1995) would say the target of
inhibition is the produced unit itself, that the inhibitory mechanism would be self-
inhibition and that there is a direct influence of intention.  Harnishfeger (1995)
would describe inhibition in the stop signal task as “behavioral Inhibition” and
Logan (1994) would describe it as active inhibition.  We add some further
remarks about inhibition in the stop signal task in contrast to so called “reactive
inhibition tasks”.  In reactive inhibition tasks the inhibitory processes are caused
by stimuli, which have no relevance for action at the time of appearance.  In
contrast, all stimuli are relevant for action in the stop signal task at the time of
appearance.  In reactive inhibition tasks, like negative priming, there is usually a
speed accuracy tradeoff, RTs and errors give information about performance.
This is not the case in the stop signal task, inhibition is measured as a single
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parameter, the stop signal reaction time.  There is no other task which allows
the measurement of the time it takes to inhibit an ongoing response.
It is also important to note, at what level the inhibition of ongoing responses
in the stop signal task is usually described.  The inhibitory phenomenon is
explicitly allocated in the domain of observable inhibitory phenomena (Band,
1997; Logan, 1994).  As Band (1997) puts it:
“Although stop-signal inhibition as a whole works against the
activation of a response, the name inhibition does not imply that a
neurological model of response inhibition would consist primarily of
inhibitory connections” (p. 108).
1.6 Aftereffects of inhibition
One apparent difference between several different inhibition tasks is, that in
some of them inhibition is measured directly in the trial where inhibition does
take place (e.g. go nogo task, stop signal task) in others inhibition is measured
at a later point during the task performance, e.g. slower responding in the next
trial (negative priming) or worse memory for inhibited items (directed forgetting).
In the latter kind of tasks, the measures can be regarded as aftereffects of
inhibition (Logan, 1994; Tipper, 1985) - inhibition in those tasks is measured as
the residual effect which subsequent processes have to overcome or which
impair subsequent performance.
A paradigmatic example for the measurement of inhibitory aftereffects is the
negative priming (NP) task.  In a typical NP task, the prime trial consists of a
target stimulus, which is accompanied by interfering stimuli.  If this condition is
compared with conditions without distractors or equal stimuli, an interference
effect becomes apparent (i.e. longer reaction times in the distraction condition).
In the probe trial of a typical NP task, a previously ignored stimulus becomes
the target, which results in longer reaction times compared to conditions where
a new stimulus is the target.  This is the negative priming effect, and it is due to
the fact that the residual inhibition of the distractor must be overcome before the
now relevant response can be produced.  Initially, both interference and
negative priming where assumed to index inhibitory distractor processing (May
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et al., 1995).  Interference does, however, not necessarily involve the active
suppression of cognitive processes or contents (Harnishfeger, 1995, May et al.,
1995).  Nevertheless it is assumed that interference leads to inhibition of the
distractor (otherwise no negative priming effect would be observable), although
the exact point at which inhibition develops is not clear.  Inhibition can develop
either during selection (Neill, 1977; Neill & Westberry, 1987) or alternatively
after selection, (Tipper et al., 1991; May et al., 1995), the latter alternative is
more probable (May et al., 1995).
The important point here is, that inhibition in those tasks seems to have some
persistence, carrying over into further trials.  Inhibition may thus serve to block
rejected information from immediate reactivation and function to facilitate on-line
processing of target information by maintaining the distinction between
distracting and goal-relevant information (May et al., 1995).  Aftereffects of
inhibition can thus be thought to be a general performance principle of human
information processing.  It seems reasonable to assume that the use of
inhibitory processes leaves measurable aftereffects in other tasks apart from
negative priming, where trial-to trial effects are not usually the focus of
research.  The procedure to calculate negative priming effects has already been
applied with positive results to some tasks which were not originally designed to
measure them, for example the stroop task (e.g. Neill, 1978; Lowe, 1979; see
MacLeod, 1991 for a review) and the flanker task (e.g. Neill & Valdes, 1995).  It
seemed therefore reasonable to assume that inhibitory aftereffects might also
be present after inhibition of ongoing responses in the stop signal task.  This
issue will be investigated in study 3 of this dissertation.
1.7 General aims of this dissertation
This dissertation is about the investigation of the inhibition of ongoing
responses.  One aim is to investigate the neuroanatomical correlates of this
function with the anatomo-clinical-correlation method (see general methods
section).  The frontal lobe is a primary candidate structure for this function.
Furthermore, to take into consideration that the frontal lobes do not work in
isolation from other brain structures, but have extensive connections to other
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parts of the brain, the possible role of other brain regions is considered and it is
assumed that the basal ganglia may also play a role in the inhibition of ongoing
responses (for a detailed theoretical consideration of those claims see
introduction section of study 1).  Therefore it will be investigated in the first
study, whether patients with focal lesions to either the frontal lobes or the basal
ganglia show a deficit in this function.  In the second study, the inhibition of
ongoing responses will be investigated in patients with traumatic brain injury, an
etiology of brain-damage where frontal lesions are highly prevalent.  Therefore,
it might be assumed that brain-damaged patients with this etiology might also
show deficits in the inhibition of ongoing responses.
The second aim of this dissertation is to analyze, whether the active inhibition
of ongoing responses leaves measurable inhibitory aftereffects, i.e. the question
is whether active inhibition can lead to an additional effect of reactive inhibition
(see study 3 for a theoretical consideration of this hypothesis).  Therefore, in the
third study the question whether having to stop in one trial leaves any
measurable aftereffects in the next trial will be investigated.  This will be
analyzed in a group of students, who performed the stop signal task.
Furthermore, an exploratory analysis of the data of the patient studies regarding
inhibitory aftereffects will be conducted.
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2. General methods
2.1 The anatomo-clinical correlation method
According to Vallar (1999) neuropsychology has developed a main heuristic,
which takes advantage of brain-damaged patients in whom mental processes
are defective, treating them as experiments of nature.  Two related heuristic
scopes may be distinguished:  First, the investigation of the neural bases of
mental function, through the anatomo-clinical correlation method (neurological
architecture of mental processes), and second, the investigation of mental
function per se (functional architecture of mental processes). The functional
architecture of mental processes may be investigated, both in healthy
participants and in brain-damaged patients, without any direct reference to the
structures that constitute its neural basis, investigation of the anatomical
correlates of mental processes is not necessary to a research approach, which
aims at expanding our knowledge as to “how the mind works”.  On the other
hand, it is unlikely that the investigation of the neural basis of mental processes
provides data relevant to our understanding of their functional architecture.  A
cognitive neuroscience approach, which integrates neural and behavioral data
sets is therefore warranted.  This dissertation is mainly concerned with the
investigation of the neuroanatomical basis of the inhibition of ongoing
responses.  However, the issue of “how the mind works” is tapped in study 3,
where aftereffects of response inhibition will be studied in healthy participants.
The chosen neuropsychological approach to the topic of response inhibition
is to be viewed as an addition to approaches where healthy participants are
subjected to brain imaging techniques or neurophysiological studies.  In imaging
studies, information about specific brain structures or events (Ô) are regarded
as a function of cognitive processes (ø), they give information about the brain
structures given the cognitive function (P(Ô/ ø).  The approach of this
dissertation is to obtain information about cognitive processes in dependence
on a damaged brain structure (P(ø/Ô) (Sarter et al., 1996).
This neuropsychological approach to brain-behavior relationships is a
necessary addition to functional imaging techniques, because those yield some
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problems for interpretation Vallar (1999).  One is “the ambiguity of null results”,
i.e. comparatively low neuronal activity might account for negative results.
Another problem of activation studies is that not only the critical or necessary
areas may be activated, but also additional or incidental areas (Vallar, 1999).
The anatomo-clinical-correlation method does not suffer from those problems,
e.g. if the lesion of a specific cerebral region does not disrupt a given mental
process, it is unlikely that the damaged area plays a substantial role.  Studies
on brain-damaged patients suffer, however, from other problems (e.g. the
localization of naturally occurring lesions is determined by factors such as the
organization of the vascular system, which may not be related to the functional
architecture of interest, the effects of lesions are not selective, and the design is
quasiexperimental, Vallar, 1999).  Thus, approaches investigating (P(Ô/ø)  and
approaches investigating (P(ø/Ô) yield complementary, rather than redundant
information about the relationship between brain structures (or events) and
cognitive functions.
2.2 Selection of patients according to lesion criteria (study 1 and 2)
Causes of brain damage
Damage to the brain can occur for a variety of reasons, e.g. cerebrovascular
disorders, intracranial tumors, traumatic brain injury, epilepsy and degenerative
disorders.  In this dissertation only patients with cerebrovascular disorders,
intracranial tumors and traumatic brain injury will be investigated.  Therefore we
will refer only to those etiologies.
Cerebrovascular disorders
Cerebrovascular disorder are due to any disruption of brain function arising from
some pathological condition related to the blood vessels.  Vascular pathology
may take many forms, however, the majority of cases are due to cerebral
ischemia or hemorrhage.  Symptoms depend mainly on lesion location (Walsh,
1987).  For an example of a cerebrovascular lesion see figure 2.1.
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Figure 2.1. Example of a CCT scan of a cerebrovascular disorder.  The scan is
of a 63 year old man who had a subarachnoid hemorrhage due to an aneurysm
of the arteria communicans anterior (this patient participated in study 1).
Intracranial tumors
The word tumor literally means a swelling. It usually means a neoplasm or new
growth.  Tumors can be distinguished according to their nature, e.g. neoplasms
in the brain may be benign or malignant (the latter invade the tissue of the
brain) and according to their growth rate, e.g. fast or slow growing.  Tumors can
produce a multitude of symptoms which depend on their location, but also on
their nature and growth rate (Walsh, 1987). For an example of a tumor lesion
see figure 2.1.
Figure 2.2. Example of a MRT scan of a tumor lesion.  The scan is of a 61 year
old woman who had a 7 x 6.5 x 7 cm frontal meningioma surgically removed
(this patient participated in study 1).
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Traumatic brain injury
Traumatic brain injury (TBI) can occur through high velocity projectiles such as
bullets and shrapnel fragments and through craniocerebral injury from the rapid
acceleration and deceleration of the head, for example in motor vehicle
accidents.  Even when the skull is not fractured, the brain may sustain a wide
variety of pathological lesions.  These include generalized lesions scattered
throughout the brain with or without localized damage such as contusion,
laceration or hemorrhage. With this complexity of pathology, clinico-anatomical
correlation might seem to be an unproductive exercise.  However, focal frontal
lesions have a high prevalence in patients with TBI (see Mattson & Levin, 1990;
Stuss & Cow, 1992 for reviews).  Particularly acceleration-deceleration forces
can cause the brain to be forced against bony surfaces, causing coup and
contrecoup injury.  The contusion, or bruising of the brain, is most likely to occur
in the frontal and temporal regions, particularly in the orbital frontal and anterior
temporal areas (see also Levin & Kraus, 1994). See Figure 2.3 for mechanisms
of brain damage in traumatic brain injury and Figure 2.4 for the sites of cerebral
contusion.
Figure 2.3. Mechanisms of cerebral contusions (adapted from Courville, 1945).
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Figure 2.4. Areas predominantly affected by cerebral contusions (adapted from
Courville, 1945).
The correlation between frontal dysfunction and frontal pathology in TBI may
not always only be due to localized frontal damage.  The primary mechanism of
TBI is mechanical stretching and shearing of nerve fibers, which results in
widespread diffuse damage.  Diffuse axonal injury is one of the major forms of
diffuse brain injury following TBI, it results in a loss of central white matter.  The
diffuse white matter insult may disrupt frontal connections with other cortical
regions and subcortical structures.  Thus, the most common neuropathological
effects of significant TBI, as detected by CT and / or MRI scanning, is
generalized cortical atrophy and ventricular enlargement.  These
neuropathological changes indicate the non-specific effects of brain injury (see
Bigler, 1987).  Executive deficits in TBI may therefore reflect damage to the
frontal lobes and / or to pathways connecting frontal regions with other cortical
and subcortical areas (Mattson & Levin, 1990; Stuss & Cow, 1992).
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Selection of participants
For study 1 patients were selected according the localization of lesion.  Two
different etiologies of brain damage were in this group: cerebrovascular
disorders and tumor resections, because both of these etiologies lead to more
focal lesions.  Lesions were located according to the available computer
tomography (CT) or nuclear magnetic resonance tomography (MRT) scans
according to Damasio and Damasio (1989) by a senior neuropsychologist.
Inclusion criteria were either circumscribed cortical lesions (either inside the
frontal lobes or outside) or lesions to the basal ganglia.  For study 2 patients
were selected according to etiology of lesion, i.e. traumatic brain injury, because
of the high prevalence of frontal lesions in this etiological group.
Patients for study 1 and 2 were tested during their stay in four different
rehabilitation center (Bad Berleburg, Bad Wildungen, Braunfels and Bad
Salzhausen) as part of a research project which was funded by the German
Research Foundation (DFG RO 529 / 12-1). Orthopedic control patients were
recruited from the same rehabilitation centers as the brain-damaged patients.
Patients had to be between eighteen and seventy years of age.  Per institutional
guidelines, all of the patients gave written informed consent.  None of the
patients were paid for participating in the study.
Exclusion criteria for study 1 and 2
¨ medical conditions not related to the brain damage which have an influence
on the central nervous system
¨ aphasia with comprehension difficulties
¨ visual disorders
¨ neglect
¨ degenerative disorders
¨ German not as a first language
¨ auditory disorders
¨ more than one incidence of brain damage (e.g. multiple strokes)
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Details of patient characteristics will be described in the methods section of the
respective studies.  Selection of participants for study 3 will also be described in
the respective methods section.
2.3 General procedure
For study 1 and 2, suitable patients were personally informed about the study
by the examiner, and asked whether they would be willing to take part.  Patients
were asked about demographic data at the initial interview.  After that an
appointment was made for the first testing session.  Usually two testing
sessions, each taking about one hour were necessary to do all the tasks,
sometimes three sessions of shorter duration had to be conducted.  In the first
session the background neuropsychological assessment was started.  In the
second session the stop signal task was conducted and usually at least one
more of the background neuropsychological tests was done.
In study 3, students who received course credit participated.  Only sex and
age were surveyed of the demographic variables and no background
neuropsychological assessment was conducted.  They were tested in one
session, which lasted approximately 45 minutes.
Demographic and clinical data
The following demographic and clinical data were obtained for patient
description:
¨ Sex
¨ Age
¨ Years of education
¨ Handedness premorbid
¨ Handedness at testing date
¨ Etiology of lesion (Hemorrhage / Stroke / Tumor / TBI)
¨ Weeks since onset of lesion
¨ Unconsciousness (TBI patients only, study 2)
¨ Edinburgh Inventory (hand preference, Oldfield, 1971)
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¨ Functional Independence Measure (FIM, disability, Keith et al., 1987;
German version: de Langen et al., 1995; Frommelt & de Langen, 1995)
Background neuropsychological assessment
The following cognitive functions were assessed for background
neuropsychological data in the studies with brain damaged patients. Details will
be described in the next section.
¨ Intellectual functioning (short form of the LPS: subtests 1+2, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12;
Sturm & Wilmes, 1983)
¨ Verbal memory span (digit span subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale –
Revised,  Wechsler, 1987)
¨ Verbal Memory (Auditory Verbal Learning Test, Heubrock, 1992)
¨ Concept formation and concept shifting (Modified Card Sorting Test, MCST,
Nelson, 1976)
The inhibition of ongoing responses
To investigate the inhibition of ongoing responses, the stop signal task was
conducted.  The task in general, the underlying horse race model, issues
concerning the design, apparatus, stimuli, and procedure will be presented
below.
2.4 Background neuropsychological assessment
An analysis of intellectual functioning, memory and executive function was
carried out in the patient studies.  It was not possible to perform each of the
neuropsychological tests with all participants.  This was due to the tight time
schedule in rehabilitation hospitals and due to patients leaving the hospital
before assessment could be finished.
Intellectual functioning
The short form of the Leistungsprüfsystem (LPS, Sturm & Wilmes, 1983) was
used.  The LPS (Horn, 1962, 1983) was designed to measure intellectual
functioning.  For investigation of people over 50 years and older, the LPS 50+
26
(Sturm, et al. 1993) was developed, which is not changed in content but
provides enlarged task sheets and norms for the ages from 50 to 90.  The short
version of the LPS which was used in this study appeared to be sensitive to
brain damage (Sturm & Wilmes, 1983) and consists of the following subtests:
1+2 (verbal comprehension), 4 (reasoning), 5 (word fluency/mixed letters), 9
(space), 10 (field dependence) and 12 (closure).  Raw scores were corrected
for age and transformed into T-Values.  One summary score (T-value) was
calculated from all subtests.
Verbal memory span
The digit span subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale – Revised (Wechsler,
1987) was used.  It consists of two parts, digits forward and digits backward.
Both parts consist of seven pairs of random digit chains. Within the pairs, the
chains are of same length.  The administrator reads the digits at a rate of one
second for each digit.  In the digit forward condition, the participant is supposed
to repeat the digits in the same order as the administrator read them, in the
digits backward condition, the participant has to reverse the order.  Within a pair
of digit chains, both chains are given to the participant, irrespective of whether
the participant was correct in the first chain.  The task is finished, when the
participant is not able to reproduce any of the two chains of a pair correctly.
Digits forward starts with chains of three digits, and goes up to nine in the last
trial, digits backward starts with two digits and goes up to eight.  For each
correct digit chain the participant scores a point.  A summary score of digits
forward and backward was calculated.
Verbal memory
A German version (Heubrock, 1992) of the Auditory Verbal Learning Test
(Lezak, 1995; Rey, 1964) was used.  It serves the assessment of verbal
memory under learning conditions.  The task consists of two word lists,
containing 15 words each.  The administrator reads the words of the first list (A)
in a one second rhythm.  The participant has to remember as many words as
possible and repeat them in random order after the list has been read.  This is
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repeated four more times with the same list.  After that, the administrator reads
once 15 words from another list (B) and the participant has to remember and
repeat those.  In the last part of the task, the participant is asked to recall as
many words as possible from the first, several times repeated list, without
hearing it again.  The summary score (total score) of the five learning trials with
list A was calculated for the studies here.
Concept formation and concept shifting
A computer version (Truong, 1993) of the Modified Card Sorting Test (MCST,
Nelson, 1976) was used.  The MCST is a modified version of the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (Milner, 1964).  At the beginning of the MCST four cards are
presented on the computer screen: a red square, two green stars, three yellow
crosses and four blue circles.  The task is to allocate 48 stimulus cards to those
target cards, according to certain rules.  The participant is not told which of the
three categories (color, form, number) is required, only feedback is given,
whether allocation was right or wrong.  In the beginning, the first category the
participant chooses is reinforced.  When six cards in a row are allocated
correctly, he is told, that the rule for allocation has been changed.  After that the
second category the participant chooses is reinforced.  When all three
categories are done, the first chosen category is reinforced again.  The task is
finished, when all categories have been chosen and completed twice, or when
all 48 cards are used up.  The percentage of perseverative errors of all errors
was used as an index in this study, since it has been frequently associated with
being sensitive to executive deficits and frontal lobe lesions (Nelson, 1976 but
see de Zubicaray & Ashton, 1996; Mountain & Snow, 1993, for reviews).  This
index is also frequently interpreted  in terms of a failure of inhibition (e.g.
Nelson, 1976, Milner, 1964).
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2.5 Response inhibition: the stop signal task
The stop signal task
The stop signal task involves two concurrent tasks: a go task and a stop task.
The go task or primary task is usually a two choice reaction time (CRT) task.
The stop task usually involves the presentation of a tone (the stop signal) which
signals participants to inhibit their response on that trial.  The stop signal is
presented at different delays between the onset of the primary task stimulus
and the reaction of the participant (SOA, see below).  The instruction is to
respond as fast as possible on all trials, but to try to stop the response if the
stop signal occurs (Logan, 1994).
The horse race model
Logan and Cowan (1984) proposed an explicit model of top-down control of
response inhibition in the stop signal task.  The horse race model accounts for
inhibition of reactions in terms of a ‘horse race’ between two independent
processes.  One generates a response to the primary task, the other responds
to the stop signal.  If the primary task process finishes before the stop signal
process, the response is executed.  If the stop process finishes before the
primary task process, the response is inhibited. Although there has been some
controversy about the locus of the finish line of this race (De Jong et al., 1990;
Osman et al., 1986; 1990), the general idea is that the process that finishes first
determines whether a response is withheld or not.  The model allows to
calculate the time necessary to stop a reaction (stop signal reaction time,
SSRT), which is not otherwise directly measurable.  For a detailed
mathematical description of the stop signal task see Logan and Cowan (1984).
An illustration of the horse race model can be seen in Figure 2.5.
A necessary assumption of the horse race model is, that the stop and the go
process are independent of each other.  This assumption usually seems to be
fulfilled (Band, 1997; Logan, 1994).  Empirical data can be described quite well
by the horse-race model, and the tests of the model support its validity (e.g.
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Band, 1997; De Jong, et al. 1990; Logan & Cowan, 1984; Osman, Kornblum &
Meyer, 1986).
The ability to inhibit actions does not seem to vary much between
participants, tasks, strategies, or conditions (Logan, 1981, 1982, 1983; Logan et
al., 1984).  The stop signal reaction time in most situations is about 200 ms up
to 250 ms.
Choice of parameters of the stop signal task
Percentage of stop signal trials
There is a tendency to delay responses as the percentage of trials with stop-
signals increases (Logan, 1981; Logan & Burkell, 1986).  In order not to affect
the speed of the primary task, a rate of approximately 25% stop signals is
recommended (Band, 1997; Logan, 1994; Logan & Burkell, 1986)
Which range of the inhibition function should be covered?
As a result of changing the delay of the stop signal, the finishing time of the
inhibitory process in the race against the go-process can be moved to the
latencies that are most interesting for the assessment of the inhibitory function.
It is not very informative to extend measurements for the inhibition function
outside the response rate range of 0.15 - 0.85 (Band 1997).  If one is only
interested in the stop signal reaction time and not in the inhibition function or
variability of the stop signal reaction time, selection of a SOA that approximates
a response rate of 0.5 is sufficient (Band, 1997).
Setting the stop signal delay(s)
There are currently several procedures to set the stop signal delay(s).  First, in
early studies of stopping, the SOAs were often selected as constants (e.g.
Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan & Burkell, 1986), ranging from 0 ms to the RT.
Second, it is possible to employ adaptive procedures for the determination of
SOA.
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Figure 2.5. The horse race model.  For simplification, the SSRT is depicted as
constant.  The figure illustrates how variations of the stop signal delay, primary
task reaction time and stop signal reaction time affect the probability of inhibition
and probability of responding.  For example, if the end of the stop process
(delay + SSRT) is later  and the RT distribution remains the same, a larger
proportion of the go-distribution falls to the left of the finishing time, and
therefore more trials escape the inhibitory control.  If the RT is increased,
however, the same finish line is projected onto an earlier point of the RT
distribution.  Because then there are less responses to the left of that line, there
is a higher chance of inhibition.  If the variability of go-RT is high, the effect of
moving the finish line is smaller than if the variability is low, because the same
shift of the finish line passes a smaller part of the RT distribution. (adapted from
Logan & Cowan, 1984).
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 In one such a procedure, SOAs are adjusted to momentaneous changes in RT,
e.g. in determining the mean go-speed after each block and subsequently
presenting stop-signals on SOAs of RT - 400 ms, RT - 300 ms, etc. (e.g. Logan
et al., 1984; Schachar & Logan, 1990).  There are several variations of this
procedure to compensate for individual differences or changes in RT.  The
timing of the SOA can be adjusted from trial to trial or after each block.
Furthermore, SOAs can be based on mean RT alone (Schachar & Logan,
1990), or on its distribution (Kramer et al., 1994; Logan et al., 1984).  Third,
another algorithm to set the delay is the staircase tracking algorithm
(Kaernbach, 1991; Logan, Schachar & Tannock, 1997; for a mathematical
description see Levitt, 1970).  With the staircase tracking algorithm delays are
adjusted that they yield a certain response rate (e.g. 29%, 50% and 71%
probability of responding, Osman et al., 1986).  Advantages and disadvantages
of the different procedures to set the stop signal delay can be seen in Table 2.1.
Band (1997) tested in several simulations the advantages and disadvantage
of the different procedures to set delays under different conditions.  Furthermore
he tested the reliability of SSRT and variability of inhibitory control.  The
simulations showed that it is possible to estimate the speed of stopping reliably
within a test session of reasonable duration.  The speed of stopping was most
reliably estimated at a point in the inhibition function where the chance of
inhibition was approximately 50%.  He found the stop speed at this point to be
robust against a variety of influences, such as the speed distribution of the stop-
and response process, and SOA-dependence or primary task dependence of
the stop speed.  However, the simulations showed that there are presently no
reliable methods to estimate the variability inhibitory control.  Efficient
measurements of the stop speed were possible with the staircase-tracking
algorithm employing 400 trials, i.e. 100 stop-trials and 300 no-signal trials, if the
staircase tracking algorithm was set to a response rate of 0.5.
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Table 2.1 Advantages and disadvantages of different procedures to set stop signal delays
Advantages Disadvantages
Fixed delays
¨ easily to implement on computers
¨ inhibition function can be investigated
¨ Strategic effects are not compensated for
¨ frequently too narrow, too wide, too low or too high section of
the inhibition function is measured
¨ cannot compensate for changes in RT
¨ response rates are not constant across groups
Adjustment to changes in RT
¨ individual differences in RT is compensated for
¨ strategic hesitation is compensated for
¨ inhibition function can be investigated
¨ differences in variability of RT are not compensated for
¨ response rates are not constant across groups
¨ too narrow, too wide, too low or too high section of the
inhibition function may be measured
Adjustment to RT and variability of RT
¨ differences in RT and variability of RT are compensated for
¨ tendency to postpone responses is compensated for
¨ inhibition function can be investigated
¨ esponse rates are not constant across groups
¨ too narrow, too wide, too low or too high section of the
inhibition function may be measured
Staircase tracking procedure
¨ corrects for differences in RT distribution
¨ corrects for tendency to postpone responses
¨ response rates remain almost constant across groups,
despite differences in inhibitory efficiency
¨ more data are acquired per condition (economy of design)
¨ 50% inhibition: yields the most reliable measure of SSRT
¨ 50% inhibition: a violation of the independence assumption
does not affect the estimation of the stop speed
¨ inhibition function cannot be investigated
Note. Arguments for and against the different procedures are derived from Band (1997)
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The only factor this procedure could not entirely compensate for, was a
decreased rate of triggering the inhibition mechanism.  Band (1997) concludes:
“Given the difficulties of interpreting the slope of the inhibition
function, this fast procedure for estimating the speed of stopping may
be the optimal procedure for many purposes” (p. 145).
Apparatus and stimuli (all studies)
The stimuli for the choice RT task were a black square (2.5 cm side length) and
a black circle (2.8 cm diameter).  Participants were seated approximately 50 cm
in front of a computer screen (VGA, 15’’).  The stop signal was a 1000 Hz tone
of 500 ms duration, presented through the internal speaker to headphones.
Participants responded by pressing one of two reaction buttons with the middle
finger and forefinger of their preferred hand (four of the nonfrontal patients and
three of the basal ganglia patients in study 1 had to use the nondominant hand
because of paresis).
Design and procedure in study 1 and 2
The choice task involved discriminating the black square and the black circle,
which were randomly assigned to the left and right response buttons.  Each trial
began with the presentation of four small squares (0.5 cm side length) which
moved from the corners of the screen to the center in a fixed interval of 500 ms.
This was done to capture and focus attention of the participants.   Immediately
thereafter one of the symbols for the choice RT task appeared.  It disappeared
after participants pressed one of the two response buttons.  In case participants
did not respond the symbol remained for 2500 ms.  After an interval of 1000 ms
during which the screen remained blank the next trial started.  The stop signal
was presented on 25% of the trials.  The sequence of events within a trial can
be seen in Figure 2.6.
The stop signal delay was set by a staircase tracking algorithm (Kaernbach,
1991; Levitt, 1970), which adapts to the response rate.  The SOA in our study
was adjusted, so that participants approximately reached a rate of 50%
inhibition.  This is done the following way:  If in a trial with stop signal the
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response was not inhibited, the SOA of the stop signal was 50 ms earlier the
next time a stop-signal occurred, so that the chance of inhibition was higher,
whereas correct inhibition was followed by an increase of the delay by 50 ms in
the next stop-signal trial, which made it harder to inhibit the response.  As a
result approximately 50% of all responses are stopped (see Levitt, 1970 for a
mathematical  discussion of this procedure).  The first stop signal was set at
200 ms.  After a period of adjustment, the SOA varies around values that are
most informative, and the mean SOA can subsequently be used for further
calculations.  This procedure inherently corrects for individual and group
differences in the RT-distribution and for the tendency to postpone responses.
It provides a way of measuring inhibition (SSRT) by controlling for differences in
speed of responding to the go signal.  This is important, because slower
response execution processes are easier to stop than faster ones at equivalent
delays.  Because brain damage may affect the speed of the response execution
process, the ability to disentangle the effects of the response execution process
on the inhibition process is of importance.  An additional advantage of the
tracking procedure is that the response rates remain almost constant across
groups, despite differences in the efficiency of inhibitory control (Band, 1997).
Participants were tested in one session, which lasted approximately 45
minutes.  They performed 2 practice blocks and 10 experimental blocks.  In the
first practice block, which had 60 trials, participants had to perform the choice
RT task alone, in the second practice block, which consisted of 40 trials, the
stop signal was added.  After that, participants performed 10 experimental
blocks, each consisting of 40 trials (30 no-signal trials and 10 stop signal trials).
The importance of responding as fast as possible to the choice RT task was
emphasized in the instructions.  Participants were told to respond quickly while
maintaining a high level of accuracy.  They were instructed not to delay their
responses in anticipation of the stop signal but to make a concerted effort to
withhold the response if they detected the stop signal.  It was explained to them,
that they would not always be able to withhold the response and that the
computer would adjust to their efficiency, yielding approximately a 50% success
rate.
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Figure 2.6. Sequence of events within a trial in the stop signal task.  Each trial
began with the presentation of four small squares (0.5 cm side length) which
moved from the corners of the screen to the center in a fixed interval of 500 ms.
Immediately thereafter one of the symbols for the choice RT task appeared.  It
disappeared after participants pressed one of the two response buttons.  In
case participants did not respond the symbol remained for 2500 ms.
0 ms
25% of all trials (N=400)
2.5 cm 2.8 cm
1000 Hz
500 ms
Stop Signal
500 ms
2500 ms
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The SSRT was estimated by calculating the difference between the average
RT on trials without stop-signal and the average delay.  Average RT on trials
without stop signal, RT where the participants responded in spite of the stop
signal, percentage of errors and probability of responding were further
dependent variables.  In addition, the last 40 trials of the first exercise block
(without stop signal) were calculated as an estimation of primary task response
speed, since RT in the experimental blocks might be influenced by the tendency
to postpone responses (Logan, 1981; McGarry & Franks, 1997).
Procedure study 3
The procedure in study 3 differed from the procedure in study 1 and 2 in two
respects: (1) the way the stop signal delay was set and (2) the number of trials.
Therefore we will refer only to those aspects.  This difference in procedure is
due to the fact that this study with students was actually conducted before the
other studies.  At this time, we first thought about having several delays to be
able to explore the inhibition function.  Furthermore, the computer program with
the staircase tracking algorithm was not available at the time the study was
conducted.  Results of this study were also a reason to employ the staircase
tracking algorithm in the following patients studies – the response rate in the
student study was on the average below 50%.  As Band (1997) has shown in
his simulation studies, in case several SOAs are applied, the estimated SSRT
of those SOAs is overestimated when the response rate is lower than 0.5 and
underestimated if the response rate is higher than 0.5 for a given SOA.  Since
the average probability of responding in study 3 was 39,8 %, the SSRT in this
study is presumably slightly overestimated.
In study 3 the stop signal was presented at four different delays.  After each
experimental block the mean reaction time of the participant was calculated and
the delays were set so that the stop signal occurred 100, 200, 300, and 400 ms
earlier than the mean reaction time (Logan et al., 1984; Logan, 1994).
Participants were tested in one session, which lasted approximately 45
minutes.  They performed 11 experimental blocks, each consisting of 60 trials.
The first two blocks were for practice only; in the first block participants had to
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perform the choice reaction time task alone, in the second the stop signal was
added.  The importance of responding as fast as possible to the choice reaction
time task was emphasized in the instructions.  Participants were told to respond
quickly while maintaining a high level of accuracy.  They were instructed not to
delay their responses in anticipation of the stop signal but to make a concerted
effort to withhold the response if they detected the stop signal.  It was explained
to them that they would not always be able to withhold the response and that
the computer would adjust to their mean reaction time, so that if they respond
later to the primary task, the stop signal would also be presented later.
We estimated SSRT with the following procedure: the RTs of the no-signal
trials were rank ordered, and the nth reaction time was determined, where n is
the number of no signal trials multiplied by the probability of responding when a
stop signal occurred at a given delay.  The nth reaction time estimates the time
at which the stopping process finished, relative to the onset of the go signal.  An
estimate of the SSRT was obtained by subtracting the stop signal delay.  This
procedure was repeated for each delay.  The SSRTs of the four delays were
averaged to calculate the average SSRT (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, 1994).
In addition we calculated the probability of responding, the error rate and the
choice reaction time (CRT) alone.  The latter was done by using trials from the
first exercise block. The 20 trials at the beginning of the block were dropped,
thus 40 trials remained for this analysis.  Details for the analysis of the inhibitory
aftereffects are given in study 3.
2.6 Some general remarks about statistical analysis
The statistical packages used were the SAS-Program, Windows Version 6.03
(SAS Institute Inc., 1988) and the SPSS-Program Version 8.0 (SPSS Inc.,
1998).  All data were screened for deviation from normality, outliers and
homogeneity of variance, and assumptions for statistical analysis were proved
according to the recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell (1996).
Dependent variables were submitted to analyses of variance (ANOVA) or T-
test (in some nonparametric clinical variables also the Kruskal-Wallis H-Test
was used).  For the ANOVAs, the GLM procedure from the SAS software
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package was used (this procedure is suitable for non-balanced data as in study
1).
Although we conducted several ANOVAs / T-tests in study 1 and study 2, we
decided not to make an adjustment  for alpha-inflation.  In study 1 as well as in
study 2, there was only one variable we were really interested in (i.e. the
SSRT).  We would have actually liked to have no significant differences in all
other variables (it is however quite unlikely in research with brain damaged
patients to have no differences in primary task reaction time or
neuropsychological data).  In some variables it was even necessary that the
groups do not differ from each other (e.g. response rate in the stop signal task),
to be able to interpret the results.  Thus, correcting for alpha would actually
have done us a favor in all variables, apart from the one we were interested in.
We think that especially in this case, where significant differences are not
actually wished for, the beta-risk should be taken much more seriously.  After a
significant ANOVA, when multiple comparisons were necessary we used the
Tukey test to evaluate those (study 1, the Tukey-option in SAS also provides
the Tukey-Kramer method to adjust for unequal cell sizes) or calculated
contrasts (study 3).
Interpretation of results is not only based on statistical significance, but also
on effect sizes, since allowing the level of significance to bear the essential
responsibility for the conclusions neglects the magnitude of effect (Cohen,
1990; Zakzanis, 1998).  Therefore, we will throughout the text not only state
whether a result is significant or not, but provide the exact p-value and Cohen’s
d (Cohen, 1988) in case the effect is interesting.  We will also interpret
tendencies in case the facts are interesting or important for interpretation.  On
the other hand, even when effects are significant we will also ask the question,
what an effect of the given size does mean, i.e. whether it has any practical
implication.  Effect sizes were calculated according to Cohen (1988).  Effect
sizes are not without problems themselves.  The measure is expressed in terms
of standard-deviation units, which means that the value of this measure does
not only depend on the effect of interest but also on the selected study
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population (Zakzanis, 1998).  However, since there is no real alternative to this,
this problem shall be stated here, but subsequently be ignored.
Correlations were estimated with the Pearson product moment correlation
coefficient or the Spearman rank correlation coefficient where appropriate.  We
tried to be as thrifty as possible with correlations.  Since correlations can differ
in groups of patients with different lesion locations (Rabbitt, 1997), correlations
for all participants were only calculated, when they did not significantly differ for
the groups  (which does however not say much with the small sample sizes
used).
Further details of statistical analysis will be given for each study separately.
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3. Study 1: Inhibition of ongoing responses following frontal, nonfrontal
and basal ganglia lesions
3.1 Summary
Theories and research results point to the importance of circuits linking the
basal ganglia and the frontal cortex in executive function and motor control (e.g.
response inhibition).  The aim of this study was to investigate the role of the
frontal lobes and the basal ganglia in the inhibition of ongoing responses.
Seventeen patients with frontal lesions (FG), 20 patients with lesions outside
the frontal cortex (NFG), 8 patients with lesions to the basal ganglia (BG) and
20 orthopedic controls (OG) performed a response inhibition task (i.e. the stop-
signal task). The stop signal task makes it possible to estimate the time it takes
to inhibit an ongoing reaction. The FG as well as the BG showed significantly
longer stop signal reaction times (SSRTs) than the OG.  No significant
differences in SSRT could be found between the NFG and any other group.
However, effect sizes between the FG and the BG in comparison to the NFG
were of medium range.  Results provide some evidence for a role of the frontal
lobes and the basal ganglia in the inhibition of reactions.
3.2 Introduction
Inhibition of reactions
Inhibitory control is a concept with importance for psychological theories about
general principles of performance as well as theories about performance
impairments in clinical groups.  Complete suppression of an action is one of the
most extreme forms of control, it is however required in many real life situations,
where unanticipated changes in the environment suddenly make ongoing
actions inappropriate.
In laboratory settings, inhibition of reactions can be investigated through a
comparison between conditions with and without response execution.
Paradigms which are used for this aim are the stop signal task (e.g. Lappin &
Eriksen, 1966; Logan, 1994; Logan & Cowan, 1984) and the go nogo task (e. g.
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Drewe, 1975a, b; Falkenstein et al., 1999; Konishi et al., 1998; Mishkin &
Pribram, 1955).  In the go nogo task participants usually have to respond to one
type of stimuli and to withhold the response to another.  For example, the
instruction can be to respond to a green symbol, but to withhold the response to
a red one.  In the stop signal paradigm the participant performs a reaction time
(RT) task (usually to visual stimuli).  This is occasionally interrupted by a stop
signal (usually a tone) with a variable stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) relative
to the response signal (Logan, 1994).  The instruction is to respond as fast as
possible on all trials, but to try to stop the response if the stop signal occurs.
Inhibition of a motor response is not directly observable, at least when people
are successful in inhibiting.  The advantage of the stop signal task is, that the
time it takes to stop a reaction, i.e. the stop signal reaction times (SSRT), can
be calculated.  This is done by the horse race model, which basically asserts
that the response production and the inhibitory process compete for the first
finishing time (Logan & Cowan, 1984).  The stop signal paradigm is regarded as
an elaboration of the no/nogo task, with an delay or SOA of zero in the go nogo
task (Band & Boxtel, 1999).  However, in the go nogo task, the inhibition of a
prepotent response is required, whereas in the stop signal task participants
have to inhibit an ongoing response.  Yet ongoing responses are the
continuation of prepotent responses and it seems plausible that the same
functional systems might take part in the inhibition of responses regardless at
which stage inhibition is required.
Models of response inhibition in the stop signal task
The brain structures involved in response inhibition are of special interest.
Unfortunately, there is only sparse research regarding this issue in the stop
signal task.
Logan and Cowan (1984) proposed a single, global mechanism for inhibition
in simple stopping tasks.  This was done on the basis of findings which have
shown that stopping performance proved to be similar in a wide variety of
different primary tasks (Logan, 1981, 1982, 1983).  However, they did not
propose any brain systems which might take part in this process.
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De Jong et al. (1995) proposed a two-mechanism model of response
inhibition in the stop signal task.  One mechanism operates at a peripheral level
of the motor system (i.e. midbrain structures) and is supposed to be in work in
situations where stop-all inhibition is required.  The second mechanism
operates centrally and is supposed to be at work when selective inhibition is
required.  The authors found also evidence for the operation of the central
mechanism in stop-all conditions, however, they concluded that this mechanism
did not play a critical role in determining actual success in withholding the
response in this condition. De Jong et al. (1995) based their hypothesis on
lateralized readiness potentials (LRP) and electromyographic (EMG) measures
during performance in several conditions of the stop signal task (i.e. stop-all,
selective-stop, stop-change).  However, this position was challenged by Band
and Boxtel (1999).  First, Band (1997) was not able to replicate the results of De
Jong et al. (1995) with a version of the go nogo task.  Second, the interpretation
of the data by De Jong et al. (1995) was based on the assumption of a fixed
threshold for responding in LRPs, which might not be valid. Third, they criticized
the logic behind inferences from response-related activity, i.e. they state that the
site of inhibition is not exclusively associated with the manifestation of it.
Fourth, they presented evidence, that supports cortical involvement in stop-all
conditions, and fifth, they reviewed recent knowledge on neural connectivity
(see Band & Boxtel, 1999, for details).
Band and Boxtel (1999) proposed that the prefrontal cortex and basal ganglia
are candidate agents for response inhibition in the stop signal task.  They
assume that cortical and subcortical structures conjointly accomplish response
inhibition and that inside this system, the prefrontal cortex is likely to be in
charge, since it is supposed to be capable of modulating subcortical input to the
motor cortex by gating the thalamic transmission of associated activity from the
basal ganglia and cerebellum (see also Brunia, 1993).  The authors argue that
the integrated mechanisms of the frontal cortex, the thalamus, and the basal
ganglia are responsible for stopping manual responses.
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The frontal lobes and basal ganglia in response inhibition
The frontal cortex is a primary candidate structure for response inhibition. It has
long been associated with inhibitory control (Fuster, 1985, 1999; Luria, 1966;
Shallice, 1988).  Evidence for the role of the prefrontal cortex in inhibitory
mechanisms comes from a number of animal (e.g. Butters et al., 1973; Gemba
& Sasaki, 1990) and human studies, using functional imaging and evoked
potential techniques (e.g. Casey et al., 1997; Kiefer et al., 1998; Konishi et al.,
1998, 1999) as well as brain damaged patients (e.g. Decary & Richer, 1995;
Drewe, 1975 a, b; Milner, 1964; Perret, 1974, see also Andres & Van der
Linden, 1998 for a review of inhibitory functions of the frontal lobes).  These
studies have shown that the frontal lobes play a key role in the performance of
tasks that require inhibition of distracting or prepotent response tendencies or
inhibition of “mental set”.
The role of the basal ganglia in response inhibition has been less intensively
studied.  However, recent theories assume that the basal ganglia play an
important role in the choice of motor programs by activating and inhibiting
competing programs (Kropotov & Etlinger, 1999; Mink, 1996; Wichmann &
DeLong, 1996).  Mink (1996), for example, suggested that the basal ganglia act
to inhibit competing motor mechanisms that could potentially interfere with the
desired movement.  Furthermore, the basal ganglia remove inhibition to allow a
desired movement to proceed. Inability to inhibit competing motor programs
results in slow movements, abnormal postures and involuntary muscle activity
seen in Parkinson’s disease.  Further evid nce for a role of the basal ganglia in
inhibitory processes comes from studies with patients with Parkinson’s disease,
where some form of switch- or set-shifting task is used (e.g. Bowen et al., 1975;
Cools et al., 1984; Flowers & Robertson, 1985; Jones et al., 1992).
Fronto-striatal circuits in motor control
The model of Band and Boxtel (1999) fits well with current research about the
physiology of motor control and executive function.  Most recent theories of
executive function assume a coordinated communication between the frontal
lobes and interconnected brain structures (e.g. Alexander et al., 1986;
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Goldman-Rakic, 1987).  It appears that there is an interchange of information
through a number of functional loops linking frontal cortex, basal ganglia
structures and motor cortex via the thalamus (Alexander et al., 1986;
Groenewegen, 1997; Jahanshahi & Frith, 1998) that mediate performance on a
range of tasks that tap executive function.
Alexander et al. (1986) proposed that those basal ganglia–thalamocortical
circuits receive input from several separate but functionally related cortical
areas, traverse specific portions of the basal ganglia and thalamus and project
back upon one of the cortical areas providing input to the circuit, thus forming a
partially closed loop (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1 Generalized basal ganglia – thalamocortical circuit. A ircuit receives
output from several functionally related cortical areas (A, B, C) that send
partially overlapping projections to a restricted portion of the striatum. These
striatal regions send further converging projections to the globus pallidus and
substantia nigra, which in turn project to a specific region of the thalamus. Each
thalamic region projects back to one of the cortical areas that feed into the
circuit, thereby completing the “closed loop” portion of the circuit (adapted from
Alexander et al., 1986)
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Multiple subsidiary circuits appear to modify and modulate the flow of
information through the major basal-ganglia- thalamocortical pathways.  They
argue that from a functional standpoint it would seem more appropriate to
attempt to rely functions to those circuits rather than to single structures of the
brain.
The concept of functional loops is supported by a large basis of research on
primates (see Alexander et al., 1986 for a review), but also research in humans
supports this notion (see Jahanshahi & Frith, 1998).  Jahanshahi and Frith
(1998) reviewed studies using positron emission tomography (PET), recordings
of movement related potentials and transcranial magnetic stimulation in
humans.  They concluded that “willed actions” are controlled by a network of
frontal and subcortical areas, i.e. the basal ganglia and the thalamus.
Neuropsychological studies comparing deficits in patients with Parkinson’s
disease, where primarily the basal ganglia are damaged, and in patients with
frontal lobe lesions (e.g. Dimitrov et al., 1999; Eslinger & Grattan, 1993; Partiot
et al., 1996) also point to close interconnections of these structures.
Research on the neuroanatomy of nogo performance in the go nogo task
We will now briefly review research with the go nogo task in relation to the
frontal lobes and basal ganglia, since this is the most similar of available
paradigms to the stop signal task and it has been used extensively in the clinical
setting as well as in animal research.
The go nogo task has been employed several times with brain-damaged
patients.  Drewe (1975a) investigated the ability of frontal and nonfrontal
patients to learn a go nogo selection.  He found that even after patients with
frontal lesions had reached the learning criterion, they still had some difficulty
performing the task.  In another study by the same author, a go nogo deficit of
frontal patients, i.e. a higher number of false positives in the nogo condition,
was also apparent (Drewe, 1975b).  These results are supported by the study of
Decary and Richer (1995), who also showed that frontal patients made more
errors than either temporal lesioned patients or controls in the go nogo task.
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Single case reports also point to the role of the frontal lobes in response
inhibition in a go nogo task (Leimkuhler & Mesulam, 1985; Malloy et al., 1993).
Cooper et al. (1994) employed the go nogo task in patients with Parkinson’s
disease.  Although response inhibition was not the focus of their study, the data
showed that patients with Parkinson’s disease made more errors in the nogo
condition than controls, thus indicating a response inhibition deficit in
Parkinson’s disease.
The go nogo task has also been used frequently in animal studies.
Watanabe (1986a, b) recorded single unit activity form the prefrontal cortex
during performance of a go nogo task in three adult rhesus monkeys.  He found
units that showed differential activity in go nogo trials, and took this results as
support of the concept that the frontal cortex is involved in response inhibition.
Further evidence for the role of the frontal cortex in response inhibition was
provided by Gemba and Sasaki (1990), Kalaska and Crammond (1995), Sasaki
and Gemba (1986) and Sasaki et al. (1989).  The study of Sasaki et al. (1989),
who investigated monkeys with permanently implanted electrodes, nicely
illustrates this.  In the second part of their experiment they delivered brief pulses
of stimulation to the implanted electrodes at the sites which were sensitive to
nogo stimuli at different times after the onset of visual go stimuli.  The
stimulation suppressed the go movement by canceling or delaying it.
Apicella et al. (1992) investigated the neuronal activity in the striatum in a
delayed go nogo task in monkeys.  They found neurons that were specifically
activated in the nogo condition, presumably reflecting a behavioral reaction
consisting of the inhibition of movement.  Thus, there is also evidence for a role
of the basal ganglia in response inhibition from animal studies.
Electrophysiological studies in humans also support the notion that a no-go
command is generated in the prefrontal cortex.  In studies using event-related
potentials (ERPs), EEG recordings have revealed a differential potential
between go and nogo trials, the so-called „nogo potential“, which usually shows
a frontal or frontal central maximum (e.g. Gemba and Sasaki, 1989; Kok, 1986;
Pfefferbaum et al., 1985).  Two major ERP events, related to response
inhibition, have frequently been described in go nogo tasks: The N2 and the P3
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(Kiefer, 1998).  Whereas early studies concentrated on the role of the P3 in
response inhibition (Fallgatter et al., 1997; Karlin et al., 1970; Pfefferbaum et al.,
1985; Simson et al., 1977, but see Jodo & Inoue, 1990), whose functional
relation to inhibition still remains doubtful (Falkenstein et al., 1999), in later
studies the role of the N2 as a reflection of response inhibition became apparent
(Eimer, 1993; Falkenstein et al., 1999, Jodo & Kayama, 1992; Schröger, 1993).
Since in most studies only a sparse electrode array is used, it is difficult to
determine possible neural generators underlying the scalp ERPs.  Therefore,
Kiefer et al. (1998) recorded 64 channel EEG and conducted a source analysis.
The source analysis indicated generators for the inhibition related ERP-effects
in the inferior prefrontal cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex and in the left
premotor cortex.
PET (Kawashima et al., 1996) and fMRI studies (Casey et al. 1997; Konishi
et al., 1998; 1999) have also been employed with the  go nogo task in humans.
Kawashima et al. (1996) found several fields with significant activation in the go
nogo task.  Two of them were in the left frontal lobes, two in left nonfrontal
areas, and four in the right hemisphere, solely located in the frontal lobes.
Casey et al. (1997) found that activation was distributed across both
dorsolateral and orbitofrontal cortex. Activity in the orbital frontal cortex and the
anterior cingulate correlated with the number of false alarms.  Konishi et al.
(1999) found nogo activity in the posterior part of the inferior frontal sulcus of
the right hemisphere, less reliably in the left hemisphere.  All those studies
support the involvement of frontal areas in response inhibition.
To summarize, lesion and imaging studies in humans, as well as
electrophysiological studies in animals and humans point to the importance of
the frontal lobes in the process of response inhibition.  Furthermore, there is
increasing evidence that the basal ganglia are also involved in this function.
Questions
Altogether, there is strong evidence, that the frontal lobes play an important role
in the inhibition of prepotent responses, it seems likely that they are also
implicated in the inhibition of ongoing responses.  In addition, there is evidence,
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that circuits linking the basal ganglia and the cortex may play an important role
in executive function, motor control and probably response inhibition.  The aim
of the current study was to investigate the neuroanatomic basis of inhibition of
ongoing responses in the stop signal task through the anatomo-clinical
correlation method (see Vallar, 1999).  Therefore, we employed the stop signal
task and investigated brain damaged patients with lesions to the frontal lobes,
cortical lesions other than the frontal lobes and lesions to the basal ganglia.
Orthopedic patients were used as control participants.  We hypothesized that
only patients with lesions to the frontal lobes and to the basal ganglia would
show deficits in the inhibition of ongoing responses (i.e. longer stop signal
reaction times).
3.3 Methods
Participants
Brain-damaged patients with different etiologies (cerebrovascular disorders,
tumor resections) were selected on the basis of lesion localization during their
stay in four different rehabilitation hospitals. Lesions were located according to
the available computer tomography (CT) or nuclear magnetic resonance
tomography (MRT) scans.  Inclusion criteria were either circumscribed cortical
lesions (either inside the frontal lobe or outside) or lesions to the basal ganglia.
Patients had to be between eighteen and seventy years of age.  Exclusion
criteria were medical conditions not related to the brain damage which have an
influence on the CNS, aphasia with comprehension difficulties, visual disorders,
neglect, degenerative disorders, German not as a first language and auditory
disorders.  Per institutional guidelines, all of the patients gave written informed
consent.  None of the patients were paid for participating in the study.
On the basis of our clinical and  lesion criteria we assigned 17 patients with
lesions anterior to the central sulcus to the frontal group (FG) and 8 patients
with basal ganglia lesions to the basal ganglia group (BG).  A group of 20
patients with non-frontal lesions (NFG) and 20 orthopedic control participants
(OG) were selected to match the FG and BG as closely as possible in age, sex
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and years of education.  Using structural neuroimaging data, detailed
anatomical descriptions of the lesions (Damasio & Damasio, 1989) were
available for 15 patients of the FG, 18 patients of the NFG and seven patients of
the BG.  In 5 cases (2 FG, 2 NFG, 1 BG) there was no brain scan available, but
a general reading of the scans.  Tumor patients were tested postoperatively and
all patients were tested in the subacute or chronic state.  The Edinburgh
Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) was used to asses hand preference and the
Functional Independence Measure (FIM, Keith et al., 1987;  German version: de
Langen et al., 1995; Frommelt & de Langen, 1995) to assess disability.
Demographic and clinical data of the four groups can be seen in Table 3.1,
further details of the localization of lesion can be seen in the appendix.
One-way analysis of variance revealed no differences between the four
groups in either age (F(3, 61)=0.05, p=0.98) or years of education (F(3,
61)=0.09, p=0.96).  The three brain-damaged groups did not differ in weeks
since onset of lesion (Kruskal-Wallis H-Test: ÷2(2)=2.939, p =0.23) and
functional independence (F(2, 42)=1.49, p=0.24).  Chi-square analysis was not
performed with the nominal variables, due to low cell sizes, but it has to be
noted that there are no patients with a brain tumor in the basal ganglia group.
Table 3.1 Demographic and clinical data of patients with frontal lesions (FG),
patients with nonfrontal lesions (NFG), patients with basal ganglia lesions (BG),
and orthopedic controls (OG).
FG
(N=17)
NFG
(N=20)
BG
(N=8)
OG
(N=20)
Sex: (male / female) 8 / 9 10 / 10 6 / 2 10 / 10
Age (M, SD) 50 (13.6) 49.9 (8.5) 51.6 (8.5) 50.5 (11.8)
Years of education (M, SD) 10.2 (1.3) 10.4 (1.5) 10.1 (1.2) 10.3 (1.5)
Handedness premorbid (r / l / bi)1 16 / 1 / 0 19 / 0 / 1 8 / 0 / 0
Handedness at testing date (r / l / bi) 16 / 1 / 0 15 / 2 / 3 5 / 3 / 0 19 / 1 / 0
Etiology (Hemorrhage / Stroke / Tumor) 10 / 1 / 6 7 / 7 / 6 6 / 2 / 0
Weeks since onset (Median, Range) 7, 1-234 6.5, 3-416 18, 5-350
Functional Independence Measure (M, SD) 120 (6) 114 (16) 114 (13)
1 r = right, l = left, bi = bilateral
2 a higher value means higher functional independence
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Background neuropsychological assessment
see general methods section
Response inhibition - the stop signal task
see general methods section
Statistical analysis
The statistical packages used were the SAS-Program, Windows Version 6.03
(SAS Institute Inc., 1988) and the SPSS-Program Version 8.0 (SPSS Inc.,
1998).  All data were screened for deviation from normality, outliers and
homogeneity of variance, and assumptions for statistical analysis were proved
according to the recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell (1996).  Dependent
variables were submitted to analyses of variance (ANOVA) with one between
subjects factor (GROUP: FG, NFG, BG and OG).  For the ANOVAs, the GLM
procedure from the SAS software package for non-balanced data was used.
Post hoc comparisons were performed with the Tukey test with an alpha of
0.05.  Effect sizes were calculated according to Cohen (1988).  Further
analyses were conducted after the results of these analyses.  Those were
analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) and the computation of correlations.  In
ANCOVA, planned comparisons were used to compare the groups.
Correlations were estimated with the Pearson product moment correlation
coefficient.  They were only conducted for variables where group differences
had emerged to estimate the relationship of those variables with SSRT.  Since
sample sizes are small, correlations was calculated for all participants, after
proving that the correlations of each group did not significantly differ from each
other.
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3.4 Results
Background neuropsychology
There were no outliers, and requirements of analysis of variance were fulfilled in
the neuropsychological data.  Details of the results of the background
neuropsychological assessment are given in Table 3.2.
Table 3.2 Neuropsychological data of patients with frontal lesions (FG), patients
with nonfrontal lesions (NFG), patients with basal ganglia lesions (BG), and
orthopedic controls (OG).
FG
(M, SD, N)
NFG
(M, SD, N)
BG
(M, SD, N)
OG
(M, SD, N)
LPS (average T-value) 48 (5) 16 49 (9) 14 44 (9) 6 55 (7) 16
AVLT (total score) 36 (13) 16 42 (14) 19 34 (14) 6 51 (8) 19
Digit span (total score) 12.3 (3.3) 17 13.8 (4.1) 18 11.3 (3.5) 7 14.3 (3) 20
MCST (% perseverative errors)25.2 (15.8) 1720.9 (20.8) 19 20.1 (15.7) 6 18.3 (19.7) 19
Note. AVLT = Auditory Verbal Learning Test; MCST = Modified Card Sorting Test, LPS =
Leistungsprüfsystem (intellectual functioning)
One-way ANOVAs showed a significant GROUP effect in intellectual functioning
(F(3,48)=4.07, p=0.01) and total learning in the AVLT (F(3,56)=5.48, p=0.002).
There were no GROUP effects in the total score of the digit span test
(F(3,58)=1.89, p=0.14) and the percentage of perseverative errors in the MCST
(F(3,57)=0.42, p=0.74).  Tukey tests revealed that the BG performed
significantly worse than the OG in intellectual functioning and that the FG and
BG performed significantly worse than the OG in total learning of the AVLT.
Performance in the stop signal task
One participant of the FG was an univariate outlier in the primary task RT in the
exercise block and in the SSRT.  This participants was not considered in further
analysis.  In the OG one participant was an outlier in signal respond RT and
another one an outlier in the percentage of errors.  Since normality was
threatened in percentage of errors in this group (z for skewness=4.9, z for
kurtosis=8.02), this participant (outlier in error %) was deleted.  To employ the
52
same strategy for all outliers we also deleted the other outlier (outlier in signal
respond RT).  Results of the stop signal task with deleted outliers are presented
in Table 3.3.
Table 3.3 Results of the stop signal task of patients with frontal lesions (FG),
patients with nonfrontal lesions (NFG), patients with basal ganglia lesions (BG),
and orthopedic controls (OG).
FG
(M, SD)
NFG
(M, SD)
BG
(M, SD)
OG
(M, SD)
Exercise block without stop signal
RT (ms) 619 (88) 596 (89) 675 (190) 531 (67)
Experimental blocks
RT, trials without stop signal (ms)853 (273) 760 (185) 797 (176) 665 (158)
Signal respond RT (ms) 739 (226) 669 (155) 706 (149) 578 (105)
Errors % 1.4 (1.2) 1.3 (1.2) 1.6 (2.1) 1 (0.8)
Probability of responding 47.8 (3.1) 47.2 (2.4) 48 (2.8) 48.6 (1.7)
SSRT (ms) 271 (60) 249 (38) 282 (44) 228 (29)
Note. SSRT = stop signal reaction time
The probability of responding did not differ between the groups
(F(3,58)=0.88, p=0.46), which shows that the staircase tracking algorithm was
successfully applied to equalize response rates between groups.  This is a
necessary prerequisite for the interpretation of results.  Furthermore, error rates
did also not differ between groups (F(3,58)=0.51, p=0.67).  As expected by our
hypothesis, there were significant differences in the SSRTs (F(3,58)=4.13,
p=0.01), the post hoc test revealed that this was due to the FG (p=0.03) and the
BG (p=0.03) being significantly slower than the OG.  However, results were
nontransitive, the NFG did neither differ significantly form the OG nor from the
FG or BG.  The strength of relationship between SSRTs and group membership
was eta2=0.18.  There were also significant differences in primary task reaction
times.  In the exercise block (F(3,58)=4.31, p=0.008) the post hoc test revealed
a significant difference between the OG and the BG (p=0.008) and a tendency
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between the OG and the FG (p=0.07).  In the experimental blocks there were
also significant differences in the primary task reaction times (trials without stop
signal), here the Tukey test between the OG and the FG (p=0.045) became
significant despite a nonsignificant F-value (F(3,58)=2.51, p=0.07).  The signal
respond reaction times (F(3,58)=2.94, p=0.04) also showed a significant
difference between the OG and the FG (p=0.03).  Thus, analysis of variance
revealed significant differences between the controls and the frontal as well as
the basal ganglia patients in the SSRT. In addition the frontal patients also
showed significant slowing in primary task reaction times compared to controls,
primary task reaction times for the basal ganglia patients were only significantly
slower in the exercise blocks. Effects sizes for primary task RT and SSRT can
be seen in Table 3.4.
Table 3.4 Effect sizes and percentage nonoverlap (Cohen, 1988) of stop signal
reaction time (SSRT) and effect sizes of primary task reaction time (RT)
FG-OG NFG-OG BG-OG FG-NFG BG-NFG FG-BG
SSRT 0.91 0.62 1.45 0.44 0.8 0.21
% nonoverlap SSRT 51.6 38.2 68.1 27.4 47.4 14.7
RT 1.13 0.83 1.01 0.26 0.53 0.39
Note. FG-OG = frontal group in comparison to the orthopedic control group, NFG-OG =
nonfrontal group in comparison to the orthopedic controls, BG-CON = basal ganglia group in
comparison to the orthopedic control group, FG-NFG = frontal group in comparison to the
nonfrontal group, BG-NFG = basal ganglia group in comparison to the nonfrontal group, FG-BG
= frontal group in comparison to the basal ganglia group.
Differences in primary task RTs across blocks in the stop signal task
As can be seen from Table 3.2, primary task reaction times were longer in the
experimental blocks than in the exercise block.  A 4 (GROUP) x 2 (BLOCK:
reaction times in the exercise block, reaction times in the experimental block;
repeated factor) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for GROUP
(F(3,58)=3.89, p=0.01) a significant main effect for BLOCK (F(1,58)=39.74,
p<0.0001) but no significant interaction of GROUP x BLOCK (F(3,58)=0.99,
p=0.4).  Thus, there was a strong tendency for all groups to have longer
reaction times in the experimental blocks, but there was no indication, that any
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group performed different in this respect.  However, because of the effect of
longer RTs in the experimental blocks, RTs in the exercise block will be
interpreted as the general speed of responding.
Inhibition and general slowing
One might argue, that the effect of longer SSRTs might be due to an effect of
general slowing in the FG and BG.  Pearson product moment correlations
between SSRT and primary task RT only reached significance in the control
group.  They were r=0.33 for the FG, r=0.06 for the NFG, r=0.47 for the BG and
r=0.51, p=0.03 for the OG.  Correlations did not significantly differ between the
groups, the correlation for all participants of all groups was r=0.41, p=0.0009.
Two strategies were employed to investigate the effect of general slowing on
inhibitory efficiency.  First, an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) was calculated
with the RTs in the exercise block as a measure of general speed of responding
as a covariate for SSRT.  Second, we selected six participants from each group
who had similar primary task reaction times in the exercise blocks for
comparisons (upper limit for inclusion was the slowest control participant, lower
limit was the fastest participant of the basal ganglia group).
The necessary requirements for ANCOVA were fulfilled.  There were no
multivariate outliers as measured by Mahalanobis distance, the slope of
regression was sufficiently homogenous (F(3, 54)=0.65, p=0.59) and visual
inspection of the residual plots of predicted values of SSRT against residuals
did not indicate any deviation from linearity.  Reliability of the covariate was
tested using odd even correlations of the RTs in the exercise blocks.  They
were essentially the same in all subgroups, the correlation for the whole group
was 0.95.  After adjustment by reaction times, the SSRT did not any longer vary
significantly between the groups (F(3,57)=1.93, p=0.13), although planned
comparisons showed a significant effect for the OG versus the FG (p=0.04),
and a tendency for the OG versus BG (p=0.07).  The strength of relationship
between adjusted SSRTs and group membership was partial eta2 = 0.092.  The
adjusted marginal means are shown in Table 3.5.
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Means and standard deviations of primary task RTs in the exercise blo k and
SSRTs of the participants selected for equal primary task reaction times can be
seen in Table 3.5.  Effect sizes were essentially maintained (see Table 3.6).  If
any changes, the non-frontal group has less difference to the control group and
the frontal group and basal ganglia group have larger differences to the
nonfrontal group.  For the following analysis alpha was set to 0.1 because of the
reduced power due to the reduced sample sizes.  An analysis of variance
revealed a tendency for a group difference (F(3,20)=2.67, p=0.07).  Planned
contrasts revealed significant effect for the OG vs. the FG with p=0.05 and the
OG vs. the BG with p=0.03.  The strength of relationship between SSRTs and
group membership was eta2 = 0.29.
Table 3.5 Results of ANCOVA and selected participants in the stop signal task
of patients with frontal lesions (FG), patients with nonfrontal lesions (NFG),
patients with basal ganglia lesions (BG), and orthopedic controls (OG).
FG
(M, SD)
NFG
(M, SD)
BG
(M, SD)
OG
(M, SD)
ANCOVA (primary task RT as a covariate)
SSRT (adjusted marginal means) 268 249 271 236
Selected participants (with equivalent primary task performance)
Primary task RT (ms) 605 (32) 605 (35) 598 (48) 604 (44)
SSRT (ms) 281 (25) 258 (27) 285 (25) 249 (27)
Note. SSRT = stop signal reaction time
Table 3.6 Effect sizes of stop signal reaction time (SSRT) for selected
participants
FG-OG NFG-OG BG-OG FG-NFG BG-NFG FG-BG
SSRT for selected participants
with equivalent primary task RT
1.23 0.33 1.38 0.88 1.04 0.16
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The relationship of inhibitory efficiency and background neuropsychology
To evaluate the relationship of variables, in which differences between the
groups had emerged, with inhibitory efficiency, Pearson product moment
correlations of these variables with SSRT were calculated.  Neither of the two
neuropsychological measures in which group differences were obtained
correlated significantly with SSRT.  The correlations of intellectual functioning
and SSRT were r=-0.12 in the FG, r=0.0 in the NFG, r=-0.17 in the BG and r=–
0.23 in the OG, for all participants the correlation was r=-0.25.  The correlations
of total learning in the AVLT and SSRT were r=–0.08 in the FG, r=0.13 in the
NFG, r=-0.46 in the BG and r=–0.15 in the OG, for all participants the
correlation was r=–0.21.
3.5 Discussion
Using the stop signal task, we have shown that patients with frontal lobe and
basal ganglia lesions have longer stop signal reaction times in comparison to
orthopedic controls.  However, results were non-transitive, brain-damaged
patients with cortical lesions outside the frontal lobes differed neither
significantly from controls nor from frontal or basal ganglia patients, although
the effect sizes between the NFG and the FG and BG were of medium range.
This issue will be discussed below.  Results could not be explained by
differences in other neuropsychological variables such as intellectual
functioning.  Thus, inhibitory efficiency seems largely independent of global
cognitive impairment.  Since our groups were matched on demographic
variables, differences also cannot be explained by such variables.  However,
the speed of initiation and inhibition of reactions showed a significant
relationship. This issue will also be discussed below in reference to the fronto-
striatal circuits.
The frontal lobes and basal ganglia in response inhibition
The longer stop signal reaction times in patients with frontal lobe and basal
ganglia lesions in comparison to orthopedic controls seem to confirm the role of
those structures in response inhibition.  The proposition of Band and Boxtel
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(1999), that the prefrontal cortex and the basal ganglia are candidate agents for
response inhibition in the stop signal task has therefore proved to be a valid
assumption.  The results highlight the role of frontostriatal circuits in response
inhibition.  A lesion to any point in such a circuit should lead to the same deficits
in performance, regardless of the location of the lesion within the circuit.
Therefore, the deficits of patients with frontal and with basal ganglia lesions
should be comparable, which they were in our study.  This is also in accordance
with other studies, which showed comparable deficits in patients with frontal and
basal ganglia lesions (e.g. Dimitrov et al.,1999; Eslinger & Grattan, 1993; Partiot
et al., 1996 ).
Our results also correspond to and extend the results of studies using the go
nogo task. Those studies have already provided evidence for the role of the
frontal cortex in response inhibition (e.g. Casey et al., 1997; Decary & Richer,
1995; 1997; Drewe, 1975a, b; Kiefer et al., 1998; Konishi et al., 1999;
Watanabe, 1986a, b).  In contrast to earlier studies, however, we employed the
first time a task which measured the internal reaction time to a stop signal and
not just the presence or absence of a response.  Furthermore, response
inhibition in the stop signal task, which was used in our study, is required at a
later step in the response execution process than in the go nogo task used in
the previous studies.
The issue of the role of the basal ganglia in response inhibition has seldom
been directly addressed before, although there are some studies on the role of
the basal ganglia on change or switching performance (e.g. Bowen et al., 1975;
Cools et al., 1984; Flowers & Robertson, 1985; Jones et al., 1992).  Our study
corresponds with the results of Apicella et al. (1992) who found neurons in the
striatum in monkeys, which were specifically activated in the nogo condition,
presumably reflecting the inhibition of movement.  The results also indicate that
it may be worthwhile to have a closer look at the role of the basal ganglia in
response inhibition.
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Response inhibition as a diagnostic marker
Although effect sizes were of medium range between basal ganglia or frontal
patients in comparison to nonfrontal patients, those effects did not reach
significance.  Some impairment in response inhibition is also to be expected in
patients with damage outside the crucial areas mentioned, since those
frontostriatal circuits do not work in isolation of the rest from the brain.  The
frontostriatal loops do not function in a fully segregated manner, instead each
circuit seems to have both closed-loop and open-loop elements (Jahanshahi &
Frith, 1998; Alexander, 1986).  For example, relevant sensory information from
posterior brain regions must be utilized.  With respect to response inhibition
Kawashima et al. (1996) found several areas with significant activation in the go
nogo task in comparison to response selection only, six of those areas were
located in the frontal cortex, but also two nonfrontal cortical areas were
activated.
Although results point to a role of frontostriatal circuits in response inhibition,
prolonged SSRTs in the stop signal task can by no means be used as a
diagnostic marker for a deficit in those structures.  As Zakzanis (1998) argues, a
diagnostic marker should be capable of discriminating approximately all patients
form all normal healthy controls on the dependent variable of interest.  When
the mean effect size is not able to discriminate all patients from controls, i.e. an
effect size of more than 3.0, which would mean that there is approximately a 5%
overlap of the groups, it is hard to argue in favor of a specific impairment as
being a reliable characteristic of the lesion.  An effect of this size is, however,
rarely given in any neuropsychological measure.  If one looks at the studies who
employed the go nogo task  (Decary & Richer, 1995; Drewe, 1975a, b) effect
sizes are on the average in the range of 1.0.
Looking at the patients individually there were 4 patients in the frontal group
(23,5%, including the outlier), no patient in the nonfrontal group and two
patients in the basal ganglia group (25%) whose performance was three
standard deviations below the mean of the control group.  Using the more
liberal criterion of two standard deviations below the mean of the control group,
eight patients of the frontal group (47%), three patients of the nonfrontal group
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(15%) and four patients of the basal ganglia group (50%) were below that
criterion.  Thus, although deficits in response inhibition cannot be said to be a
reliable characteristic of the lesion, significant impairment in response inhibition
can be found in quite a lot of patients with those lesions.
Inhibition and initiation of reactions
Inhibition and initiation of reactions showed a significant relationship in the
current study (r=0.41 for the whole group) and differences between the groups
diminished (but did not totally disappear) after analysis of covariance. However,
when participants with essentially the same primary task reaction times were
selected, the differences between the groups remained.  These results may
seem contradictory, but can be explained by methodological differences.
Analysis of covariance can lead to overadjustment when groups differ on the
covariate, it is however an accepted procedure to use ANCOVA in this case in a
quasi-experimental design (Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).  On the other hand,
matching participants ex post facto on a “nuisance” variable results in
“systematic unmatching” of participants (Tupper and Rosenblood, 1984).
What follows from the relationship of primary task RT and SSRT? It seems
likely that at least in part the same neuronal structures are involved in the
inhibition and initiation of reactions.  We derived our hypothesis about the
structures which could possibly be involved in response inhibition from studies
on structures taking part in inhibitory processes as well as from general
concepts about motor control, which entail the initiation of movements.
Jahanshahi and Frith (1998) state that willed actions are controlled by a network
of frontal and subcortical areas, which are activated with self-generated actions
involving nonroutine decision making, regardless of whether the nature of the
decision making is related to “what to do” or “when to do” or “whether or not to
act” (p. 494).  Likewise, Mink (1996) proposed that it is the role of the basal
ganglia to activate and inhibit competing motor programs.  In addition to deficits
in response inhibition, there is also empirical evidence that the process of motor
preparation appears to be impaired in patients with prefrontal lesions (Alivisatos
& Milner, 1989; Verfaellie & Heilman, 1987).  The role of the frontal cortex in
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response activation is also supported in the studies of Watanabe (1986b) and
Casey et al. (1997) who employed the go nogo task.  Therefore, it seems likely
that damage to the crucial structures may result in impairment in response
initiation as well as response execution.
Alternatively, it could be argued, that brain structures involved in response
inhibition and response initiation are close to each other, but since lesions are
not isolated on small spots but usually involve several structures those lesions
affect both systems.  On a more fine-grained level, the same structures may
take part in both processes, but different neuronal units are responsible for
different aspects.  Watanabe (1986b) found that of 512 units in the prefrontal
cortex, 253 showed differential activation in go and nogo trials.  However, it
remains unclear, how far the activity of the remaining neurons reflects that they
take part in both response initiation and response inhibition or reflect further
mental processes in the task, e.g. stimulus processing.
Even if there is some overlap in the neuronal structures for response
inhibition and response initiation, this overlap does not necessarily have to be
perfect.  As our comparisons of patients with similar primary task RTs has
shown, general motor slowing seems to explain part of the results, but not all of
them.  Even though effects were smaller when controlling for primary task
response speed, they did not disappear, indicating, that the structures
responsible for initiation and inhibition are at least partly separable from the
other.  This is also in accordance with a recent study of Williams et al. (1999),
who investigated the development of inhibitory control over life span with the
stop signal task.  He found that age-related changes in inhibitory control could
not be explained by general speeding or slowing of responses, although a
significant amount of variance was accounted for SSRT by go signal reaction
time in adults.
Executive impairment in our patient samples
Unexpected was the fact, that the perseverative errors of the MCST did not
differentiate between our groups, especially frontal patients and controls.  This
negative result might be due to three different reasons: a) the MCST is not a
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sensitive measure of frontal lobe damage, b) our patients did not have
executive deficits, and c) the controls performed worse than expected.
The result, that the MCST did not discriminate between nonfrontal and frontal
patients is not an isolated finding. De Zubicaray and Ashton (1996) reviewed
studies investigating the MCST’s differential sensitivity to frontal lobe
dysfunction. They found that evidence regarding the sensitivity to frontal lobe
dysfunction is weak.  More surprising is however, that the orthopedic controls
did not perform significantly better than the patients.  The effect size for the
difference between controls and frontal patients in our study was 0.39, which
shows that there is some effect, but not a very big one.  Few studies have
investigated the differential performance of normals and those with frontal
dysfunction on either the MCST or the WCST.  There are some reports of
patients with frontal lobe damage who did not show deficits in the WCST
(Eslinger & Damasio, 1985; Heck & Bryer, 1986, for reviews see de Zubicaray &
Ashton, 1996; Mountain & Snow, 1993).  This is however an exception to the
rule, most studies find differences in comparison to healthy controls (e.g.
Grafmann et al.,1990).  Looking at the values of our patients, it seems that our
control group performed slightly worse than in some, but not all, studies (see de
Zubicaray & Ashton, 1996 for control group data of several studies using the
MCST). It might be, that our selection of the control group was conservative,
since we employed orthopedic controls and not healthy persons.  However, this
approach seems sensible, since it corrects for general effects of being ill and
having to stay in hospitals and taking various medications.
Do our frontal patients perform better than in other studies? Nelson (1976)
recommended a cutoff of 50% perseverative errors or greater for detecting
frontal lobe dysfunction. This score correctly classified 38% of her patients with
frontal lobe lesions (8 of 21). Taking into account that she had discarded 4
frontal patients who had no difficulties in the MCST and had made few errors,
this cutoff classified at least 32% of her patients correctly (8 of 25, the %
perseverative errors score for those patients cannot be derived from the
presented data).  In our study only two of 17 frontal patients (i.e. 12%) had a
score that high.  On the average Nelson’s (1976) patients had a mean score of
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42% perseverative errors (however, this value excludes the four patients
without difficulties).  In comparison, our sample of frontal patients showed an
average value of 25% perseverative errors. It cannot be ruled out, that our
effects would have been greater in a patient sample with more executive
deficits.  However, selectively including patients who show executive
disturbance in studies produces a bias, and this is not the case in our study; our
patient sample represents patients selected for specific lesions, irrespective of
behavioral disturbances.
The tendency to wait in the experimental block
Primary task reaction times in the experimental blocks were significantly longer
than in the exercise block for all groups.  Longer reaction times in the
experimental blocks could be due to two reasons: a) effects of fatigue, and b) a
tendency to wait for stop signals in spite of instructions.  It cannot be ruled out,
that fatigue has some influence on this effect.  However, this effect should be
much less pronounced than the obtained prolongation of RTs.  An interpretation
of the data as a tendency to wait is in accordance with other studies (Logan,
1981; McGarry & Franks, 1997), although the prolongation of RTs was less
pronounced in those studies.  This might be due to the fact, that it is much
easier to persuade students not to employ any waiting strategy than patients.
It might have been expected that when a strategy is employed, frontal
patients differ from the other patients in either being more impulsive or more
conservative (Shallice & Evans, 1978; Vilkki & Holst, 1991).  However, the
interaction between group and block was not significant, which indicates, that
the tendency to prolong RTs was independent of group membership. The
strategic behavior happened, even though patients were explained that they
would not profit from waiting for the stop signal.  They were also reminded
several times during the task breaks to respond as fast as possible.
However, the tendency to wait has no implication for the validity of our
results.  This tendency is unlikely to influence SSRT, since the tracking
procedure is able to compensate for group as well as individual differences in
primary task RT (Band, 1997).  Furthermore, the probability of responding was
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not different between the groups and close to 50%.  If there is any systematic
error, all groups should be affected.
Conclusion
This study provides support for a role of fronto-striatal circuits in the inhibition of
reactions. The results also provide evidence, that it is useful to rely functions
such as response inhibition to functional circuits or networks of interconnected
brain structures, rather than isolated brain regions.  The obtained effects are,
however, too small for SSRT to serve as an diagnostic marker of those brain
regions. The neuronal structures for response inhibition and response initiation
seem to be at least in part overlapping.  Further studies comparing more
participants with lesions in different frontal regions, basal ganglia regions and
also posterior regions have to determine a more detailed anatomical
assignment of this function.
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4. Study 2: Inhibition of ongoing responses in patients with traumatic
brain injury
4.1 Summary
In addition to slowness of information processing, it is often assumed that high
level control processes are deficient in traumatic brain injury (TBI).  The aim of
this study was to investigate a specific executive function, the inhibition of
ongoing responses in TBI.  27 patients with TBI (TBI) and 27 orthopedic
patients (OC) performed the stop signal task, which makes it possible to
estimate the time it takes to inhibit an ongoing reaction.  Contrary to
expectations, patients with TBI did not show deficits in the inhibition of ongoing
reactions.  None of the clinical, demographic or neuropsychological data
showed a significant relationship to speed of inhibition, apart from age, which
showed a significant relationship only in the TBI.  It seems likely, that deficits in
the complete inhibition of responses are not very common after TBI.
4.2 Introduction
Disruption of executive functions involving mood, behavior, and aspects of
cognition is frequently reported in patients with traumatic brain injury (Leon et
al., 1998; Levin & Kraus, 1994; Mattson & Levin, 1990; Umilta & Stablum,
1998).  Clinical descriptions of patients with TBI often include features that are
associated with frontal lobe injury or executive function deficits, such as poor
impulse control, decreased flexibility, impaired attention, perseveration, and
diminished divergent thinking.  Although slowness of information processing
appears to account for many of the deficits after TBI (Ponsford & Kinsella, 1992;
Schmidt et al., 1996; Veltman, 1996; Whyte et al., 1997), some authors assume
that in addition to slowness, the degree of controlled processing (Cicerone et
al., 1996; Park et al., 1999) or supervisory strategy (Azouvi et al., 1996,
Spikman et al., 1996; Stablum et al., 1994) required to perform a task is another
important factor.
The broad term “executive functions” usually refers to a long list of abilities,
such as planning, anticipation, action sequencing, cognitive flexibility or
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monitoring (for reviews see Fuster, 1999; Lezak, 1982; Stuss & Benson, 1986).
One frequently mentioned ability in the context of executive function is inhibition
(Fuster, 1985, 1999).
Most of the studies in TBI measured inhibition as i terference (i.e. being
more distractible than controls points to a deficit in the inhibition of irrelevant
stimuli) (Veltman et al., 1996) or used complex tasks such as the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (Gansler et al., 1996).  Gansler et al. (1996) showed that
response inhibition involved in establishing and maintaining response set is
apparently impaired in patients with TBI.  Vakil et al. (1995) demonstrated
impaired negative priming in the Stroop task in patients.  Spikman et al. (1996)
also found that patients were impaired in all conditions of the Stroop-task in
comparison to controls.  However, no specific deficits remained, when general
slowing was controlled for.  Veltman et al. (1996) measured inhibition on the
basis of the differences between a distraction condition and a condition without
distraction.  Controlling for slowness in the basic condition, they found no
interaction effect between patients and controls, both needed more time for the
distraction task.  Although the increase in time needed in the distraction
condition was slightly larger in the patients, the proportional increase in time
needed for the distraction task was almost the same in both groups. The
findings of their study thus point to the conclusion that there are no specific
deficits in inhibition and interference.
Inhibition is not a unitary concept, but several forms of inhibition can be
distinguished (Arbuthnott, 1995; Harnishfeger, 1995).  Arbuthnott (1995)
distinguishes between the targets of inhibition in several tasks. Targets of
inhibition can be associative neighbors (e.g. in tasks with ambiguous words),
competitors in the task context (e.g. distracting stimuli) or the produced units
themselves (e.g. when a particular response has to be inhibited).  She further
states that the influence of intention on inhibition can be either indirect (e.g.
distracting stimuli are inhibited) or direct (e.g. a particular response has to be
inhibited).  In the above mentioned studies, which are mainly concerned with
the inhibition of distracting stimuli, the target of inhibition is mainly a competitor
in the task context and the influence of intention is indirect.  Contrary to this, the
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focus of this study will be on another form of inhibition, where the target of
inhibition is the produced unit itself and inhibition is fully intentional.  This is
measured as a deliberate and complete suppression of an ongoing motor
response.  Complete response suppression is one of the most extreme forms of
control, it is however required in many real life situations, where unanticipated
changes in the environment suddenly make ongoing actions inappropriate.
To our knowledge there are only few studies specifically addressed to the
issue of response inhibition in patients with TBI.  Braun et al. (1989) found that
paradigms designed to elicit commission errors (a go nogo paradigm and a
paradigm with prestimulus warning) were the most sensitive, particularly the
error rate measures for these tasks, to distinguish patients with TBI and
controls.  Using discriminant function analysis, they showed that the go nogo
paradigm classified participants better than complex choice reaction time (CRT)
paradigms.  Collins and Long (1996) compared simple and choice RT (the CRT
task was actually a go nogo task) in patients with TBI.  Both tasks were able to
discriminate between TBI and control participants, but the CRT task yielded the
best classification rate (however not statistically significant).  Unfortunately, the
authors did not analyze error rates.  Cremona-Meteyard and Geffen (1994)
studied event-related potentials (ERPs) in patients with TBI in a task which
included a nogo condition.  They found that patients did not show the normal
attenuated contingent negative variation (CNV) following nogo cues.  They
interpreted this finding as perseverative behavior.  However, usually the major
ERP events related to response inhibition in go nogo tasks are the N2 and the
P3 (Kiefer et al., 1998), which were, apart from being delayed in patients as
were all components in the study, essentially normal.
In sum, studies investigating different forms of inhibition have brought mixed
results so far.  The purpose of this study was to investigate one particularly
important executive function, the complete and active inhibition of an ongoing
action.  Therefore, we compared a group of patients with TBI with a group of
orthopedic controls in their ability to inhibit an ongoing motor response.  Since
inhibition of a motor response is usually not directly observable, at least when
people are successful in inhibiting, we used the stop signal task, which allows to
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calculate the time it takes to stop a reaction, i.e. the stop signal reaction time
(SSRT).  We assumed that patients with TBI would show less inhibitory
efficiency than controls in the stop signal task, since studies using the go nogo
tasks have provided some evidence for a response inhibition deficit in TBI
(Braun et al., 1989; Collins & Long, 1996).  In addition, the relation of clinical
characteristics, demographic variables and neuropsychological data to
response inhibition was evaluated.
4.3 Methods
Participants
Two groups of patients participated in the present study.  A group of patients
who had sustained traumatic brain injury (TBI, N=27) and an orthopedic control
group (OC, N=27).
Ages in the TBI ranged from 17 to 68 years, in the OC ages ranged from 21
to 69 years.  In both groups schooling ranged from 9 to 13 years. T-tests
revealed no differences between the two groups in either age (T(52)=0.55,
p=0.58) or years of education (T(52)=0.09, p=0.93).  All participants were right-
handed and the patients in the TBI were all able to perform the task with their
preferred hand.  The time since trauma in the TBI ranged from 3 weeks to 10
years, the median was 8 weeks.  All patients were tested in the subacute or
chronic state.  Severity of head injury ranged from mild to severe.  Because the
Glasgow Coma Scale was not available for the majority of TBI patients a
detailed neuropsychological assessment was carried out to provide an estimate
of the cognitive impairment and disabilities.
Exclusion criteria were medical conditions not related to brain damage which
could have an influence on the central nervous system, aphasia with
comprehension difficulties, visual disorders, neglect, degenerative disorders,
German not as a first language and auditory disorders.  Participants were
recruited from four different rehabilitation hospitals.  Per institutional guidelines,
all patients gave informed consent.  None of the patients were paid for
participating in the study.
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The Edinburgh Inventory (Oldfield, 1971) was used to asses hand preference
and the Functional Independence Measure (FIM, Keith et al., 1987;  German
version: Frommelt & de Langen, 1995; de Langen et al., 1995) to assess
disability.  Demographic and clinical data of two groups are presented in Table
4.1.
Table 4.1. Demographic and clinical data of TBI patients and orthopedic
controls
TBI OC
Sex (male / female) 21 / 6 21 / 6
Age (M, SD) 40.6 (14.5) 42.7 (13.7)
Years of education (M, SD) 10.6 (1.5) 10.6 (1.6)
Handedness premorbid (r / l / bi1) 27 / 0 / 0 27 / 0 / 0
Handedness now:  (r / l / bi) 27 / 0 / 0
Functional Independence Measure2 120.9 (4.1)
Unconsciousness: none / less than a day / more than a day9 / 5 / 13
Weeks since onset of lesion (Median, Range) 8, 3-696
1 r = right, l = left, bi = bilateral
2 a higher value means higher functional independence
Background neuropsychological assessment
see general methods section
Response inhibition - the stop signal task
see general methods section
Statistical analysis
The statistical package used was the SAS-Program, Windows Version 6.03
(SAS Institute Inc., 1988).  All data were screened for deviation from normality,
outliers and homogeneity of variance, and assumptions for statistical analysis
were proved according to the recommendations of Tabachnick and Fidell
(1996).  Group differences were evaluated using T-tests.  Effect sizes were
calculated according to Cohen (1988).  Where appropriate, correlations were
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estimated with Pearson product moment correlations and Spearman rank
correlations.
4.4 Results
Results of the neuropsychological assessment
There were no outliers and data were sufficiently normal distributed.  Details of
the results of the background neuropsychological assessment are given in
Table 4.2.
Table 4.2. Neuropsychological data of TBI patients and orthopedic controls
TBI
M (SD) N
OC
M (SD) N
Intellectual functioning (LPS, T-score) 49 (7) 25 58 (6) 26
AVLT – total learning (total score) 45 (14) 27 55 (10) 24
Digit span (total score) 15.2 (4) 26 15.1 (3.5) 27
MCST: % perseverative errors of all errors15 (18) 24 10 (13) 25
T-tests showed that the TBI performed significantly worse than the OC in
intellectual functioning (T(49)=4.6, p>0.0001) and total learning in the AVLT
(T(49)=3.08, p=0.003).  There were no significant differences in the total score
of the digit span test (T(51)=0.08, p=0.94) and the percentage of perseverative
errors in the MCST (T(47)=1.18, p=0.24).
Performance in the stop signal task
In each group one participant was deleted from analysis of the stop signal task,
because of outliers (one participant in the TBI had outliers in three variables: RT
in the exercise block, SSRT and error %, one participant in the OC  had one
outlier in error %).  Therefore, results of the stop signal task are presented for
the remaining 26 participants of each group.  Results of the stop signal task are
presented in Table 4.3.
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Table 4.3. Results of the stop signal task
TBI
M (SD)
OC
M (SD)
Exercise block without stop signal
Reaction times 534 (88) 504 (65)
Experimental blocks
RTs, trials without stop signal 753 (216) 729 (236)
Signal respond RTs 674 (188) 647 (205)
Errors % 0.6 (0.6) 0.7 (0.7)
Probability of responding 48.1 (2.3) 47.7 (2.7)
SSRT 238 (45) 232 (39)
The probability of responding did not differ between the groups (T(50)=0.58,
p=0.56), which shows that the staircase tracking algorithm was successfully
applied to equalize response rates between groups.  This is a necessary
prerequisite for the interpretation of results.  Furthermore, error rates did also
not differ between groups (T(50)=-0.17, p=0.86).  Contrary to our hypothesis
there were no significant differences in the SSRTs (T(50)=0.53, p=0.6, effect
size 0.14).  There were also no significant differences in the primary task RT in
the exercise block (T(50)=1.41, p=0.16, effect size 0.39) as well as in the
experimental blocks in the trials without (T(50)=0.39, p=0.7) and with stop signal
(T(50)=0.51, p=0.61).
Differences in exercise block and experimental block of the stop signal
task
As can be seen in Table 4.3, primary task reaction times were longer in the
experimental blocks than in the exercise block.  A 2 (GROUP: TBI, OC) x 2
(BLOCK: reaction times in the exercise block, reaction times in the experimental
block) ANOVA revealed a significant main effect for BLOCK (F(1,50)=61.67,
p=0.0001) but no significant interaction of GROUP x BLOCK (F(1,50)=0.01,
p=0.92).  Thus, there was a strong tendency for both groups to have longer
reaction times in the experimental blocks, but there was no indication, that any
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group behaved different in this respect.  Because of the effect of longer RTs in
the experimental blocks, RTs in the exercise block will be interpreted as an
indicator of the general speed of responding.
Inhibition and clinical characteristics, demographic characteristics and
neuropsychological data
In TBI participants, SSRT showed no relationship to functional independence in
the FIM (r=-0.04).  Spearman rank correlations between SSRT and days of
unconsciousness (r=0.26) and time since lesion (r=0.07) were also both low and
not significant.
Years of education did not show a significant relationship to SSRT in either
group (TBI: r= -0.24, OC: -0.1).  Age correlated significant in the TBI with SSRT
(r=0.39, p < 0.05), but not in the OC (r=-0.05).  However, those correlations
were not significantly different from each other (Fisher’s Z-Test: z=1.567,
p=0.12).
The correlations of SSRT with the background neuropsychological variables
can be seen in Table 4.4.  None of those correlations was significant.
Table 4.4. Correlations of SSRT and background neuropsychology
Intellectual
functioning (LPS,
T-value)
AVLT – total
learning
(total score)
Digit span
(total score)
MCST: %
perseverative
errors of all errors
TBI -0.23 -0.28 -0.36a -0.07
OC -0.08 -0.06 -0.17 0.04
Note. a p=0.07
4.5 Discussion
The present study found no evidence of a deficit in the inhibition of ongoing
responses in patients with TBI in comparison to orthopedic controls.  This result
does not seem to be due to insufficient power, because the sample size was
reasonably large and the effect size between the TBI and OC for SSRT was
0.14, which it quite small.  In addition, clinical characteristics of the TBI and
background neuropsychological variables did not show any significant
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relationship to the ability to inhibit reactions.  Of the demographic variables, only
age showed a significant relationship to SSRT, and this only in the TBI.
However, correlations of TBI and OC did not differ significantly from each other.
Both groups of participants showed a tendency to wait in the experimental
blocks.
The failure to detect inhibitory deficits
One might argue, that patients were not impaired enough, and therefore the
failure to detect deficits in response inhibition might be due to this.  However,
half of our TBI (N=13) was reportedly unconscious for at least 24 hours, and
can therefore be considered to have suffered severe head injuries.
Furthermore, TBI patients showed significant impairment in intellectual
functioning and memory.
In addition to no difference in inhibitory efficiency between the two groups,
there was also no significant difference in the RTs in the exercise block
between the groups, although overall general slowing is one of the most
consistently reported effects of TBI.  However, the RT difference had an effect
size of 0.39 in our study. Other authors have also reported that the effect of
general slowing frequently does not reach significance (Stuss et al., 1989).  It
might be, that our selection of the control group was conservative, since we
employed orthopedic controls and not healthy participants.  However, this
approach seems appropriate, since it corrects for general effects of being ill,
having to stay in hospitals and taking various medications.
Impaired executive functions after TBI are not always demonstrated (e.g.
Ponsford & Kinsella, 1992; Veltman et al., 1996).  Our study adds to this and
indicates, that one specific executive function, the inhibition of ongoing
responses, seems to be preserved in the majority of TBI patients.  In fact, only
three of 27 participants the TBI had an SSRT below two standard deviations of
the OC (11%, including the outlier).
The results of our study seem to be in line with the results of Robertson et al.
(1997).  Robertson et al. (1997) investigated patients with TBI with the
sustained attention to response task (SART).  This task involves the withholding
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of key presses to rare (1 in 9) targets.  They presented empirical evidence that
the SART is sensitive to sustained attention and not an impaired ability to inhibit
a response, although it consists of a go nogo task.  In their view errors were not
seen as failures in withholding a response but as the consequence of a failure
in maintaining an optimum approach to the task over time.  It could be, that we
obtained no deficits in response inhibition because the stop signal task made it
possible to maintain an optimal task approach over time, even though it took
participants approximately 45 minutes to complete the task.  The acoustic stop
signal might have served as an alerting element.  It could also be, that in the
study of Braun et al. (1989), who found that commission errors in go nogo tasks
were particularly sensitive in discriminating head injured patients from controls,
those errors were more indicative of a nonoptimum task approach, rather than
inhibitory difficulties.
Executive impairment in the TBI patients
Unexpected was the fact, that the perseverative errors of the MCST did not
differentiate between the TBI and OC patients.  This negative result might be
due to three different reasons: a) the MCST is not a sensitive measure in
patients with TBI, b) the controls performed worse than expected, and c) our
patients did not have executive deficits.
The effect size for the difference between controls and TBI patients in our
study was 0.32, which is small.  To our knowledge no studies have investigated
the sensitivity of the MCST in patients with TBI.  Some studies, however, found
significant differences between patients with TBI and controls in the Wisconsin
Card Sorting Test (Cockburn, 1995; Axelrod et al., 1994).  Of course, although
the use of the MCST is frequently advocated as an alternative to the WCST and
measures are thought to be comparable (e.g. Greve & Smith, 1991), there is
evidence that the equivalence of the two tests is doubtful (e.g. de Zubicaray &
Ashton, 1996).  However, the score we used, the percentage of perseverative
errors, is one in which both tests seem to be comparable (van Gorp et al.,
1997).  Thus, it could have been expected, that patients with TBI perform worse
than controls in the MCST.
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Looking at the values of our patients, it seems that our control group did not
perform worse than control participants in other studies (see de Zubicaray &
Ashton, 1996 for control group data of several studies using the MCST).  It
seems thus likely, that our patients have less executive deficits than patients in
some other studies.  It cannot be ruled out, that our effects for SSRT would
have been greater in a patient sample with more executive deficits.  However,
selectively including patients who show executive disturbance in studies
produces a bias, and this is not the case in our study; our patient sample
represents TBI patients selected irrespective of behavioral disturbances.
Furthermore, SSRT and MSCT performance did not show a significant
relationship with each other, which is in accordance with other studies showing
no or only low correlations between executive function tests (Duncan, 1997).
Duncan (1997) found that the median correlation between several measures of
“perseveration” was 0.1, and the median correlation between measures of
“disinhibition” was –0.01 in patients with TBI.  Thus, even if we had had patients
who show executive impairment in the MCST, it remains doubtful that they
would also have shown impairment in SSRT.
The relationship of clinical and demographic characteristics and
inhibitory efficiency
Inhibitory efficiency showed no relationship to clinical measures of the TBI.
This is in accordance with other studies, who demonstrate that traditional
severity measures are probably not very valid and interesting or useful for
functional evaluation (Braun et al., 1989).
Age correlated significant with SSRT in the TBI, but not in the OC, those
correlations were, however, not significantly different from each other.  Our
results for the OC is in accordance with a study of Williams et al. (1999) who
found only limited evidence of slowing of the SSRT across adulthood, young
adults were in their study approximately 20 ms faster than the oldest group
(over 60 years).  Some investigators proposed that older people are more
affected by head injury than younger people, because they may have less
available reserves to cope with the insult (Stablum et al., 1996).  This might be
75
the reason for the correlation of age with SSRT in the TBI group.  However, the
issue of the effects of TBI and age on SSRT cannot be clearly resolved in this
study, further investigations would be necessary.
The tendency to wait in the experimental block
Primary task reaction times in the experimental blocks were significantly longer
than in the exercise block for all groups.  Longer reaction times in the
experimental blocks could be due to two reasons: (a) effects of fatigue and (b) a
tendency to wait for stop signals in spite of instructions.  It cannot be ruled out,
that fatigue has some influence on this effect.  However, this effect should be
much less pronounced than the obtained prolongation of RTs.  An interpretation
of the data as a tendency to wait is in accordance with other studies (Logan,
1981; McGarry & Franks, 1997), although the prolongation of RTs was less
pronounced in those studies.  This might be due to the fact, that it is much
easier to persuade students not to employ any waiting strategy than patients.
However, the tendency to wait has no implication for the validity of our
results.  The interaction between group and strategy was not significant, which
indicates, that the tendency to prolong RTs was independent of group
membership.  This tendency is also unlikely to influence SSRT, since the
tracking procedure is able to compensate for group as well as individual
differences in primary task RT (Band, 1997).  Furthermore, the probability of
responding was not different between the groups and close to 50%.  If there is
any systematic error, both groups should be equally affected.
Conclusion
The present study found no evidence of difficulties in inhibiting ongoing
responses in patients with TBI.  It seems likely, that difficulties in the complete
suppression of responses is not a very common deficit after TBI.
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5. Study 3: Inhibitory aftereffects in the stop-signal paradigm
5.1 Summary
The inhibition of responses to interfering stimuli in a trial results in longer
reaction times in the following trial in which to-be-ignored stimuli become
targets.  This is due to the fact that the residual inhibition of the distractor must
be overcome before the now relevant response can be produced.  Such
negative priming effects are well-known inhibitory aftereffects and the focus of
intensive research.  However, it seems reasonable to assume that the use of
inhibitory processes leaves measurable aftereffects in a variety of other tasks
and situations.  Therefore, the aim of the present study was to investigate
whether the aftereffects of inhibition could be obtained in a task measuring
motor inhibition (i.e., the stop signal task).  Our results indicate that inhibitory
aftereffects were present in the stop signal task whether or not participants were
successful in inhibiting their reactions.  They were greater after unsuccessful
than after successful inhibition.  Moreover, inhibitory aftereffects were greater
when both trials consisted of the same primary task properties.  Strategic
effects might explain part of the results, but there is evidence that a specific
inhibition of either the stimulus, or the response to that stimulus, or both plays a
role in the constitution of the aftereffects.
5.2 Introduction
In many psychological tasks performance in one trial is influenced by the
properties of the preceding trial or trials.  This has been reported for simple two
choice reaction time tasks (Green et al., 1983; Kirby, 1980; Kornblum, 1973;
Laming, 1968; Remington, 1969; Soetens et al., 1984; Soetens et al., 1985) and
for reaction times (RTs) following errors (Laming 1979; Rabbitt, 1966a; Rabbitt
1966b; Rabbitt & Rogers, 1977).  Trial order effects can be inhibitory or
facilitatory (Soetens et al., 1984).
A special case of trial order effects occurs in tasks where stimuli interfere
with each other (Eriksen & Eriksen, 1974; Tipper, 1985; Houghton & Tipper,
1996; Neill et al., 1995).  Inhibition of interfering stimuli results in longer reaction
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times (RTs) in the next trial when to-be-ignored stimuli become targets.  This is
due to the fact that the residual inhibition of the distractor must be overcome
before the now relevant response can be produced (e.g., Tipper, 1985;
Houghton & Tipper, 1996; Neill et al. 1995).  Such negative priming effects are
well-known inhibitory aftereffects (Logan, 1994) and the focus of intensive
research.  Although the exact relationship between the primary task interference
and the negative priming effect is still unresolved, in general, variables that
increase interference also increase negative priming (Neill et al., 1995).
It seems reasonable to assume that the use of inhibitory processes leaves
measurable aftereffects in other tasks, where trial-to trial effects are not usually
the focus of research.  The procedure to calculate negative priming effects has
already been applied with positive results to some tasks which were not
originally designed to measure them, for example the stroop task (e.g. Neill,
1978; Lowe, 1979; see MacLeod, 1991 for a review) and the flanker task (e.g.
Neill & Valdes, 1995).  Inhibition in these tasks is usually referred to as
‘cognitive inhibition’ (Harnishfeger, 1995).
The aim of the present study was to investigate whether or not aftereffects of
inhibition could also be obtained in a task measuring motor or behavioral
inhibition (Dempster, 1993; Harnishfeger, 1995). Therefore, it seemed
appropriate to use the stop signal task (Lappin & Eriksen, 1966; Logan &
Cowan, 1984; Logan et al., 1984; Osman et al., 1986). In this task inhibition of
simple motor reactions takes place in stop signal trials and is measured by the
stop signal reaction time, i.e. the time it takes to inhibit a reaction.
It seemed reasonable to assume that behavioral inhibition, like cognitive
inhibition, has effects that last longer than the immediate effect of being
successful or not.  The question arises, whether or not inhibiting or trying to
inhibit reactions on one trial leaves an aftereffect in the next trial.  Kramer et al.
(1992, cited by Logan, 1994) found that go signal RTs were slower on trials
following successful inhibition than on control trials.  They compared young and
old adults and found that this effect was stronger for older participants than for
younger ones (50 ms vs. 21 ms, respectively).  Apart from this report, there are
no further studies investigating inhibitory aftereffects in the stop signal task.
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Therefore, the aim of our study was to replicate the results of Kramer et al.
(1992, cited by Logan 1994).  In addition we asked whether an inhibitory
aftereffect is also observable when inhibition is not successful in the first trial.
Furthermore, we wanted to see if the degree of similarity between the properties
of trial n and trial n-1 (i.e., the primary task symbols and the corresponding
response) has any influence on the size of inhibitory aftereffects.  We assumed,
that an inhibitory aftereffect would always be observable after a stop-signal
occurred, and that this effect would be more pronounced when the properties of
the trial n were the same as those of trial n-1.  This would reflect the results
obtained with negative priming tasks: not all responses are slowed, only those
that bear a specific distractor-to-target relationship (Tipper, 1985; Houghton &
Tipper, 1996; Neill et al., 1995; May et. al., 1995).
5.3 Methods
Participants
Participants were 37 undergraduate students (24 female, 13 male), receiving
course credit for participating.  Three of the participants (2 female, 1 male) were
excluded from analysis because contrary to instructions, they started waiting for
the stop signal, which resulted in mean RTs over 1000 ms and late stop signals.
The remaining 34 participants had a mean age of 24 years (minimum 20,
maximum 35 years).
The stop signal task
see general methods section
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Data analysis
Data were analyzed with the SAS-Program, Windows Version 6.03 (SAS
Institute Inc., 1988).  To evaluate whether our results were comparable to the
findings reported in the literature we estimated SSRT with the following
procedure: the RTs of the no-signal trials were rank ordered, and the nth
reaction time was determined, where n is the number of no signal trials
multiplied by the probability of responding when a stop signal occurred at a
given delay.  The nth reaction time estimates the time at which the stopping
process finished, relative to the onset of the go signal.  An estimate of the SSRT
was obtained by subtracting the stop signal delay.  This procedure was
repeated for each delay.  The SSRTs of the four delays were averaged to
calculate the average SSRT (Logan & Cowan, 1984; Logan, 1994).  In addition
we calculated the probability of responding, the error rate and the choice
reaction time (CRT).  The latter was done by using trials from the first exercise
block. The 20 trials at the beginning of the block were dropped, thus 40 trials
remained for this analysis.
In analyzing our results we first calculated the RTs of no signal trials,
depending upon the properties of trial n-1.  Trials n-1 were classified as follows:
(a) no signal trials, (b) stop signal trials with successful inhibition and (c) stop
signal trials without successful inhibition.  The factor ‘properties of trial n-1’ was
called EVENT.
As a further step, these RTs were further split into trials where trial n and trial n-
1 consisted of the same primary task stimulus and trials where trial n and trial n-
1 consisted of different primary task stimuli.  This factor was called SYMBOL.
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5.4 Results
The probability of responding to the stop signal was 39.8% (SD=6), the error
rate was 2.3%, and the SSRT was 239 ms (SD=28). The CRT in the exercise
block (M=485, SD=48) was significantly faster than the CRT in the experimental
block (no-signal RTs) (T=3.12, p<0.004), as calculated by a T-test for
dependent samples.  Results closely resemble those reported in other studies
(e.g. Logan, 1981; Logan et al., 1984; Logan & Cowan, 1984; De Jong et al.,
1995).
In the next step we evalu ted whether there were any differences in trials
following successful or unsuccessful inhibition compared to control trials. Table
5.1 presents the RTs of no signal trials, depending upon the properties of trial n-
1.
Table 5.1 Reaction times of no signal trials for correct responses only,
depending upon the properties of trial n-1 for all trials
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
RT in ms Number of trials
per participant
Trial n-1 M (SD) M (SD)
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
no signal 507 (57) 281 (19)
stop-signal, successful inhibition 536 (72)   60 (8)
stop-signal, no inhibition 550 (79)   38 (6)
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
A repeated-measures analysis of variance revealed a significant effect of
EVENT (F(2,66)=31.7, p<0.0001).  Contrasts between the first (no signal in trial
n-1) and the second (successful inhibition in trial n-1) condition (F(1,33)=42.8,
p<0.0001, M=29 ms, SD=26 ms, effect size for dependent samples=1.2) and
between the first and the third (no inhibition in trial n-1) condition
(F(1,33)=51.72, p<0.0001, M=43 ms, SD=35 ms, effect size for dependent
samples=1.2) were both significant. Also the contrast between the two
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conditions where trial n-1 was a stop signal was significant (F(1,33)=5.78,
p<0.02, M=14.5 ms, SD=35 ms, effect size for dependent samples=0.4).  These
results confirm that it took participants longer to respond in trials following a
stop signal whether or not inhibition was successful, than on control trials.
Furthermore reactions were significantly longer after unsuccessful than after
successful inhibition.
As a further step, trial couples were separated into those where the primary
task consisted of the same symbol in both trials and those where the symbols
were different.  Table 5.2 presents the RTs of no signal trials, depending upon
the properties of trial n-1 and separated for same and different symbols in both
trials.
Table 5.2 Reaction times of no signal trials for correct responses only,
depending upon the properties of trial n-1 for trials with same symbols and for
trials with different symbols.
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾-
RT in ms Number of trials
per participant
Trial n-1 M (SD) M (SD)
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
same symbols
no signal 506 (53) 143 (11)
stop-signal, successful inhibition 541 (71)   29 (4)
stop-signal, no inhibition 559 (87)   19 (3)
different symbols
no signal 507 (64) 138 (8)
stop-signal, successful inhibition 530 (76)   31 (5)
stop-signal, no inhibition 536 (70)   19 (4)
¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾¾
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A repeated measures analysis of variance again revealed a significant effect
of EVENT (F(2,66)=27.95, p<0.0001), as well as a significant effect of
SYMBOLS (F(1,33)=8.46, p<0.006).  The interaction between these two factors
was also significant (F(2,66)=5.18, p<0.008), indicating that it took participants
longer to respond on trials when trial n-1 was a stop-signal trial with the same
primary task properties than when trial n-1 was a stop-trial with different primary
task properties, but that there was no such effect in trials which were not
preceded by a stop signal (see Figure 5.1).
Figure 5.1 Reaction times of no signal trials for correct responses only,
depending upon the properties of trial n-1 for trials with same symbols and for
trials with different symbols.
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5.5 Discussion
Our results provide evidence that inhibitory aftereffects occur after motor
inhibition in the stop signal task.  Inhibitory aftereffects in this task occur
whether or not the participant is successful in inhibiting the reaction in the
previous trial.  We obtained a 29 ms difference between trials following
successful inhibition and control trials, which is similar to the 21 ms obtained by
Kramer et al. (1992, cited by Logan, 1994).  There was also a significant
difference between trials following successful and unsuccessful inhibition, it took
participants longer to respond in the latter case.  Furthermore, our results show
that inhibitory aftereffects were greater when both trials consisted of the same
primary task properties and when inhibition was not successful.
The aftereffects cannot be explained by the horse-race model, because the
model only explains performance on a single trial, without reference to the serial
position of that trial.  The model treats the trials as independent from each
other. Several mechanisms might be responsible for the obtained aftereffects,
which we can only speculate about at this point.
Strategic effects
CRT was significantly longer during the experimental blocks where the stop
signal was presented than in the exercise block with the choice task alone. This
effect is in accordance with results from other studies (Logan, 1981; McGarry &
Franks, 1997). One could argue that participants increase their decision
criterion after a stop signal occurs in terms of a variable criterion model (Grice
et al., 1982; Jacobs, 1993) and thus deliberately prolong their reaction.
Although participants were explicitly told not to start waiting for stop-signals and
although the probability of a stop-signal occurring was always ¼, such strategic
criterion-shift effects cannot be ruled out with the current design.
The effect that unsuccessful inhibition resulted in longer aftereffects fits well
into a strategic account, since it seems more logical to change strategies in
unsuccessful trials than in successful.  However, another explanation seems
also plausible here: it might be that a failure in inhibiting the response is
equivalent to making an error for the participants.  It is known that reaction
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times following errors are slower than reactions following correct responses
(Laming, 1979; Rabbitt & Rogers, 1977), and thus this effect may account for
the difference between successful and unsuccessful inhibition.
It can be ruled out that strategic effects account for the whole pattern of
results.  The influence of same and different symbols in both trials warrants
another explanation.  We assume that a response strategy such as deliberately
prolonging responses needs some time to build up and that participants might
use the intertrial interval for this process.  However, they have no way of
predicting which trial will be the next, so the way they set their response
criterion at this stage will equally influence all following trials.  Thus, strategic
effects might only account for a general slowing after stop signal trials but not
for this specific effect.
Specific mechanisms
It seems more likely that some specific mechanism, perhaps similar to the
mechanisms responsible for negative priming is in operation here.
Unfortunately, until now, no single mechanism has been able to explain the
negative priming effect.  Different mechanisms seem to work together and
depend on the experimental context (for an overview see May et al., 1995; Neill
et al., 1995; Neill & Valdes, 1995; Tipper & Milliken, 1995).  There are two main
ways to explain the negative priming effect, which can also be applied to the
aftereffects of motor inhibition: one inhibitory and one mnestic (May et al.,
1995).
The inhibition model (Neill, 1977; Tipper, 1985) assumes that something is
inhibited on the prime trial, or shortly thereafter, and that this inhibition carries
over to affect processing on the probe trial.  One version of the inhibition model
can be regarded as the cognitive blocking hypothesis (Tipper & Cranston,
1985).  The authors posit that if detected, a familiar distractor stimulus activates
its internal memory representations.  An inhibitory mechanism then functions to
decouple the activated representation of distractors from response output.
Inhibition on the prime trial impedes responding on the next.  Thus, inhibition
operates in a forward direction.  Applied to the stop signal paradigm, the
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inhibition that has built up in stop signal trials would decouple the representation
of the stimulus from the response output and thus result in a delayed response
on the subsequent trial.  In addition to the cognitive blocking hypothesis there
are several other views about the exact locus of inhibition in the negative
priming task (Neill et al., 1995):  One deals with the inhibition / suppression of
response (e.g. Dalrymple-Alford & Budayr, 1966; see however Tipper et al.,
1988), another with the inhibition of irrelevant cognitive representations (e.g.
Neill, 1979; but see Lowe, 1979).
An alternative explanation to inhibitory accounts is the episodic retrieval
theory (Neill & Valdes, 1992), based on Logan’s (1988) instance theory of
automatization.  According to this view, the presentation of a stimulus
automatically evokes the most recent episode involving that stimulus.  The
retrieved episode contains information (or tags) about the stimulus, including
the response or nonresponse that was associated with it.  However, this theory
only seems to account for some instances of negative priming and fails to
account for others (May et al., 1995).  For example, it cannot explain instances
where negative priming reverses to positive priming (e.g. Lowe, 1979; Neill,
1979; Neill & Westberry, 1987; Neumann & De-Schepper, 1991).  Furthermore,
episodic retrieval theory predicts that participants should be impeded in making
a response in a target-to-distractor condition.  However, participants typically
show facilitation in this condition (Kane et al., 1994; Neill, 1978).  Applied to the
stop signal paradigm, the theory would account for the obtained aftereffects in
the following way: If, in one trial, a square appears as the primary task symbol
and then a stop signal occurs, this episode is encoded in memory.  If the next
trial consists again of a square, a ‘do-not-respond’ tag is automatically retrieved.
This tag necessarily conflicts with the current response requirement.
We do not know enough about the aftereffects of motor inhibition to decide
between inhibition-based accounts or episodic retrieval accounts.  However, the
task requires that inhibition of the response takes place in the first trial.  To
adopt an episodic retrieval account one would have to argue that this inhibition
does not last, but instead leaves a trace in memory, which is then reactivated in
the next trial.
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Future studies should evaluate the exact nature of the aftereffec  of motor
inhibition and conditions and contexts that influence them.  For example,
studies with different stimulus response mappings (e.g. 2:1) will allow us to
differentiate between different hypothesis concerning the effect of the properties
of trial n-1.  Varying the intertrial intervals will make it possible to evaluate
strategic effects.  It could be argued that a strategy needs some time to build
up, whereas a true inhibitory effect should decrease with time.
Conclusion
Our study provides evidence that the inhibition of reactions leaves measurable
inhibitory aftereffects.  It does not seem likely that the pattern of results can be
explained solely by strategic effects.  Instead we assume that specific
mechanisms are at work here, which might resemble mechanisms explaining
the negative priming effect. Clearly, further studies are necessary to describe
and explain the phenomenon.
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6. An explorative analysis of inhibitory aftereffects in brain-damaged
patients
6.1 Summary
For the current investigation data of studies 1 and 2 were analyzed in respect to
inhibitory aftereffects.  Inhibitory aftereffects were obtained after successful as
well as after unsuccessful inhibition, this was the case in all groups.  Aftereffects
were, however, not significantly larger after successful than after unsuccessful
inhibition.  Furthermore, aftereffects were also not significantly larger when both
trials consisted of the same symbol than when they consisted of different
symbols.  There were also no differences in regard to the aftereffects between
the patients and controls. Results of this analysis must, however, remain
inconclusive, since specific effects might have been obscured by the tendency
of participants to wait in the experimental blocks during the performance of the
stop signal task.
6.2 Introduction
The results of study 3 provide evidence that inhibitory aftereffects occur after
inhibition trials in the stop signal task.  Inhibitory aftereffects occurred when the
participant was successful inhibiting the reaction as well as when the participant
was not successful inhibiting the reaction on the previous trial.  There was a
significant difference between trials following successful and unsuccessful
inhibition, indicating that it took participants longer to respond after unsuccessful
inhibition.  Furthermore, our results showed that inhibitory aftereffects were
greater when both trials consisted of the same primary task properties.
Strategic effects might explain part of the results, e.g. participants might adopt a
more conservative response criterion after a stop signal, especially after
unsuccessful inhibition.  An alternative explanation might be that unsuccessful
inhibition is perceived as an error by participants and some form of post-error
slowing takes place.  There was, however, evidence, that a specific form
inhibition of either the stimulus, or the response to that stimulus, or both plays a
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role in the constitution of the aftereffects, possibly comparable to the negative
priming effect.
The aim of this analysis was to reanalyze the data of study 1 and study 2 to
see, whether we could also find inhibitory aftereffects.  We want to emphasize
here, that any results obtained in this analysis have to be regarded with extreme
caution.  This is due to mainly two reasons.  First, participants started to prolong
their RTs during the experimental blocks.  This however poses a serious
problem for the analysis of inhibitory aftereffects.  Especially in conditions, for
which only few RT measurements are available, these might not be very
reliable.  Furthermore, this gross strategic behavior might cover more subtle
effects that consist of a few milliseconds. Therefore, any results of this analysis
should be regarded rather as a help for hypothesis generation for future studies,
than as definitive research results.  Second, the study design was planned for
the investigation of SSRT and not for the study of inhibitory aftereffects.
6.3 Method
Data from studies 1 and 2 were used for analysis of inhibitory aftereffects.  Data
were analyzed with the SAS-Program, Windows Version 6.03 (SAS Institute
Inc., 1988).  To answer the questions of the analysis, the RTs of no signal trials
were calculated, depending upon the properties of trial n-1.  Trials n-1 were
classified as follows: (a) no signal trials, (b) stop signal trials, successful
inhibition, and (c) stop signal trials, unsuccessful inhibition.  The factor
‘properties of trial n-1’ was called STOP.  These RTs were further split into trials
where trial n and trial n-1 consisted of the same primary task stimulus
(repetitions) and trials where trial n and trial n-1 consisted of different primary
task stimuli (alternations).  This factor was called SYMBOL. Means and
standard deviations of RTs for the groups were calculated from the median RTs
of the individual participants.  RTs were subjected to analysis of variance, for
study 1 this was done in a 4 (GROUP) x 3 (STOP) x 2 (SYMBOL) design, for
study 2 this was done in a 2 (GROUP) x 3 (STOP) x 2 (SYMBOL) design.
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6.4 Results
Patients with focal lesions
The upper part of Table 6.1 presents the reaction times of trial order effects for
the different conditions for all groups.
Table 6.1. Reaction times of no signal trials for correct responses only,
depending upon the properties of trial n-1, once separately for same and
different symbols and once irrespective of symbols, for patients with focal
lesions and their orthopedic controls
FG
N=16
NFG
N=20
BG
N=8
OG
N=18
Number of
trials per
Participant
M (SD)
RT in ms
M (SD)
RT in ms
M (SD)
RT in ms
M (SD)
RT in ms
M (SD)
same symbols
same, no signal 107 (6) 830 (275) 739 (191) 786 (183) 635 (165)
stop-signal, successful inhibition18 (2) 907 (342) 803 (190) 844 (171) 681 (169)
stop-signal, no inhibition 17 (2) 871 (266) 799 (167) 891 (207) 675 (157)
different symbols
different, no signal 106 (6) 860 (270) 759 (189) 777 (161) 653 (155)
stop-signal, successful inhibition20 (2) 934 (331) 790 (220) 808 (192) 660 (175)
stop-signal, no inhibition 17 (3) 894 (273) 808 (205) 869 (242) 679 (135)
all trials
no signal 213 (12) 843 (268) 749 (187) 786 (174) 645 (160)
stop-signal, successful inhibition38 (3) 909 (320) 793 (199) 824 (177) 671 (166)
stop-signal, no inhibition 34 (4) 877 (249) 801 (189) 879 (215) 675 (144)
Note. The number of trials does not amount to the total number of trials, since there were ¼ of
stop-signal trials followed by another stop signal and stop signal trials at the end of blocks.
A 4 x 3 x 2 analysis of variance with one between participant factor (GROUP:
FG, NFG, BG, OG) and two within participant factors (STOP: no signal in trial n-
1, stop signal with successful inhibition in trial n-1, stop signal with unsuccessful
inhibition in trial n-1; SYMBOL: same symbol in both trials, different symbols in
both trials) was conducted. There was a significant main effect for group
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(F(3,58)=3.3, p=0.03), Tukey tests revealed that this effect reflects the longer
RTs of the FG in comparison to the OG in all conditions.  The effect of SYMBOL
was not significant (F(1,58)=0.15, p=0.7), but the effect of STOP
(F(2,116)=17.62, p=0.0001) was.  Of the two-way interactions GROUP x
SYMBOL was not significant (F(3,58)=1.82, p=0.15) and also not the interaction
SYMBOL x STOP (F(2,116)=1.98, p=0.14), but the interaction GROUP x STOP
showed a tendency (F(6,116)=1.86, p=0.09). The three way interaction of
GROUP x SYMBOL x STOP was not significant (F(6,116)=0.27, p=0.95).
To evaluate the STOP-effect and the tendency for an interaction of STOP x
GROUP, we looked at the contrasts between the STOP conditions.  The RTs
for those conditions, regardless of the SYMBOL-effect can be seen in the lower
part of Table 6.1 and in Figure 6.1.  The contrast between no signal in trial n-1
and stop signal, successful inhibition in trial n-1 was significant (F(1,58)=20.41,
p=0.0001, but showed no GROUP-effect (F(3,58)=1.1, p=0.36), and so was the
contrast between no signal in trial n-1 and stop signal unsuccessful inhibition
(F(1,58)=36.3, p=0.0001), which also showed no group effect (F(3,58)=1.9,
p=0.14), thus indicating that inhibitory aftereffects were obtained after
successful as well as after unsuccessful inhibition.  The contrast between
successful and unsuccessful inhibition was not significant (F(1,58)=0.48,
p=0.49), but here the GROUP effect showed a tendency (F3,58)=2.61, p=0.06).
A Tukey test for the difference between successful and unsuccessful inhibition
for the four groups revealed a tendency for the BG vs. the FG (p=0.06).
However, there was no significant difference or tendency between any of the
focal lesion groups in comparison to orthopedic controls.
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Figure 6.1. RTs after no signal trials and after trials with successful or
unsuccessful inhibition, irrespective of the symbol in trial n-1 for patients with
focal lesions and their orthopedic controls
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Patients with TBI
The upper part of Table 6.2 presents the reaction times for the different
conditions for the two groups.
Table 6.2. Reaction times of no signal trials for correct responses only,
depending upon the properties of trial n-1, once separately for same and
different symbols and once irrespective of symbols for TBI patients and
orthopedic controls
TBI N=26 OC N=26
Number of trials
per participant
M (SD)
RT in ms
M (SD)
RT in ms
M (SD)
same symbols
same, no signal 109 (8) 740 (222) 717 (243)
stop-signal, successful inhibition 19 (3) 785 (217) 737 (222)
stop-signal, no inhibition 17 (2) 793 (223) 755 (247)
different symbols
different, no signal 107 (7) 749 (204) 711 (237)
stop-signal, successful inhibition 20 (3) 778 (244) 743 (272)
stop-signal, no inhibition 18 (3) 787 (225) 747 (251)
all trials
no signal 215 (15) 743 (211) 714 (238)
stop-signal, successful inhibition 38 (3) 783 (229) 735 (233)
stop-signal, no inhibition 34 (3) 786 (221) 743 (243)
Note. The number of trials does not amount to the total number of trials, since there were ¼ of
stop-signal trials followed by another stop signal and stop signal trials at the end of blocks.
A 2 x 3 x 2 analysis of variance with one between factor (GROUP: TBI, OC) and
two within factors (STOP: no signal in trial n-1, stop signal with successful
inhibition in trial n-1, stop signal with unsuccessful inhibition in trial n-1;
SYMBOL: same symbol in both trials, different symbols in both trials) was
conducted. There was no significant main effect for group (F(1,50)=0.34,
p=0.56).  The effect of SYMBOL was also not significant (F(1,50)=0.08,
p=0.78), but the effect of stop was (F(2,100)=16.27, p=0.0001). None of the
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interactions were significant (GROUP x SYMBOL: F(1,50)=0.01, p=0.93;
GROUP x STOP: F(2,100)=0.27, p=0.77; SYMBOL x STOP: F(2,100)=0.2,
p=0.82; GROUP x SYMBOL x STOP: F(2,100)=0.48, p=0.62).
To evaluate the STOP-effect, we looked at the contrasts between the STOP
conditions.  The RTs for those conditions, regardless of the SYMBOL-effect can
also be seen in the lower part of Table 6.2 and Figure 6.2. The contrast
between no signal in trial n-1 and stop signal, successful inhibition in trial n-1
was significant (F(1,50)=16.19, p=0.0002), and so was the contrast between no
signal in trial n-1 and stop signal unsuccessful inhibition in trial n-1
(F(1,50)=28.36, p=0.0001), thus showing that inhibitory aftereffects were
obtained after successful as well as after unsuccessful inhibition.  The contrast
between successful and unsuccessful inhibition in trial n-1 was not significant
(F(1,50)=2.02, p=0.16).
Figure 6.2. RTs after no signal trials and trials after successful or unsuccessful
inhibition, irrespective of the symbol in trial n-1 for TBI patients and orthopedic
controls
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6.5 Discussion
The results of the analysis were basically the same for the study of patients with
more focal lesions and for the study of patients with more diffuse lesions,
therefore they will be discussed together.  Inhibitory aftereffects were obtained
after successful as well as after unsuccessful inhibition in all groups.  These
aftereffects were not significantly greater after unsuccessful than after
successful inhibition.  Furthermore, we found that aftereffects were not
significantly greater when both trials consisted of the same symbol than when
they consisted of different symbols.  In addition, there was also no significant
difference between any patient group and control participants.
Why did we not find any specific effects in the inhibitory aftereffects?
As already mentioned, participants started to prolong their RTs during the
experimental blocks.  This provides a serious methodological problem for the
inhibitory aftereffects.  It could be argued, that this general strategic behavior
was so strong, that it superimposed any specific effects.  Therefore, effects
between successful and unsuccessful inhibition and effects between same and
different symbols in both trials were diminished.  There are, however, some
further differences in comparison to our previous study in addition to the grossly
strategic behavior, which have to be discussed.
The populations studied are different.  However, since those negative results
were not only obtained for brain-damaged patients, but also for orthopedic
controls it seems unlikely that this factor contributes much to the negative
results.  Our selection of the controls is conservative, they presumably show
more variance than healthy controls and show general effects of being ill and
having to stay in hospitals and taking various medications.  These factors
should however not have so much influence to make general performance
principles disappear.
Another difference to the previous study was the way the stop signal delay
was set.  In the student-study the delay was set with the MRT minus delay
procedure, in the patient studies the staircase tracking algorithm was used.
However, although it might be possible that inhibitory aftereffects vary with the
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size of the delay, an issue which is not yet investigated, there is no obvious
reason, why they should be influenced by the way the delay is set.
The behavior of participants differed in one further aspect: The RTs after no
signal trials were on the average the same in the student study regardless
whether those were trials followed by the same or different symbol.  This was
not the case in our patient groups.  Furthermore, some of the groups seem to
be more variable in this respect (see Table 6.3).
Table 6.3. RTs when trial n-1 was a no signal trial, having the same or the
different symbol as trial n
Students
M (SD)
FG
M (SD)
NFG
M (SD)
BG
M (SD)
OG
M (SD)
TBI
M (SD)
OC
M (SD)
RT same 506 (53) 830 (275) 739 (191) 786 (183) 635 (165) 740 (222) 717 (243)
RT different 507 (64) 860 (270) 759 (189) 777 (161) 653 (155) 749 (204) 711 (237)
Difference -1 (23) -30 (64) -20 (50) 9 (40) -18 (32) -8 (50) 6 (29)
It seems that there exist differences between participants, whether they respond
faster after same symbol or after different symbol trials. In studies of simple two
choice reaction time both repetition (trial is the same as the preceding trial) and
alternation (trial is different from the preceding trial) effects have been found (for
a review see Luce, 1986).  The magnitude and direction of the sequential
effects depends upon the relative frequency with which signals are presented
and upon the tendency for the signals to be repeated in the presentation
schedule.  Those factors were both 50:50 for each signal in our study.  Another
variable is the response stimulus interval (RSI) or the interstimulus interval (ITI)
.  Kirby (1980) states that repetition effects are usually found for RSIs of less
than approximately half a second, and alternation effects with RSIs of greater
than half a second.  However, although studies are fairly consistent about
repetition effects in short RSIs, the results concerning long RSIs are not
unequivocal, some studies also find repetition effects at long RSIs (e.g. Laming,
1968, Bertelson & Renkin, 1966).  In addition, Kirby (1976) was able to produce
either repetition or alternation effects at long RSIs by instructing participants to
attend to those.  Two kinds of explanations have been offered for sequential
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affects: automatic facilitation and subjective expectancy (e.g. Kirby, 1976;
Soetens, 1998; for a review see Luce, 1986).  Automatic facilitation of the
repeated signal is likely to have a brief temporal span and is stimulus
determined.  This effect seems to account for the repetition effect at short RSIs
or ITIs.  Subjective expectancy usually has stronger influence at longer RSIs or
ITIs.  Depending upon the expectation of the participant both, repetition or
alternation effects can occur.  The ITI in our study was 1000 ms.  Thus,
repetition or alternation effects can both appear in our data and it is likely, that
these effects are based on subjective expectancy in the individual participants.
How could expectation of a certain symbol influence the inhibitory
aftereffects?  It could be, that the stop signal slows reaction time because it
interposes an extra trial between stimulus and response and the benefit from
expectation is lost.  From this, no slowing would be predicted, if the trials were
unexpected, but significant slowing, if trials are expected (loss of expectancy
effect).  It seems not probable that this effect alone could account for the
inhibitory aftereffects, but it might play a contributing role.  The hypothesis
would be, that the expected symbol would provide greater inhibitory aftereffects
than the unexpected symbol.
We thought about building extreme groups of participants showing either a
alternation or a repetition effect from our orthopedic and brain damaged
patients.  However, as we already mentioned, the quality of our data is not very
good for the investigation of inhibitory aftereffects.  Furthermore, selecting
extreme groups cannot replace an experimental design, which manipulates
expectations about repetitions and alternations (e.g. in manipulating the ratios
of repetitions and alternations in the following pattern: 70:30, 50:50 and 30:70).
Therefore we decided to refrain from this and leave this issue for future
experimentation.
No specific explanation regarding the negative results between successful
and unsuccessful inhibition can be offered.  We previously argued that this
significant effect in our student study might be due to strategic behavior or post
error slowing.  One could argue, that the patients did not adopt this strategy or
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did not show post error slowing.  However, it seems likely that the gross
strategic behavior of the patients diminished more subtle effects.
Speculations about brain areas involved in the inhibitory aftereffects
Why did we not find differences between patients and controls?  First, it might
again be argued, that the gross strategic behavior has obscured any subtle
effects.  Second, an important factor is, that group selection was not conducted
for the investigation of inhibitory aftereffects.  Which anatomo-clinical
correlations could be expected for the inhibitory aftereffects depends on the
underlying mechanisms of them, which have not been investigated in detail yet.
However, some speculations can be mentioned here.  The speculations we will
put forward will be based on studies on negative priming, the use of strategies
in brain-damaged patients and the brain regions involved in error detection and
compensation, since those phenomena were considered to play a role in the
constitution of the aftereffects.
Regarding negative priming, there is to our knowledge only one study
investigating this effect in patients with focal lesions (Stuss et al., 1999).  They
found that patients with right, left or bilateral prefrontal damage showed
diminished negative priming in a spatial location task, which was in some
patient groups dependent on task complexity.  Patients with right posterior
lesions showed similar diminished negative priming deficits as the right frontal
patients.  However, the authors used a location based negative priming task, in
which participants select the target stimulus on the basis of a physical attribute
and respond to the object’s location.  In case the inhibitory aftereffects in the
stop signal task are comparable to negative priming effects, they would be
comparable with identity based negative priming tasks.  Negative priming of
identity and negative priming of location have been associated with two
separate inhibitory systems (Connelly & Hasher, 1993) in reference to the two
visual pathways that send information to the frontal cortex, proposed by
Ungerleider and Mishkin (1982).  One pathway, the ventral or occipitotemporal
pathway, which passes through the inferior temporal lobe, might be associated
with identity negative priming, whereas the other pathway, the dorsal or
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occipitoparietal pathway, which passes through the posterior parietal area,
might play a role in location negative priming. Both of the proposed pathways
involve the frontal cortex.  An dissociation between these two forms of negative
priming can occur, this has especially been shown in studies with older adults
(Connelly & Hasher, 1993; see Fox, 1995; May et al., 1995 for reviews).  Older
adults show an impairment in identity negative priming, but preserved location
negative priming. If inhibitory aftereffects in the stop signal task resemble
identity negative priming, this might entail the ventral pathway, which passes
through the inferior temporal lobe.
Regarding errors (the term errors is used here to refer to “slips” and not
“mistakes”, see Reason, 1990), areas of the frontal lobes have been implicated
in the detection and compensation of them, especially the anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC).  Studies using event related potentials point to the existence of a
brain system for error detection and compensation, whose activity is reflected in
the error related negativity (ERN), which is characterized by a negative peak
about 100 ms following the onset of electromyographic activity when the
participant makes an error on that trial (e.g. Gehring et al., 1993;  Dehaene et
al., 1994).  Studies suggest that the ERN may be generated in the anterior
cingulate cortex (Coles, 1998; Miltner et al., 1997;  Dehaene et al., 1994).  The
exact role of the ERN and the ACC are still a subject of dispute.  Scheffers et al.
(1996) for example proposed that the ERN plays a role in error detection,
whereas Carter et al. (1998) suggested that the ACC is active in conditions in
which errors are likely to occur, but not error detection itself.  It has also been
proposed, that the activity of the error detection system is related to the degree
to which responses are slowed after errors (Coles et al., 1995).
Regarding the use and application of strategies, there are a lot of reports
describing the behavior of frontal patients as “bizarre” (e.g. Burgess & Shallice,
1996), being either more impulsive or more conservative than other participants
(Shallice & Evans, 1978; Vilkki & Holst, 1991). Executive deficits and deficits in
strategy application are also found in patients with posterior lesions, however,
they are much less prevalent than in patients with frontal lesions (e.g. Channon &
Crawford, 1999).  There is also evidence, for a role of the basal ganglia in
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executive deficits in association with frontal-striatal circuits (e.g. Dimitrov et al.,
1999; Eslinger & Grattan, 1993; Partiot et al., 1996), however, those deficits do
not necessarily include the application of strategies, but more likely shifting
deficits.  For example Day et al. (1984) found that patients with Parkinson's disease
are able to employ a predictive motor strategy.  Patients with Parkinson’s disease seem,
however, to have difficulties to shift or refocus attention to an dimension which has
previously been irrelevant (i.e. 'learned irrelevance', Owen et al., 1993).
In sum, it might be worthwhile to include again a frontal group in any
systematic investigation of inhibitory aftereffects in future studies.  However, it
would seem advisable to have different “nonfrontal” groups, e.g. having a separate
temporal lesioned group.
Conclusion
Aftereffects in this analysis were again obtained after successful as well as after
unsuccessful inhibition.  However, no specific effects emerged. Most of the
negative results can probably be explained by the low quality of the patient data
for the investigation of the inhibitory aftereffects.  The negative result of the
SYMBOL effect might furthermore be due to variable expectations of
alternations and repetitions within the groups.
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7. General discussion
7.1 Summary of results
The preceding studies had two general aims.  The first aim was to investigate
neuroanatomical correlates of the inhibition of ongoing responses, the second
aim was to investigate the consequences of inhibiting an ongoing response for
the next trial in the stop signal task (i.e. inhibitory aftereffects).
In the first study we investigated the role of the frontal lobes and the basal
ganglia in the inhibition of ongoing responses.  Patients with frontal lesions as
well as patients with basal ganglia lesions showed significantly longer stop
signal reaction (SSRTs) than orthopedic patients.  No significant differences in
SSRT could be found between the nonfrontal patients and any other group,
although effect sizes of the frontal group and the basal ganglia group in
comparison to the nonfrontal group were of medium range.  Results provided
support for a role of fronto-striatal circuits in the inhibition of reactions, and also
support for the notion, that it is useful to rely cognitive functions to functional
circuits or networks of interconnected brain structures, rather than isolated brain
regions.  The obtained effects were, however, too small for SSRT to serve as
an diagnostic marker of those brain regions (Zakzanis, 1998).  SSRT and
primary task RT showed a significant relationship, thus indicating that the
neuronal structures for response inhibition and response initiation seem to be at
least in part overlapping.
In the second study, we investigated the inhibition of ongoing responses in
patients with traumatic brain injury.  Contrary to expectations, patients with TBI
did not show significantly longer SSRTs.  It seems therefore likely, that deficits
in the complete suppression of responses are not very common after TBI.
In the third study, we investigated, whether the inhibition of ongoing
responses leaves measurable inhibitory aftereffects.  The data of a student
sample, who had performed the stop signal task were analyzed for inhibitory
aftereffects.  The results indicated that inhibitory aftereffects were present in the
stop signal task whether or not participants were successful in inhibiting their
reactions.  Moreover, inhibitory aftereffects were greater when both trials
consisted of the same primary task properties.  Strategic effects might explain
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part of the results of this study, but there was evidence that a specific inhibition
of either the stimulus, or the response to that stimulus, or both play a role in the
constitution of the aftereffects.
In an explorative investigation the data of study 1 and study 2 were analyzed
in respect to inhibitory aftereffects.  Inhibitory aftereffects were again obtained
after successful as well as after unsuccessful inhibition, this was the case in all
groups.  However, no specific effects were significant. Furthermore, no
significant differences between the brain-damaged patient groups and control
groups emerged.  Results of this analysis must, however, remain inconclusive,
since specific effects might have been obscured by the tendency of participants
to wait in the experimental blocks during the performance of the stop signal
task.
In the following sections, we will compare results across studies and discuss
major conclusions.  Furthermore, we will discuss some general methodological
limitations of the studies and sketch perspectives for future research.  We will
not discuss single studies in detail, since this has already been done in the
discussion section of each study.
7.2 Neuroanatomy of response inhibition
The involvement of the frontal lobes in the inhibition of ongoing
responses
The results of study 1 support a role for the frontal lobes in the inhibition of
ongoing responses.  Even though the difference between basal ganglia and
frontal patients in comparison to nonfrontal patients was not significant, the
effect size was of medium range.  Study 2 did, however, not add further support
to the notion of the role of the frontal lobes in response inhibition.
Of course, in study 1 the patient selection criterion was a different one –
those patients were selected according to lesion criteria, in study 2 patients
were selected according to the etiology of brain damage.  However, frontal lobe
lesions are highly prevalent in this group, some patients showed evidence of
focal frontal lesions in their brain scans, and presumably others had diffuse
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frontal lesions.  Although this negative result is in accordance with many studies
in the literature (e.g. Spikman et al, 1996; Veltman et al., 1996), where
executive deficits are much less reliably found in TBI than in patients with focal
lesions, it still remains an issue of discussion.
Apart from etiology, in what respect did the patients differ from each other?
The TBI patients were on the average nine years younger than the patients with
frontal lesions in study 1, both groups were, however, compared with orthopedic
controls of their age.  It has been suggested, that within patients with TBI that
older people are more affected by head injury than younger people, because
they may have less available reserves to cope with the insult (e.g. Stablum et
al., 1996), and that younger people can often cope quite well.  However, TBI
patients performed significantly worse than the OC in two of the
neuropsychological measures, the total score of the AVLT and intellectual
functioning.  The FG performed only significantly worse than the OG in total
score in the AVLT, the difference in intellectual functioning did not reach
significance, although there was an effect.  Thus, impairment in the TBI was
evident and it does not seem likely that a better ability to cope with brain injury
can account for the results.
It seems most likely that frontal lesions in patients with TBI may differ from
those patients with focal lesions, i.e. it might be that in the TBI group the crucial
frontal areas were not affected in the majority of patients. The issue of different
lesion locations as an explanation for the differences in results has to remain an
issue of further investigation.  An alternative explanation would be, that diffuse
damage, which is prevalent in TBI, does not per se suffice to produce deficits in
the inhibition of ongoing responses, specific systems have to be damaged to
produce those deficits.
Since it is presumably not the whole frontal lobe which takes part in response
inhibition, future studies should compare patients with focal right, left and
bilateral frontal lesions, to investigate whether any performance differences
emerge.  Furthermore, a more detailed anatomical assignment with groups of
participants with lesions to different areas of the frontal lobes (e.g. basal-medial,
mesial, dorsolateral, orbital) should be conducted (see Stuss & Benson, 1984).
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The same is true for the investigation of patients with basal ganglia lesion.
Those should also be divided into groups according to laterality and the precise
lesion location (striatum, pallidum, substantia nigra).  This could yield a more
detailed neuroanatomical assignment of the inhibition of ongoing responses.
The neuroanatomy of motor control
In study 1 we argued, in line with Band and Boxtel (1999), that the available
neuropsychological and neurophysiological data support a role of the prefrontal
cortex and the basal ganglia as a candidate structures for the inhibition of motor
responses.  Because cortical and subcortical structures form a loop, it was
proposed that those structures conjointly accomplish response inhibition.  The
data of study 1 indicated, that lesions to those structures can indeed lead to
deficits in the inhibition of ongoing responses.
Of course, the frontal cortex and the basal ganglia are not the whole story
concerning motor control.  Response-generating processes pass through a
number of processing phases.  Most of this processing seems to happen in
parallel, only few studies point to serial processing (Dettmers, 1997).  Goldberg
(1985, 1987) proposed a “dual premotor system hypothesis”, on which also the
model of Band and Boxtel (1999) for response inhibition is based.  Goldberg
(1985, 1987) assumes the existence of two loops, a medial and a lateral loop,
that lead along cortical as well as subcortical motor structures (see Figure 7.1).
In the medial loop, virtually all regions of the cerebral cortex project via the
basal ganglia and motor nuclei of the thalamus back to restricted regions of the
cerebral cortex, most notably the supplementary motor area (SMA).  This loop
is thought to operate in a feed-forward mode and to function as an integrated
system for the selection of responses.  According to Goldberg (1987) it is
primarily this medial system that is responsible for volitional control over
behavior and the capacity for acting autonomously, because the system has the
capacity to act selectively on external information for behavioral cueing.
Response inhibition is thought to be related to the medial loop (Band & Boxtel,
1997).
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Figure 7.1. Schematized diagram containing the most important anatomical
structures involved in response activation and inhibition.  In the medial loop
(depicted in black) widespread regions of the cortex project through the basal
ganglia and thalamus to the SMA.  In the lateral loop (depicted in grey), the
motor, somatosensory and parietal cortices project via the cerebellum and the
thalamus back to premotor and primary motor areas.  The major output from the
motor cortex to the spinal cord and muscles is formed by the pyramidal tract.
The callouts contain the psychophysiological measures reflecting the activity of
the structures to which they point.  FC: frontal cortex; GP: globus pallidus, MI:
primary motor cortex; PC: parietal cortex; PMC: premotor cortex; SI:
somatosensory cortex; SMA: supplementary motor area (adapted from Band &
Boxtel, 1999)
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In the other, the lateral loop, activity from more restricted areas of the cortex,
most notably somatosensory and posterior association areas is focused back
through the cerebellum and specific motor nuclei of the thalamus to the primary
motor cortex.  The function of this feedback-dependent loop is thought to be the
context-dependent adjustment of the parameters of the first loop by translating
sensory information into immediate adjustments of motor activity to improve the
timing and smoothness of actions (Goldberg, 1985).
It becomes apparent from the graph, that it may be worthwhile to investigate
a variety of other brain areas in relation to response inhibition.  Especially the
thalamus, which has been proposed to have a critical role in the information
transmission (Goldberg, 1985) or to have a gating function (Brunia, 1993) would
seem worthwhile an investigation.  Furthermore, Goldberg (1985) assumes that
the  lateral loop functions to perform context-dependent adjustment of the
parameters of the movement strategy selected by the operation of the medial
loop.  Thus, those two loops do not work in isolation, and it might be of interest
to investigate the role of parts of the lateral loop, for example the cerebellum, in
the context of response inhibition.  In addition, although there is insufficient
evidence to support the notion that the SMA is an inhibitory agent  (Band &
Boxtel, 1999), the possibility certainly deserves further investigation.
Speculations: How is response inhibition accomplished by the brain?
A deficit after a lesion to a certain brain area does not tell anything about the
way how brain structures work together.  Several authors have suggested a
hierarchical organization of response control with a higher-level role for the
prefrontal cortex (e.g. Fuster, 1989; Norman & Shallice, 1986).  Between the
leading activity of the prefrontal cortex and the final commands from the primary
motor cortex, there are some preparatory processes of the premotor area and
supplementary motor area (Goldberg, 1985).  The primary motor cortex is the
last cortical level where motor activity can be modulated.  The frontal lobes are
thus thought to cooperate with subcortical structures, but seem to play the
leading role in the control of responses.  The prefrontal cortex is likely to be in
charge, since it is capable of modulating subcortical input to the motor cortex by
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gating the thalamic transmission of associated activity from the basal ganglia
and the cerebellum (Band & Boxtel, 1999; Goldberg, 1985, 1987).
Most models are not very explicit about the mechanism by which the
prefrontal cortex exerts inhibition.  One explicit model was proposed by Brunia
(1993).  Brunia (1993) hypothesized, that selection for action takes place in an
interaction between the prefrontal cortex and subcortical motor structures.  He
furthermore proposed that the site of response selection is in the thalamus.
Cerebellum and basal ganglia outputs are sent to the motor cortex via
interconnection in the reticular nucleus of the thalamus. Important is, that the
transfer in the thalamus takes place under selective control of the prefrontal
cortex, which is responsible for opening and closing the “thalamic gate”.  Brunia
(1993) referred to this mechanism as „gating“. He argued: „For a go command
to be followed, the thalamic motor gate has to be open, whereas a no-go
command implies an active closing of that gate. There is supporting evidence
for the notion that a no-go command is generated in the (pre)frontal cortex“
(Brunia, 1993, p.336).  The gating model can also explain results of studies
showing that response inhibition is associated with heart rate deceleration
(Collet et al., 1999; Jennings et al., 1992).  Brunia assumes that the frontal
areas that are involved in the gating mechanism also influence heart rate
changes related to attention and response intention.  It is thus possible to view
cardiac deceleration in association with inhibition as a correlate of central
inhibition originating from the same areas in the frontal cortex (Band & Boxtel,
1999).
Of course, this theory about how response inhibition could be accomplished
by the brain cannot be proved or rejected with the present research.  It is,
however, an interesting issue to speculate about those mechanisms.  It might
furthermore be interesting to investigate in future studies heart rate changes
and other autonomic responses, like respiration or electrodermal activity, which
have also been shown to be sensitive to response inhibition (Collet et al., 1999),
in patients who show decreased inhibitory efficiency.
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7.3 Inhibitory aftereffects
Persistence of inhibition
Inhibition in the stop signal task seems to have some persistence, carrying over
into further trials.  It has been shown, that inhibitory processes leave
measurable aftereffects in a variety of tasks, for in the example negative priming
tasks of location and identity (for reviews see Fox, 1995; May et al., 1995), the
stroop task (e.g. Neill, 1978; Lowe, 1979; see MacLeod, 1991 for a review) and
the flanker task (e.g. Neill & Valdes, 1995).  Aftereffects of inhibition can thus be
thought to be a general performance principle of human information processing.
Although inhibitory aftereffects in experimental paradigms are operationalized
as an impairment in performance (slower RT), in real life the mechanisms
responsible for those effects do actually serve to facilitate efficient performance.
For example, if distracting information captures someone’s attention this can be
dangerous or irritating.  It has therefore been hypothesized that inhibition in
negative priming tasks may serve to block rejected information from immediate
reactivation and function to facilitate on-line processing of target information by
maintaining the distinction between distracting and goal-relevant information
(May et al., 1995).  The aftereffects of response inhibition may reflect a similar
function.  A just rejected motor program, which has become inappropriate is
blocked from immediate reactivation to facilitate the distinction between goal-
relevant and irrelevant responses.
Inhibitory aftereffects in existing frameworks of inhibition and
speculations about common underlying processes
In the general introduction, we tried to allocate the inhibition of ongoing
responses into different frameworks of inhibition. Harnishfeger (1995) would
describe the inhibition of ongoing responses as “behavioral inhibition”, Logan
(1994) would describe it as active inhibition, and Arbuthnott (1995) would say
that the target of inhibition is the produced unit itself, that the inhibitory
mechanism would be self-inhibition and that there is a direct influence of
intention.  How can we relate the inhibitory aftereffects to the conceptualizations
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mentioned in the introduction?  Harnishfeger (1995) would describe them as
“unintentional cognitive inhibition” and Logan would describe them as “reactive
inhibition”.  It is not clear how Arbuthnott (1995) would describe the target of
inhibition – it might be the produced unit itself or competitors in the task context
(this issue might resolve itself when further investigation of the aftereffects will
be undertaken).  She would say that the influence of intention is indirect (if we
assume the ideal case that participants do not start waiting for the stop signal),
and that the inhibitory mechanims is self-inhibition.  See Table 7.1 for those
characterizations.
Table 7.1 Inhibition of ongoing responses and inhibitory aftereffects in existing
frameworks of inhibition
Stop-signal inhibition Inhibitory aftereffects
Harnishfeger 1995
behavioral inhibition cognitive inhibition, unintended
Logan, 1994
active inhibition reactive inhibition
Arbuthnott, 1995
Target of inhibition:
produced unit itself produced unit itself?
competitors in the task context?
Inhibitory mechanims
self-inhibition self-inhibition
Intention
direct indirect
In Arbuthnott’s (1995) framework it is interesting to note, that self-inhibition
may be the same underlying process in both forms of inhibition.  This points to a
possible way the inhibition of ongoing responses could be related to the
inhibitory aftereffects and how both inhibitory phenomena in this task might be
modeled within an common framework.  However, both phenomena might as
well be modeled by some other model, which describes those phenomena in
terms of associations in working memory (Kimberg & Farah, 1993).  The
possible underlying processes of inhibition of ongoing responses and inhibitory
aftereffects are an interesting issue, and should be investigated in future
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simulation studies.  Any model of the underlying processes should be able to
explain both phenomena in one framework.
Common brain structures for the inhibition of ongoing responses and
inhibitory aftereffects? - Speculations
The inhibitory aftereffects are clearly related to the inhibitory process in the
previous trial.  Does this imply, that the same brain structures play a role in both
phenomena?  Assuming that a common mechanism is responsible for both
phenomena may seem to imply that this would be the case.  However, we have
also argued, that the inhibitory aftereffects might resemble identity negative
priming, which might imply a role for the temporal lobes, which were not
considered as a candidate structure for the inhibition of ongoing responses.
Inhibiting an ongoing response seems to be one process, carrying something
of this inhibition over into the next trial is presumably caused by this process,
but might require another process, and to overcome this residual effect in the
next trial probably still another.  Thus, we think that brain structures related to
the two phenomena should be at least partly overlapping, but that this overlap
does not necessarily have to be total.  One speculation might be, that the frontal
cortex could be a key structure which plays a role in both phenomena, but that
other brain areas may differ.
7.4 Limitations and methodological problems
The design of the stop signal task
A problem in the design of the stop signal task in our patient studies was, that it
was not possible to prevent patients from employing a waiting strategy.  This
behavior is presumably responsible for the partly negative results of the
explorative analysis of inhibitory aftereffects in brain damaged patients.  One
possibility to prevent this in future studies would be to set a smaller response
window and to give feedback about primary task RT and to set goals for
responding fast.  The response window was set to  2500 ms in the current
study, because we wanted to assess patients who were markedly slowed.
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However, only few patients had RTs longer than 1000 ms in the exercise block
of the stop signal task.  Thus, it seems that a response window of 1000 ms
would suffice for most patients.  It should be taken into consideration, to set the
response window individually for each patient in accordance with his or her RT
in the exercise block.  Adjusting the response window individually might not be
suitable for the investigation of inhibitory aftereffects (they might differ with trial
length), but should be considered in the investigation of SSRT in future studies.
One general issue also has to be said about the interpretation of SSRT.  The
SSRT can be influenced by the triggering rate of the inhibitory process.
Failures to trigger the inhibitory mechanism result in longer SSRT.  Longer
SSRTs in that case could be interpreted as either longer RTs to stop signals or
as failures in triggering the stop mechanism.  The conclusion would still be an
inhibitory deficit in some patients, however of a different quality.  In the
simulation studies of Band (1997) a failure to trigger the inhibitory mechanims
was the only factor the tracking procedure could not compensate for (none of
the other procedures to set the delay could either).  If a deficiency in triggering
the inhibitory process is suspected in a given data set, there is no way to correct
the estimation of the stop-process duration (Band, 1997).  It is easier to
evaluate, whether failures to trigger the inhibitory mechanims happened in
datasets with fixed delay procedures, than in data, where the staircase tracking
algorithm is used, like in our patient studies (a participant who is not always
able to trigger the inhibitory process would never be able to reach the
asymptotic no-response level, even when stop-signals are presented well in
advance of the primary task stimulus; Band, 1997).  That failures in triggering
the inhibitory mechanims influenced our data is, however, quite unlikely.
Frequent failures to trigger the inhibitory mechanism should show up in a higher
probability of responding and a short delay of the stop signal.  Occasional
failures of triggering the response mechanism should not have much influence
on the probability of responding, because the delay after a failure will be
shorter, and the probability of responding higher if the mechanism is triggered in
the next stop signal trial.  However, a slight increase in the probability of
responding might still be observed.  Furthermore, participants were under close
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observation throughout the testing session by the examiner and no behavioral
indication of failures in triggering the inhibitory mechanism were observed.
Instead, effort to inhibit responses was visible, even when inhibition was not
successful.  In addition, aftereffects of inhibition were found after successful as
well as after unsuccessful inhibition in all groups.  The stop signal was a clearly
audible tone and difficult to ignore, it might even have had an alerting function.
There were also no failures to trigger the response mechanism in our data (i.e.
there were no omission errors in the trials without stop signal).  The correlations
between primary task RT and SSRT across groups also make it likely, that
speed was the important factor.  Thus, although it can not totally be ruled out
that failures to trigger the inhibitory mechanism happened, this seems quite
unlikely.
Selection of participants
In study 1, patients with cerebrovascular disorders and tumor patients were
investigated.  Patients with intracranial tumors or stroke are the most frequent
participants for neuropsychological research.  Although those two etiologies are
frequently combined in neuropsychological research, this approach suffers from
some problems (Anderson et al., 1990).  The dysfunction caused by stroke
depends largely on direct and radical destruction of neurons.  In contrast,
tumors begin by displacing neuronal structures, and may not actually cause
neuronal destruction for relatively long periods.  The first systematic comparison
of the cognitive impairments between patients with tumor and patients with
stroke based on modern neuropsychological and neuroanatomical procedures
has been undertaken by Anderson et al. (1990).  They tried to match the
location and size of cerebrovascular lesion to the location and size of the tumor
lesions on an a case-by-case basis.  However, tumor growth does not respect
vascular boundaries, it was therefore not possible to match all participants.
Furthermore, tumor participants were somewhat younger than their stroke
counterparts (the age differences in the groups were consistent with age-of-
onset factors in these two pathology types).  Anderson et al. (1990) found
differences in the neuropsychological impairments of the two groups.
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Impairments caused by tumors were generally milder as compared to those
caused be stroke, and there was greater variability in the degree of cognitive
impairment within the tumor group.  Those results are in agreement with the
pathophysiological properties of tumor growth and cerebrovascular disorders. It
was not possible to select participants with only one etiology for study 1 if we
wanted reasonable group sizes.  There was, however, no indication of
differences between cerebrovascular patients and tumor patients in study 1 of
this dissertation.  This issue remains, however, something to be concerned
about and to be investigated in future studies.
A further methodological limitation of the selection of our patients concerns
the matching procedure.  Although we were able to match the groups on
important demographic variables like age, sex and years of education, this was
done on group basis and not on a case by case basis.  As Tupper and
Rosenblood (1984) argue, it is preferable to do the matching on individual
participants rather than on groups.  A case by case match is, however, quite
difficult to accomplish when several patient groups are investigated.
One further issue concerning the patient selection in study 1 was that not all
participants were right handed and some of them had to perform the stop signal
task with their nondominant hand.  That not all participants were right handed is
probably not a great problem, since participants could perform the task with
their preferred hand and we did not compare right vs. left sided lesions.
However, having to perform a task with the nondominant hand might be a
problem.  There is no study which investigates, whether participants are better
in stopping reactions with their preferred hand than the other, so it is uncertain,
what the effect of having to perform the task with the nondominant hand might
be.  This problem is, however, nearly unavoidable in neuropsychology.  Four
patients of the NFG (whole group of twenty) and three patients of the BG (whole
group of eight) had to use the nondominant hand because of paresis.  Of the
three patients of the BG, who had to use the nondominant hand, none was
three standard deviations below the mean of the OG (two of the other BG
patients were), two were two standard deviations below the OG mean.  Thus, it
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is unlikely that the effect of the BG is due to performing the task with the
nondominant hand.
One implicit assumption of the anatomo-clinical correlati n method ins
constancy (Vallar, 1999).  Constancy refers to the notion that investigation of
the organization of the normal mind through brain damaged patients is possible
only if after a cerebral lesion mental processes do not undergo a functional
reorganization that involves the generation of new components or new
connections.  If this is the case, the mental processes of a brain-damaged
patient would be qualitatively different, in terms of functional architecture, from
those of a normal participant.  After damage to a specific component, patients
may develop specific strategies, which are not typically used by normal
participants.  In this case the constancy assumption, however, remains valid,
provided that such strategies are part of the behavioral repertoire of the normal
participant, i.e. they are based on the components of the normal system spared
by the lesion.  The postulate that, at least in adult participants, the
reorganization of the system after a brain lesion does not include qualitative
changes, such as novel components or connections cannot be easily verified.
Data indicate, that some degree of plasticity is a feature of the central nervous
system, in order to cope, at least in part, with the damage produced by a lesion.
This ability does not necessarily imply, however, that the post-lesional
organization is qualitatively different from the normal system.  The constancy
assumption has to be treated with great caution.  Thus, a problem in our patient
selection concerns the inclusion of patients after varying intervals of brain
damage in our studies (most patients were postacute, but some where also
chronic).  This remains an issue for further studies.
Another problem in the patient studies might be, that for some patients CT
scans, for other MRT scans were available for the localization of lesion.  MRT
scans usually provide a better image of the brain structures, and thus lesions
are more easily detected (Hadley & Teasdale, 1988).  It is, however, quite
unlikely that we overlooked lesions in patients in study 1 were only a CT scan
was available, since cerebrovascular and tumor lesions are usually focal and
relatively easy to detect.  The different quality of scans was, however, the
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reason, why we did not build subgroups of TBI, selecting those with frontal
lesions and diffuse damage.  Especially for the evaluation of diffuse damage,
the scans might have been misleading.
One last remark to our selection criteria: we excluded participants with
speech comprehension difficulties to make sure, that task instructions would be
understood.  However, such a procedure can lead to selectively excluding
patients with severe left sided lesions.  This is a general problem in
neuropsychological research, since a prerequisite for the performance of most
tasks is that patients are able to comprehend verbally given instructions.  There
was, however, no indication in our sample that we had more patients with right
sided lesions, most of the frontal patients had bilateral lesions and in the other
groups lesions seemed equally distributed.  There was also no indication in our
data that patients with left-sided lesions were less impaired than patients with
right sided lesions.
Statistical analysis
There are some methodological issues concerning the evaluation of the
correlation of primary task RT and SSRT.  In study 1 we had conducted an
ANCOVA and a comparison of subgroups with similar primary task RTs.  Both
however, are problematic from the methodological perspective.
In ANCOVA, one of the major requirements is the independence of the
independent variable and the covariate.  In practice, this requires random
assignment of participants.  In a study with attribute variables as independent
variables (in our case lesion location) it is very unlikely to have independence of
the treatment and the covariate (Tupper & Rosenblood, 1984).  This is also true
for study 1 – the longer primary task RTs are an effect of brain damage and
thus related to our independent variable.  Most authors, however, accept the
use of ANOCA in quasiexperimental research in cases like ours (Huitema et al.,
1980; Tabachnick & Fidell, 1996).
With respect to the comparison of subgroups with similar primary task RTs it
has to be said that Tupper and Rosenblood (1984) argue against matching
participants ex post facto. They state that “systematic unmatching” occurs when
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participants are equated on a “nuisance” variable.  By holding identified
nuisance variables constant, the result will generally be to systematically
unmatch the pairs with regard to some other (unidentified) nuisance variable(s).
Furthermore, the selected subpopulations are not representative, the matching
procedure identifies a sample from the population that differs systematically
from the population of interest.  Any inferences can only be made to the sample
that has been collected by matching, not to the population.  An additional
problem is that the employed procedure automatically results in the selection of
extreme groups (“fast” brain-damaged and “slow” orthopedic participants),
regression effects are thus likely to apply to those subsamples.
7.5 Perspectives
Some perspectives for future research have already been pointed out in the
sections above and in the discussion sections of the single studies, some more
might, however, be added.  Of course, first of all a cross-validation of the results
has to be done, i.e. the observed effects should be replicated in new samples
(Cohen, 1994).
Perspectives for the investigation of inhibition of ongoing responses in
brain damaged patients
Further interesting studies in the inhibition of responses might be to compare
the performance of brain damaged patients across different inhibition tasks (e.g.
like Kramer et al., 1994 have done it in elderly participants).  A comparison of
the performance in the stop signal task and a go nogo task might for example
be interesting, to evaluate, whether patients with difficulties in one task show
also difficulties in the other.  Also a comparison of the inhibition of ongoing
responses in the stop signal task with inhibitory phenomena in other tasks might
be a worthwhile endeavor.  Associations and dissociations of different inhibitory
phenomena might be investigated this way.
The stop signal task was used in its basic form in the present investigation.
However, stopping an action or response is only the first step towards a new
goal in a changing environment, a general requirement in all kinds of cognitive
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control.  Stopping an action does at least in some cases also imply switching to
another, alternative action (Logan, 1994).  Further investigations could be
directed at the next step after stopping, i.e. a change to another reaction.  This
is something, which can be measured with the stop-change paradigm (e.g.
Logan & Burkell, 1986).  Another interesting investigation in the context of
stopping performance in brain-damaged patients could also be selective
stopping, which resembles situations in which the stop signal is not always a
signal to stop (e.g. a pedestrian walks consciously over the crosswalk, in spite
of the red traffic lights, because he or she is sure that no cars are approaching)
or not everything must be stopped (e.g. one has to stop driving at a junction if
one does not have the right of way, but not if one has).  The former can be
experimentally studied in stopping tasks where two different tones are
presented in the same fashion as stop signals, but only one of the tones signals
the participants to stop the reaction (Riegler, 1986, cited in Logan, 1994).  The
latter can be studied in tasks where participants are asked to selectively inhibit
one response but not another, e.g. only the response assigned to the right index
finder (e.g. DeJong et al., 1995).  Stopping is an extreme form of control.  Many
changes in goals in the environment are more subtle, requiring only to do
something a little bit different. More subtle forms of inhibition are required for
adaptation, rather than cancellation of ongoing behavior (Logan, 1994).  Thus, it
could also be of interest to investigate response inhibition in some kind of
tracking task, where the direction of tracking changes, but tracking has not to be
stopped.
For our hypothesis in study 1 we have frequently referred to patients with
Parkinson’s disease as a model for basal ganglia lesions, since research on
patients with focal basal ganglia lesions is sparse.  However, in Parkinson’s
disease, it is primarily the dopaminergic pathway which is damaged.
Furthermore, connections of the frontal lobes and the basal ganglia are
primarily dopaminergic (e.g. Robbins et al., 1993).  Thus, one might speculate
that dopamine plays a role in the inhibition of ongoing responses.  It could
therefore be interesting to evaluate the inhibition of ongoing responses under
neuropharmacological aspects in brain damaged patients.
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Perspectives for the investigation of inhibitory aftereffects
It still remains an issue to investigate the inhibitory aftereffects produced by the
stop signal task in brain damaged patients with a design suited for this purpose.
However, before this should be done, it would be useful to find out more about
the aftereffects themselves, about the conditions under which they occur, which
factors influence them, to what phenomena they can be related and how they
could be best explained.
For a more detailed evaluation of the factors influencing the inhibitory
aftereffects, it might be worth to vary experimentally the probability of two stop
signals following each other.  In study 3, the probability of two stop signals
following each other was 25% (like the overall probability of a stop signal).
Without changing the overall probability of the stop signal, the probability of two
stop signals after each other could be manipulated, e.g. to 0%, 10%, 20% and
30%.  It would be especially interesting to see whether in the 0% condition
inhibitory aftereffects could also be obtained.  It is known from negative priming
experiments that the expectation of a conflict in the probe trial is sometimes a
necessary condition for the appearance of the negative priming effect (Tipper &
Cranston, 1985, Tipper et al., 1990; for an overview see May et al., 1995).  It
might therefore be that no inhibitory aftereffects could be obtained in a 0%
condition.  However, if stable inhibitory aftereffects can be obtained in a 0%
condition, the trials could be used more efficiently for the investigation of the
aftereffects in further experiments.
A further aspect that might have an influence on the aftereffects is the stop
signal delay.  However, if any effect could be found for the different delays, this
might be confounded by the fact that at earlier delays successful inhibition is
more probable.  Therefore, such an experiment should be conducted with a
large number of trials, and with delays not too far at the ends of the inhibition
function, to be able to compare aftereffects after successful and after
unsuccessful inhibition separately over different delays of the stop signal.
An interesting question would be the timecourse of the inhibitory aftereffects.
In negative priming studies manipulations of the intertrial interval (ITI) within
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blocks often led to a diminuation of the effect with larger ITIs, whereas
manipulation of the ITI between the blocks or between groups often yielded a
relatively constant negative priming effect, regardless of the ITI (Neill et al.
1992; for an overview see May et al., 1995).  It would therefore be of interest to
manipulate the ITI in the stop signal task between and within blocks and / or
groups.
As already mentioned in the explorative analysis, there might be an effect of
the expectation of repetitions or alternations of the primary task symbol on the
inhibitory aftereffects.  In manipulating the probability of repetitions and
alternations (e.g. 30:70, 50:50 and 70: 30) this issue could be investigated.
A further worthwhile investigation would be to allocate two stimuli to each of
the two response buttons.  This would clarify the effects of stronger inhibitory
aftereffects after repetition trials in study 3 further and the issue, whether the
reaction to a specific stimuli or a specific response is inhibited.
It was not possible in study 3 to look at all possible trial order effects, e.g. to
look at two stop signals following each other, or to investigate the effect of the
trial before the stop signal on the stop signal trial, since any effects we would
have obtained would be modified by the four different stop signal delays we had
in this study, which would not have left enough trials (see appendix).  In one
previous study Osman et al. (1986) showed that stimulus-response repetition
showed a greater probability of responding in stop signal trials for a given delay
following repetition than alternation trials.  This effect might, however, not be
specific and simply explained by the horse race model, because faster
responses are less easily to stop than slower at a given delay (reaction times in
their study was faster for repetitions than for alternations).  The study of further
trial order effects in the stop signal task might be an issue worth of further
investigation.
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7.6 Conclusion
The studies of this dissertation revealed some interesting results about
neuroanatomical correlates of the inhibition of ongoing responses and about
inhibitory aftereffects in the stop signal task.  There was some support for the
notion that the frontal lobes and the basal ganglia play a crucial role in the
inhibition of ongoing responses.  In addition, results showed that inhibitory
aftereffects are present in the stop signal task.  Necessarily, since this was the
first time inhibition of ongoing responses was investigated with the stop signal
task in brain-damaged patients, and since this was also the first investigation of
inhibitory aftereffects in the stop signal task, this research raises a lot of
questions for future studies.
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8. Summaries
8.1 English summary
The term “inhibition” refers to mechanisms that reduce or dampen neuronal,
mental or behavioral activity.  On the behavioral and cognitive level inhibition is
important when a task is finished, when a goal is no longer relevant, when an
error needs to be corrected and when appropriate stimuli have to be selected
and inappropriate rejected.  Inhibition is however, not a unitary concept, several
distinct forms of inhibition can be distinguished.
In this dissertation inhibitory phenomena were investigated in brain-damaged
patients and healthy persons with the use of the stop signal task (Logan &
Cowan, 1984).  This task has the advantage that the time it takes to stop an
ongoing reaction can be measured (stop signal reaction time, SSRT).  The first
aim of this dissertation was to investigate neuroanatomical correlates of the
inhibition of ongoing responses with the anatomo-clinical-correlation method
(study 1 and 2).  The second aim was to investigate the consequences of the
inhibition of ongoing responses for the next trial in the stop signal task (study 3).
Theories and research results point to the importance of circuits linking the
basal ganglia and the frontal cortex in executive function and motor control (e.g.
response inhibition).  Therefore in study 1, the role of the frontal lobes and the
basal ganglia in the inhibition of ongoing responses was investigated.
Seventeen patients with frontal lesions (FG), 20 patients with cortical lesions
outside the frontal cortex (NFG), 8 patients with lesions to the basal ganglia
(BG) and 20 orthopedic controls (OG) performed the stop-signal task.  The FG
as well as the BG showed significantly longer SSRTs than the OG.  No
significant differences in SSRT could be found between the NFG and any other
group.  However, effect sizes between the FG and the BG in comparison to the
NFG were of medium range.  Results provide some evidence for a role of the
frontal lobes and the basal ganglia in the inhibition of ongoing reactions.
In study 2, the inhibition of ongoing responses was investigated in patients
with traumatic brain injury (TBI), an etiology of brain-damage where frontal
lesions are highly prevalent.  Therefore, it might be assumed that brain-
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damaged patients with this etiology also show deficits in the inhibition of
ongoing responses.  A group of 27 patients with TBI (TBI) and a group of 27
orthopedic control patients (OC) performed the stop signal task.  Contrary to
expectations, patients with TBI as a group did not show significantly longer
SSRTs. It seems therefore likely, that deficits in the complete suppression of
responses are not very common after TBI.
In the third study it was investigated, whether the inhibition of ongoing
responses leaves measurable inhibitory aftereffects.  Aftereffects of inhibition
like the negative priming effect are well-known and focus of intensive research.
It seemed reasonable to assume that the use of inhibitory processes leaves
measurable aftereffects in a variety of other tasks and situations.  The data of
34 students, who had performed the stop signal task were analyzed for
inhibitory aftereffects.  The results indicated that inhibitory aftereffects were
present in the stop signal task whether or not participants were successful in
inhibiting their reactions. They were greater after unsuccessful than after
successful inhibition.  Moreover, inhibitory aftereffects were greater when both
trials consisted of the same primary task symbols.  Strategic effects might
explain part of the results of this study, but there was evidence that specific
inhibition of either the stimulus, or the response to that stimulus, or both play a
role in the constitution of the aftereffects.
In an explorative investigation the data of study 1 and study 2 were analyzed
in respect to inhibitory aftereffects.  Inhibitory aftereffects were again obtained
after successful as well as after unsuccessful inhibition, this was the case in all
groups.  However, none of the specific effects became significant and no
significant group differences emerged.  Results of this analysis must, however,
remain inconclusive, since specific effects might have been obscured by the
tendency of participants to wait in the experimental blocks during the
performance of the stop signal task.
The studies of this dissertation reveal some interesting results about
neuroanatomical correlates of the inhibition of ongoing responses and about
inhibitory aftereffects in the stop signal task.  Necessarily, since this was the
first time the inhibition of ongoing responses was investigated with the stop
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signal task in brain-damaged patients, and since this was also the first
investigation of inhibitory aftereffects in the stop signal task, the current
research raises a lot of questions for future studies.
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8.2 Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Der Begriff „Inhibition“ bezieht sich auf Mechanismen, die neuronale, kognitive
oder Verhaltensaktivität reduzieren.  Inhibition ist wichtig, wenn eine Aufgabe
beendet ist, wenn ein Ziel nicht länger relevant ist, wenn ein Fehler korrigiert
werden muß oder wenn geeignete Stimuli ausgewählt und nicht geeignete
zurückgewiesen werden müssen.  Inhibition ist kein einheitliches Konzept,
mehrere unterschiedliche Formen der Inhibition können unterschieden werden.
In der vorliegenden Dissertation wurden Inhibitionsprozesse unter
Verwendung der Stop Signal Aufgabe bei hirngeschädigten und bei gesunden
Personen untersucht.  Die Stop Signal Aufgabe ermöglicht es die Zeit zu
schätzen, die benötigt wird, um eine bereits initiierte Reaktion zu hemmen (Stop
Signal Reaktionszeit, SSRT).  Das erste Ziel dieser Arbeit war es, die
neuroanatomischen Korrelate der Inhibition bereits initiierter Reaktionen mit der
anatomisch-klinischen Korrelationsmethode zu untersuchen (Studie 1 und 2).
Das zweite Ziel war die Untersuchung der Konsequenzen der Hemmung bereits
initiierter Reaktionen für das nächste Trial in der Stop Signal Aufgabe (Studie
3).
In der ersten Studie wurden die Rolle der Frontallappen und der
Basalganglien bei der Inhibition bereits initiierter Reaktionen untersucht.  Hierzu
führten siebzehn Patienten mit Läsionen im frontalen Kortex (FG), 20 Patienten
mit kortikalen Läsionen außerhalb des frontalen Kortex (NFG), 8 Patienten mit
Läsionen an den Basalganglien (BG) und 20 orthopädische Kontrollpersonen
(OG) die Stop Signal Aufgabe durch.  Die FG und die BG zeigten signifikant
längere SSRTs als die OG.  Es wurden keine signifikanten Unterschiede
zwischen der NFG und den anderen Gruppen in der SSRT gefunden.  Die
Effektstärken zwischen der FG und der BG im Vergleich zur NFG lagen jedoch
im mittleren Bereich.  Die Ergebnisse deuten darauf hin, daß die Frontallappen
und die Basalganglien an der Inhibition bereits initiierter Reaktionen beteiligt
sind.
In der zweiten Studie wurde der Frage nachgegangen, ob Inhibitionsdefizite
nach traumatischen Hirnschädigungen auftreten.  Hierzu wurden eine Gruppe
von 27 Patienten mit einem Schädelhirntrauma (SHT) und eine Gruppe von 27
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orthopädischen Patienten mit der Stop Signal Aufgabe untersucht.  Patienten
mit einem SHT zeigten als Gruppe keine signifikant längeren SSRTs als
orthopädische Kontrollpersonen.  Dies kann als Hinweis darauf gewertet
werden, daß Defizite in der Hemmung bereits initiierter Reaktionen nach einen
SHT nicht sehr häufig sind.
In der dritten Studie wurde untersucht, ob die Inhibition bereits initiierter
Reaktionen meßbare Auswirkungen auf nachfolgende Durchgänge hat.  Die
Daten von 34 gesunden Versuchspersonen, die die Stop Signal Aufgabe
durchgeführt hatten, wurden hierzu analysiert.  Nacheffekte traten sowohl nach
erfolgreicher als auch nach nicht erfolgreicher Inhibition auf.  Die Nacheffekte
waren nach nicht erfolgreicher Inhibition größer als nach erfolgreicher Inhibition.
Auch waren die Nacheffekte bei identischen Stimuli in der Primäraufgabe
größer als bei nicht-identischen Stimuli.  Auch wenn strategische Effekte die
Ergebnisse teilweise erklären können, ergaben sich Hinweise darauf, daß ein
spezifischer Inhibitionsmechanismus bei der Entstehung der Nacheffekte eine
Rolle spielt.
In einer explorativen Analyse wurden die Daten der Studien 1 und 2 in
Hinblick auf inhibitorische Nacheffekte ausgewertet.  Nacheffekte traten
wiederum sowohl nach erfolgreicher als auch nach nicht erfolgreicher Inhibition
auf.  Spezifische Effekte wurden jedoch nicht signifikant.  Die Ergebnisse dieser
Analyse lassen jedoch keine endgültigen Schlußfolgerungen zu, da die Daten
nur bedingt zur Untersuchung der inhibitorischen Nacheffekte geeignet waren.
Die Studien dieser Dissertation beinhalten einige interessante Ergebnisse
über neuroanatomische Korrelate der Inhibition bereits initiierter Reaktionen
und über inhibitorische Nacheffekte in der Stop Signal Aufgabe. Da dies die
erste Untersuchung der Inhibition bereits initiierter Reaktionen mit der Stop
Signal Aufgabe bei hirngeschädigten Patienten ist und auch die erste
Untersuchung über inhibitorische Nacheffekte in der Stop Signal Aufgabe,
werfen die Ergebnisse viele weitere spannende Fragen für die zukünftige
Forschung auf.
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Study 1: Localization of lesions in the frontal group
Frontal lesion
Etiology / Diagnosis Basal –
medial
Dorso-
lateral
Mesial Orbital
Infarct basal of the anterior horns 3 0 0 0
SAB A. carotis interna 0 2 0 0
SAB, A. communicans anterior 1 0 1 0
Tumor 0 3 3 0
Astrozytoma 0 2 0 0
SAB, AV-malformation 2 0 0 0
SAB A. communicans anterior 3 0 3 0
Olfactoriusmeningioma 3 0 3 3
SAB A. communicans anterior 0 1 0 0
Convexity meningioma 0 2 0 0
SAB A. carotis interna 0 2 0 0
SAB A. pericallosa 3 0 3 0
Meningioma fronto-basal 3 3 3 3
SAB, A. communicans anterior 2 0 3 0
Meningioma 3 0 3 0
SAB Ramus A. communicans anterior 0 3 0 0
SAB, A. communicans anterior 0 3 3 0
1= right  2= left, 3 bilateral; SAB = subarachnoid hemorrhage; A. = arteria
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Study 1: Localization of lesions in the non-frontal group
Non-frontal lesion
Etiology / Diagnosis Temporal Parietal Occipital
Infarct, Stenosis A. carotis interna, origin 0 2 0
SAB, A. cerebri media 2 0 0
SAB A. basilaris 1 1 0
Infarct 1 0 0
Tumor 0 2 0
Infarct 0 2 2
SAB A. cerebri media 2 2 0
Infarct 2 2 0
Glioblastom corpus collosum
Tumor 0 2 2
Infarct periventricular medulla 1 0 0
Glioblastoma 0 2 2
Infarct A. cerebri media 2 2 0
SAB 0 1 0
SAB, Pica-Aneurysma 1 0 0
Parenchymatous hemorrhage 1 1 0
Infarct A. communicans media 1 1 0
Meningioma medial sphenoid bone 0 0 0
SAB 0 2 0
Meningioma medial sphenoid bone 2 0 0
1= right  2= left, 3 bilateral; SAB = subarachnoid hemorrhage; A. = arteria
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Study 1: The go nogo task in patients with focal lesions
Author(s),
Year
Participants Method Results
Decary &
Richer,
1995
- 8 frontal (6r, 2l)
- 8 temporal (4r, 4l)
- 8 controls
(resection for relieve
of epilepsy!, at least
one year after
surgery)
- 3 go nogo
(equiprobable,
15:85; 85:15)
- several other RT
tasks
go nogo
Response times: no group effect
Error Rates: F more errors
Drewe,
1975
12 LF
12 RF
12 R NF
12 L NF
- go nogo
- several other RT
tasks
go nogo
- F more errors than NFs
- NFs improved over blocks Fs not
- LFs did not differ from RFs
Drewe,
1975
12 LF
12 RF
12 R NF
12 L NF
go - no go learning:* no difference LF + RF
* F were impaired in
- number of patients reaching
criterion
- trials to criterion
- errors
- more false positive errors
=> even after reaching criterion F
patients had some difficulty
Leimkuhler
&
Mesulam,
1985
50-year-old woman
large meningioma in
the falx involving the
medial aspects of the
frontal lobes
bilaterally
many errors of commission in the go-
no go test.
Following surgical excision of the
tumor, her go-no go performance
became normal.
Malloy et
al.,
1993
32 yr., orbitomedial
frontal lesion
go nogo deficits
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Study1: Correlation SSRT and primary task RT
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Study 2: The go nogo task in patients with TBI
Author(s),
Year
Participants Method Results
Cremona-
Meteyard
& Geffen,
1994
11 CHI
8 CON
go nogo
ERPs
TBI did not show the normal CNV after no go
cues (interpretation as perseverative behavior)
Braun et
al.,
1989
22 CHI
22 Controls
several RT
tasks.
paradigms designed to elicit commission errors
(a go/no-go paradigm, and a paradigm with
prestimulus warning on a random interstimulus
interval) were the most sensitive, particularly
error rate measures for these tasks.
Collins &
Long,
1996
47 impaired TBI
47 nonimpaired
TBI
48 controls
(students!).
simple and
choice
reaction time
(RT) (go
nogo!)
Impairment
Index
Median RT scores were better able to
discriminate between impaired TBI patients and
normal controls;
go nogo yielded a better classification rate (not
statistically significant)
intraindividual variability of RT scores was better
able to discriminate between nonimpaired TBI
patients and normal controls.
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Delays, Reaction times and probability of responding for stop-signal trials, depending upon the properties of trial n-1 for all
trials and separated for same and different symbols in both trials (trial n as a stop signal trial).
Trial n: stop signal trial
successful inhibition no inhibition All Stop Signal Trials
Trial n-1
Average
delay
M (SD)
Number of
trials per
participant
M (SD)
Average
delay
M (SD)
Number of
trials  per
participant
M (SD)
RT in ms
M (SD)
Number of
trials per
participant
M (SD)
Average
delay
M (SD)
P(respond)
M (SD)
all trials
no signal
stop signal, successful inhibition
stop signal, no inhibition
130 (67)
215 (69)
189 (66)
62 ( 7)
8 (3)
8 (2)
348 (74)
369 (65)
299 (108)
39 (6)
8 (2)
2 (2)
482 (53)
492 (59)
 483 (105)
102 (5)
17 (3)
11 (2)
215 (64)
292 (59)
211 (68)
39 (6)
50 (14)
19 (14)
same symbols
no signal
stop signal, successful inhibition
stop signal, no inhibition N=29
117 (67)
249 (78)
233 (68)
28 (4)
3 (1)
1 (1)
350 (71)
403 (58)
378 (112)
17 (3)
5 (1)
1 (1)
485 (54)
514 (75)
490 (70)
45 (2)
8 (1)
2 (1)
203 (64)
345 (60)
318 (110)
37 (7)
62 (15)
55 (40)
different symbols
no signal
stop signal, successful inhibition
stop signal, no inhibition
141 (67)
196 (71)
183 (66)
34 (5)
6 (2)
8 (2)
349 (78)
310 (69)
231 (91)
23 (4)
3 (2)
1 (1)
481 (58)
464 (63)
  477 (157)
57 (4)
9 (2)
9 (1)
224 (64)
244 (59)
192 (66)
 40 (7)
39 (17)
14 (14)
Note: The data of all 34 participants were not available for all conditions.
It would be an interesting issue to analyze all possible trial combinations for aftereffects.  The current data set does however not make
such an analysis sensible.  The table shows the values for aftereffects where the second trial is a stop signal.  The probability of
responding varies in the different conditions. (F(2, 66)=104.36, p>0.0001) all contrasts were significant. However, the same analysis for
average delay as a dependent variable also yielded a significant effect (F(2,66)=255, p>0.0001).  This is due to the fact, that during the
experiment, after a late delay, where it is more difficult to inhibit a reaction, it was more probable to have an early delay and vice versa.
Thus, it is not possible to differentiate between effects of the previous trial and the effects of stop signal delay.  Furthermore, there is
another problem: trial numbers are quite low  and for the separation between symbols there were not even for all participants data
available.
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